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Abstract 
It is only 28 years ago since children's right gained comprehensive legal protection both 
at the UN level and the African regional level through the adoption of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child and the African Children's Charter respectively. Over the 
years a lot has been written to give context to the provisions of these instruments both 
at the global level and particularly at the African regional level. This contribution 
acknowledges and adds to the wealth of literature already written by children's right 
experts as it pays particular attention to one of the most delicate rights ascribed to 
children in article 12 of the CRC and article 4(2) of the African Children's Charter 
protecting children's right to participation. Research on children’s right to participation 
in particular, is still embryonic in Africa and this contribution dares to exploit the 
unfortunate gap created by such limited research. The author acknowledges that the 
scarcity of research exploring the applicability of children’s right to participation could 
be based on the diversity of cultural and parenting styles extant in Africa. This 
contribution also holds that the limited application of children’s right to participation 
in family decision-making processes is also exacerbated by the strong position of 
parental responsibilities and rights in Africa. 
The author introduces the State as an ice breaker into the family environment 
to protect the best interests of the child especially in cases where decisions taken during 
family decision-making processes with or without a child's participation is not in the 
best interests of the child. To justify the rational of state intervention into the family, the 
author argues that there is nothing like a parent-child relationship without the state 
because, the state is the source of laws which established such relationships. To 
demonstrate this, the author introduces the balance model to best define the role of the 
state, parents and the child in a family decision-making process.  
This thesis is divided into two parts, although not expressly. Part one consists of 
chapters two, three and four. These chapters provide the contextual background to the 
legal protection of children’s right to participation. Each chapter is tailored to feed the 
preceding chapter as the work unfolds. Chapter four in particular, is in the middle of the 
two parts, as it attempts, succinctly, to portray, thanks to classical examples from South 
Africa and Cameroon (reasoning for limitation provided in the introductory paragraph 
of chapter four), the various practical (legal and policy frameworks) and institutional 
support provided by state parties to support, facilitate, and redress any issues related to 
their mandate to promote children’s right to participation in general and specifically in 
family decision-making processes. The second part of this thesis feeds from the context 
xiv 
laid in the first part and consists of chapters five, six and seven. These chapters are 
complimentary to one another and crucial to the context discussed in the earlier 
chapters. For example, chapter five analyses the role of the state and the parents in giving 
children the space and time to participate in family decision-making processes and to 
give their view due weight. Chapter six builds on such roles in the context of children’s 
right to participate in health and medical decisions concerning them and chapter seven 
introduces a balance model to enable better and comprehensive attainment of children’s 
right to participate in family decision-making processes in Africa. 
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Sammanfattning 
Det är bara 28 år sedan barns rättigheter erhöll ett omfattande skydd både på FN-nivå 
och på den regionala afrikanska nivån genom antagandet av konventionen om barns 
rättigheter och den afrikanska barnstadgan. Under åren har det skrivits mycket som 
placerat dessa instruments stadganden i ett globalt och afrikanskt sammanhang. Detta 
bidrag noterar och utgör ett tillägg till den uppsjö av litteratur som redan skrivits av 
experter på barns rättigheter. Det lägger särskild vikt på en av de mest känsliga 
rättigheterna som barn tillerkänts, nämligen artikel 12 i barnkonventionen och artikel 
4(2) i den afrikanska barnstadgan som skyddar barns rätt till deltagande. Särskilt 
forskningen kring barns rätt till deltagande är fortfarande i startgroparna i Afrika och 
detta bidrag utnyttjar den olyckliga lucka som skapats av denna begränsade forskning. 
Författaren medger att denna brist på forskning kan bero på mångfalden av kulturer och 
uppfostringsmetoder i Afrika. Detta bidrag hävdar också att den begränsade 
tillämpningen av barns rätt till deltagande i beslutsprocesser inom familjen förstärks av 
den starka ställning som föräldrarnas skyldigheter och rättigheter har i Afrika. 
Författaren introducerar staten som en isbrytare i familjeomgivningen för att 
skydda barnets bästa framförallt i fall där beslut som tas i beslutsprocesser inom 
familjen, med eller utan barnets deltagande, inte är i barnets bästa intresse. Författaren 
motiverar statens inblandning i familjen med att det inte existerar något förhållande 
mellan barn och föräldrar utan staten, eftersom staten är källan till den lagstiftning som 
etablerar dessa förhållanden. För att demonstrera detta introducerar författaren en 
balansmodell för att bäst definiera statens, föräldrarnas och barnets roll i 
beslutsprocesser inom familjen. 
Denna avhandling är indelad i två delar, om än inte uttryckligen. Del ett består av 
kapitel två, tre och fyra. Dessa kapitel tillhandahåller den kontextuella bakgrunden till 
det rättsliga skyddet av barns rätt till deltagande. Varje kapitel är utformat så att det 
bygger på det föregående kapitlet medan arbetet utvecklas. Framförallt kapitel fyra ligger 
mellan dessa två delar, då det strävar till att koncist porträttera de olika former av 
praktiskt (rättsliga och politiska ramar) och institutionellt stöd som konventionsstaterna 
tillhandahåller för att stöda, främja och rättsligt pröva frågor som rör deras mandat att 
befrämja barns rätt till deltagande i allmänhet och i synnerhet i beslutsprocesser inom 
familjen. Detta sker med hjälp av klassiska exempel från Sydafrika och Kamerun 
(motiveringen till avgränsningen tillhandahålls i den första paragrafen i kapitel fyra). 
Avhandlingens andra del bygger på den kontext som getts i den första delen och består 
av kapitel fem, sex och sju. Dessa kapitel kompletterar varandra och är avgörande för 
xvi 
det sammanhang som diskuterats i de tidigare kapitlen. Kapitel fem analyserar till 
exempel statens och föräldrarnas roll i att ge barn utrymme och tid att delta i 
beslutsprocesser inom familjen och att ge deras åsikter vederbörlig vikt. Kapitel sex 
behandlar dessa roller ifråga om barns rätt att delta i beslut som rör deras hälsa och 
medicinska frågor och kapitel sju introducerar en balansmodell för att möjliggöra bättre 
och mer omfattande uppnående av barns rätt att delta i beslutsprocesser inom familjen. 
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Background 
It is probably safe to hold that the inclusion of the right to participation in a children’s 
rights treaty is perhaps the strongest signal of hope and intent by the international 
community to not only grant children ‘rights’ but to also grant them the opportunity to 
have a view in the enjoyment of their rights. At the global level, this right has been given 
legal context through the provision of article 12 of the CRC and, at the African regional 
level, through article 4(2) of the ACRWC. Reading both provisions for the first time, one 
is quickly drawn to the fact that children’s right to participation is not a stand-alone 
right, it is in fact a cluster of rights,1 more so because its comprehensive interpretation 
and understanding spills over to include sister provisions such as children’s right to 
freedom of expression and children’s right to have their best interest given paramount 
consideration in any matter that concerns them. 
Its relationship with other rights portrays it as a binding force, as a right that is 
seated right at the epicentre of the broader structure of child law jurisprudence. It could 
also be looked at as a right which does not only grant children access to other rights but 
also ensures that they are involved in the implementation of their rights. Indeed, 
Freeman, writing in 1996, regards children’s right to participation as the kingpin of 
children’s rights jurisprudence.2 Parkes, in 2013, portrays it as a perfect fit in enabling 
children to share their views on key issues such as a child’s health and education.3 
However, despite these glorious depictions it is worth noting that other scholars 
presented have different perspectives. For instance, Sloth-Nielsen in 2008 classified it as 
something of a fashion item on the children rights agenda4 and Lynch, in 2002, branded 
it as a right that assigns children with a daunting task.5 A point worth noting is that these 
                                                            
1  See chapters two and three below for further analysis on these related rights. 
2  M Freeman ‘The importance of a children’s rights perspective in litigation’ (1996) 2(4) Butterworths 
Family Law Journal 84 – 90. 
3  A Parkes Children and international human rights law: The right of the child to be heard (2013). 
4  J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Seen and heard? New frontiers in child participation in family law proceedings in South 
Africa’ (2009) 2 Speculum Juris 1. 
5  N Lynch ‘Restorative justice through a children’s rights lens’ (2010) 18(2) International Journal on 
Children’s Rights 179. 
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diverging perspectives simply go far to confirm the complicated nature of this right – 
both in its interpretation and implementation. This thesis regards it as new wine poured 
into an old bottle. 
Generally, children’s right to participation, as portrayed throughout this thesis, is 
a crucial but ambitious right that might and might not be (comprehensively) available 
to children. Despite it being more than 25 years since both the CRC and the ACRWC 
were adopted, it is not difficult, especially through the lens of children’s right to 
participation, to note that these treaties have not been comprehensively understood and 
implemented. One other reason and what also forms the crux of this thesis is the fact 
that this right, unlike some other rights in both treaties, requires implementation both 
in the public and private spheres. Over the years, a plethora of research has concentrated 
on facilitating its interpretation in the public sphere, with very little focus on the private 
sphere, specifically the family environment. Some of these contributions have been 
analysed below in the literature review section and further in the chapters below.  
2. Problem statement 
Children’s right to participation is, amongst others, one of the highlights of both the 
CRC and the ACRWC. Jointly, both instruments are and remain a medium for the 
realisation of children’s rights in Africa. Other mediums that also highlight this right 
and likewise are applicable to children have been sporadically considered in the chapters 
below.  Worth noting at this stage, though, is the fact that the inclusion and/or protection 
of children’s right to participation as a justiciable right in these instruments indicates a 
strong dash of hope that the right will transcend beyond the statement of legal rhetoric. 
Subsequently, a comprehensive understanding of what exactly constitutes children’s 
right to participation in Africa would somehow require a thorough analysis of this right 
as it applies to children.  
Sadly, the commitment and participation of children in statutory child protection 
systems in most African countries continue to receive narrow theoretical and policy 
attention. As demonstrated below, although most states have made attempts to 
incorporate children’s right to participation in national legal and policy instruments, 
through which they have committed to protect and promote a child’s right to 
participation amongst all stakeholders within the child protection system, it is 
acknowledged that the system in most African countries, as also displayed sporadically 
below, lack a consistent framework for capturing their opinions in the development of 
policy, law, services and practice. 
3 
It is, therefore, obvious that despite the frequent violations of children’s right to 
participation, extant in Africa generally, there has not been much research on the 
implementation (as has been the case in Europe, for instance) in dissecting this crucial 
children’s right, especially in family decision-making processes that affect their well-
being in Africa.6 Such a drought of literature and research extensively weakens the level 
of awareness of the critical need to pay particular attention to this right as it applies to 
children. It is this gap that this thesis intends to analyse, with specific and thorough 
examination of children’s participation in the private space – the family. The rational 
for this interest (family) is influenced by the specific notion of, and respect for, the role 
families play at the African level in the upbringing of a child - also reflected in several 
provisions of the ACRWC and the CRC.  
3. Research questions 
The underlying question which this thesis wishes to answer is to what extent children’s 
right to participation is protected both in international, African and national legal and 
policy frameworks. It also wishes to answer questions concerning the applicability of 
such legal provisions within the family, especially during decision-making processes on 
matters concerning a child. Similarly, this thesis intends to answer other related 
questions which include:  
a) To what extent is childhood conceptualised and understood in typical African 
ideologies? 
b) Is there, legally or otherwise, any ‘special’ African concept of family? 
c) Do children have a right to participate in family decision-making processes on all 
matters that concern them and to what extent, especially taking into consideration 
a child’s age, should this right be applicable? 
                                                            
6  Most of the literature I have reviewed thus far has focused on the situation in specific European 
countries and the CRC and very little on Africa and the ACRWC. For instance, see H Matthews & M 
Limb ‘The right to say: The development of youth councils/forums within the United Kingdom’ 
1998 The Royal Geographical Society;  A Ben-Arieh ‘Where are the children? Children's role in 
measuring and monitoring their well-being’ (2005) 74 Social Indicators Research and A Ben-Arieh ‘The 
child indicators movement: Past, present, and future’ (2008) 1(1) Child Indicators Research 3–16. 
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d) Is a child’s age important in the decision to be included or not to be included in a 
family decision-making process, and is it equally important in ascertaining the 
weight given to a child’s opinion expressed on a matter which concerns him/her? 
e) International law, African regional law and several African national laws recognise 
that children do have a right to health – in the context of this thesis, does a child 
have a right to participate in a health-related family decision-making process on a 
matter which concerns him or her and to what extent should a child’s opinion be 
taken seriously and when can it be avoided? 
f) Do parents and other adults have a responsibility to help, to ensure a clear message 
and comprehensive information for a child, and to ensure better quality of a child’s 
participation and decisions? 
g) Following from (question e and f) in case such engagement fails or is not 
favourably executed in the best interests of the child, should state intervention into 
the private space of family decision-making processes be encouraged? 
These are the main questions which this thesis intends to address. Other minor 
questions have been raised and answered sporadically as the chapters unfold. 
4. Objectives of the study 
This thesis takes the view that through the adoption of human rights instruments, and in 
particular the CRC and the ACRWC, and further domestication of these instruments, 
African member states had in mind the best interests of the child and the goal to effectively 
realise their rights in Africa. Generally, as noted from the questions above, the thesis aims 
at uncovering the role of the state and parents in protecting and promoting children’s 
right to participation in the private space. The study also intends to test the effective 
implementation of this right alongside children’s right to health and access to medical 
treatment – specifically, the thesis wishes to achieve the following goals: 
h) Show that children are generally entitled to be given satisfactory special treatment 
and consideration with regard to the enjoyment of their right to participation, 
especially in issues concerning them directly; 
i) Explore the relevant legislative and other domestic legal guarantees in Africa in 
general, with a vision to assess the extent to which they conform to international 
human rights standards for children with regards to their right to participation; 
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j) Analyse the centrality of children’s right to participation as protected in both the 
ACRWC and the CRC to include family decision-making processes, analyse the 
strength and limits of parental authority; recommend a stronger role of the state 
through state (agencies) intervention; 
k) Examine practical situations through case law, to weigh the extent to which 
children have participated in decision-making processes within the family and 
precisely in relation to their right to health and whether they are consonant with 
current norms of human rights as in (b) above, and 
l) Propose a model through which children could be involved and due weight given 
to their views in family decision-making processes. 
It should be noted that throughout this thesis, the analyses provided on the issues 
questioned are not intended to suggest the complete collapse of all existing related 
practices, ideas, institutions, legal and policy frameworks. Rather, the prime intention is 
to highlight the dynamics of one complex right intended to contribute to children’s 
individual and/or collective freedom and their right to be involved in shaping their own 
well-being. In summary, this thesis is premised to encourage the gritty protection, 
promotion and fulfilment of children’s right to participate in family decision-making 
processes. It aims to encourage the synergy in the interest of legitimising children’s 
rights and parental responsibilities, authority and rights, and also, to investigate the role 
of the state in regulating religious, cultural and political practices that could affect a 
child’s upbringing. Lastly, this thesis affirms the positive place of a child’s participation 
in all matters that concern him or her within the family setting. 
5. Significance of the study 
The brief for this thesis is to analyse the current legal and policy framework extant in 
Africa and the practice around children's participation in Africa, and specifically in 
family decision-making processes in order to underline themes and issues from this 
context which can assist in the advancement of the implementation of this crucial 
children’s right especially in the family. However, currently it is difficult to provide a 
synopsis of the practice across Africa, as in some cases this right has been implemented 
in a partial and intermittent fashion, in most cases influenced by local custom. Certainly, 
the lack of in-depth research on this subject in particular, and the need to better 
understand the various roles that children play in society are critical.  
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However, that does not repudiate the significance of this right both to children and 
their proper transition from childhood to adulthood, their relationship with other 
human beings and a candid confirmation of their ability to have a say in both the 
claiming and enjoyment of their human rights. At the global level, 2017 marks the end 
of the UN’s 15-year plan on children’s rights adopted in 2002 during the first ever UN 
special session on children’s rights after the adoption of the CRC. The coincidental 
overlap of the end of this 15-year plan and the defense of this thesis in 2017 makes this 
thesis timely and crucial. Also, this study will be significant as it will, from an overview 
of available literature, legislation and case law, provide an in-depth analysis in the area 
of children’s right to participation at the African regional level with specific focus on 
their right to health. 
6. Literature review 
The background for this research is the growing and continuously expanding literature 
on children’s rights, particularly strong from the last decade of the 20th Century to date. 
Generally, since the adoption of both the CRC and the ACRWC much has been written 
with regard to the recognition and enforcement of children’s rights. Similarly, much 
research has been conducted on the specific aspects of the four guiding principles of 
children’s rights.7 As a result, this review only affords a succinct outline of some of the 
pertinent work already done in the area, with specific focus on children’s right to 
participation, identifying in the process some of the limitations of the existing literature 
which, in turn, form the justifications for this thesis. At this point, the literature outlined 
is not comprehensive but the review process is continuous throughout this thesis, as 
other pieces of literature are introduced as the thesis unfolds. 
The literature reviewed has been obtained from primary and secondary sources. 
The primary sources comprise authoritative records of law made by law-making 
authorities on children’s rights and with focus on or relation to the rights associated to 
a child’s right to participation. At the international level, there is a plethora of literature 
reflecting on such subject matters as the evolution of children’s rights, the enhancement 
                                                            
7  These include: Non-discrimination, Best interests of the child, Right to life, survival and development, 
Respect for the views of the child. 
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of the CRC, and the nature of the responsibilities it provokes.8 However, some 
contributions have focused on analysing the specific rights embedded in the CRC, such 
as the right to participation.9 Even though it could be argued that such literature has 
dealt with the subject this study intends to cover, it should however be noted that most 
of the analyses are strictly based on experiences in Europe and the implementation of 
the CRC there. The African experience is passive and lacks in-depth analysis.10 
At the African regional level, since the adoption of the ACRWC and the 
subsequent creation and appointment of the African Committee of Experts on the 
Rights of the Child, the ACRWC has benefited from a massive amount of research 
geared towards tracing its evolution,11 analysing the effects of the transition between the 
then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the African Union (AU),12 enriching its 
specific rights and critiquing its objectives.13 Some have focused on strengthening 
children’s right to participation within some AU structures such as New Partnership of 
                                                            
8  See, for example, G Van Bueren The international law on the rights of the child (1995) 136; MS Pais The 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (1997) United Nations Manual Human Rights Reporting Under Six 
Major International Human Rights Instruments 427; Ben-Arieh (n 6 above); H Matthews & M Limb (n 6 
above); R Wallace International human rights text and materials (2001); Budd et al ‘Clinical assessment 
of parents in child protection cases: An empirical analysis’ (2001) Law and Human Behavior 93-108; E 
Fuchs ‘Children’s rights and the global civil society’ (2007) 43(3) Comparative Education 393-412; J Sloth-
Nielsen ‘The ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Some 
complications for South Africa’ (1995) 11 South African Journal on Human Rights 401-420; G Melton & 
B Wilcox ‘Children’s law: Toward a new realism’ (2001) 25(1) Law and Human Behavior 3-12; and D 
Reynaert ‘A review of children’s rights literature since the adoption of the United Nations Convention on 
the Rights of the Child’ (2009) 16 Childhood 518-534. 
9  See for example, G Lansdown Can you hear me? The right of young children to participate in decisions 
affecting them (2005); I Coyne ‘Children’s participation in consultations and decision-making at health 
service level: A review of the literature’ (2008) 45(11) International Journal of Nursing Studies 1682-1689; 
G Lansdown ‘The realisation of children’s participation rights’ in A Percy-Smith and N Thomas (eds) A 
Handbook of children and people’s participation: Perspectives from theory and practice (2010) 11-23; I 
Coyne & M Maria ‘Children’s participation in decision-making: balancing protection with shared 
decision-making using a situation perspective’ (2011) 15(4) Journal of Child Health care.  
10  See for example, Parkes (n 3 above) 113. 
11  A Lloyd ‘Evolution of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the child and the African 
Committee of Experts: raising the gauntlet’ (2002) 10(2) International Journal of Children’s Rights 181. 
12  R Murray Human Rights in Africa: From OAU to the African Union (2004). 
13  R Gose The International Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (2002); T  Kaime The African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child: A Socio-legal perspective (2009); D  Olowu ‘Protecting 
children’s rights in Africa: A critique of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ 
(2002) 10(2) The International Journal for Children’s Rights 127-136; UE Ofodile ‘The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the African child today: Progress or problems?’ (2010) 25(1) American 
University International Law Review 37-76 and T Kaime ‘The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
and the cultural legitimacy of children's rights in Africa: Some reflections’ ( 2005) 5(2) African Human 
Rights Law Journal 221-238. 
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Africa’s Development (NEPAD).14 The author also considers some literature analysing 
the participation of children in countries such as South Africa,15 but most of the papers, 
though substantive, narrowly analyse this key children’s right as it applies from the angle 
of children’s participation in family decision-making processes. 
7. Research methodology and materials 
The research method adopted in this thesis to respond to the questions raised and to 
meet the objectives set above, is unique. It is based on a collection of legal and other 
related social science methods. It is multidisciplinary, as it is analysed through the works 
of earlier contributors on related issues. Indeed, in examining children’s right to 
participation in Africa, the multidisciplinary interpretative approach employed by this 
research helps to answer questions on issues which are beyond the legal context. For 
example, the author adopts, from sociology, the study of society as a concept and how 
the society in which a family, for example, originates or resides, shapes the behaviour of 
the members or ideologies on which a family is structured.16 The interrelation between 
sociology and law has been established through the studies of socio-legal concepts 
which, according to Cotterell, is a rewarding combination as through socio-legal studies, 
key legal terminologies intended to ‘shape’ society or family are analysed in a societal 
context and their practicality or functionality are examined.17 Also, because the author 
deals with and highlights issues concerning typical African cultural and religious 
ideologies, this thesis also makes use of anthropological concepts, such as socio-cultural 
anthropology. This concept enables the author to understand and analyse a number of 
cultural patterns and ideologies and how they contribute to the general understanding 
and application of children’s right to participation in the family in particular, through 
the interpretation of childhood.18 
                                                            
14  B Mezmur & J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Listen to us: Arguing the case for child participation in NEPAD’ (2009) 17 
African Journal of International and Comparative Law. 
15  S Moses ‘Children and participation in South Africa: An overview’ ( 2008) 16(3) International Journal 
of Children’s Rights 327-342. 
16  See, for example, T Cagun et al. Introduction to sociology (2006) 7. In their book, they maintain that 
sociology is the study of ‘human social life’ and that sociology as a social science has several sub-branches 
which range from the analysis of communication strategies to the understanding of how the world works 
through its development of ideologies.  
17  R Cotterrell ‘Why must legal ideas be interpreted sociologically?’ (1998) 25 Journal of Law and Society 
171. 
18  F Cloak, ‘What is Anthropology?’ (1968) 51(5) The High School Journal 195–202. 
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The choice of this collection of methods through the lens of a collection of methods 
is based on the fact that it is possible that a comprehensive understanding of what 
constitutes meaningful participation and the right to participation in general, 
necessitates the interpretative methods of other disciplines. For example, anthropology, 
sociology and political science have been identified in this thesis as key disciplines that 
could help strengthen legal provisions. This is also supported by the fact that a purely 
formal legal or programmatic approach is not sufficient to achieve children’s right to 
participation, for example in the family, especially because children are not the heads of 
families or main deciders on the ideologies on which most family beliefs are structured. 
Rather, socially and culturally constructed differences between a child as a member of a 
family and a member with the right to be involved in family decision-making processes 
in all matters concerning them must be analysed beyond the law. Indeed, the practical 
guarantee of the right to participation generally transcends beyond legalistic ideology 
and practice.  
The multidisciplinary interpretative approach which in this case will be a 
combination of all the methods highlighted above, therefore, supplements the 
understanding and interpretation of children’s right to participation and provides the 
opportunity to first define its core knowledge, identify and uncover deeper layers of 
human behaviour especially in the appreciation of a child’s capacity to participate in a 
family decision-making process. There is no specific section in this thesis which decodes 
these human behaviours, because that is not the strength of the author. However, 
sporadically, for example, through the works of legalists,19 sociologists,20 and 
anthropologists,21 the author is able to arrive at some of the conclusions drawn in this 
                                                            
19  For example, Kaime, (n 13 above); Lloyd (n 13 above); L Lundy ‘United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child and child well-being’ in A Bien-Arieh et al. (eds) Handbook of child well-being (2014) 2439-
2462; J Eekelaar ‘The role of the best interest’s principle in decisions affecting children and decisions about 
children’ (2015) 23(1) International Journal of Children’s Rights 3–26 and E Munro ‘Children, Family and 
the State: Decision-making and Child Participation. Nigel Thomas’ (2002) 29(4) Journal of Sociology & 
Social Welfare 166 169. 
20  For example, GK Nukunya Tradition and change in Ghana: An Introduction to sociology (2003); A Twum-
Danso ‘Reciprocity, respect and responsibility: The 3Rs underlying parent-child relationships in Ghana 
and the Implications for Children’s Rights’ (2009) 17(3) International Journal of Children’s Rights 415–
43. See other but similar examples further afield; R Richter & U Zartler ‘Children participating in family 
decisions’ (2011) 32 Revista de Cercetare si Interventie Sociala 7–24. 
21  RK Hitchcock ‘Indigenous children’s rights and well-being: Perspectives from Central and Southern 
Africa’ (2013) in DJ Johnson et al (eds)Vulnerable children: Global challenges in education, health, well-
being, and child rights 219-223 and 225-232; RK Ame ‘Traditional religion, social structure, and children’s 
rights in Ghana: The making of a trokosi child, in DJ Johnson et al (eds)Vulnerable children: Global 
challenges in education, health, well-being, and child rights (2013) 240–252. 
21  Kaime (n 13 above). 
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thesis. Again, the reliance on these disciplines is justified as, for example, Freeman 
acknowledges and attests that it is “sensible to move from law to the social sciences 
(since, after all, law seeks to regulate society, so it had better understand it) and then to 
the humanities (since law, and especially human rights law, deals with human beings, so 
it had better understand them)”.22 Succinctly, this method is crucial as it provides, as 
seen in this thesis, a concise blend between participation from a human rights, legal 
perspective and related disciplines. 
Within its multidisciplinary method, most of this thesis is tailored and dominated 
by legal methods of research – based strongly on the law in context - legal analyses of 
existing laws and practice related to decisions made for a child and/or by a child in 
matters concerning him or her. Legal analysis is the primary method employed. 
Significantly, such analysis is applied systematically, especially as the author attempts to 
reflect on the holistic approach of children’s participatory rights, and the specific context 
of these rights in family decision-making processes on matters that concern children. 
The systematic nature of this method is facilitated by analysing legal instruments and 
legal case reviews (international, regional and domestic). Within this legal approach, the 
author also adopts a comparative perspective which allows him to be critical or analytical 
about the rules of the subject and to ascertain facts that emanate from thorough 
evaluation of materials under comparison. 
The materials used are obtained from both primary and secondary sources. The 
primary sources consist of authoritative records of the law made by law-making 
authorities, such as international and regional instruments on children’s rights with 
specific focus on children’s right to participation and those related to rights associated 
with participation. Legislation (including national Constitutions, child statutes, and 
related legal instruments which also canvass the specific issue of child participation), 
judicial decisions (both binding and persuasive authorities), and resolutions of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) on children’s 
participation, as well as those of the Committee on the CRC23 related to Africa, Inter-
American and European perspectives are consulted and analysed to give the thesis a 
broader analysis of this right and a balance to the comparative approach of this thesis. 
                                                            
22  M Freeman ‘On the interactions between law and social science in the understanding and implementation 
of human rights’ in F Viljoen (ed) Beyond the law: Multi-disciplinary perspectives on human rights (2012) 
4. 
23  The Committee on the CRC is a body of independent experts that monitors the implementation of the 
CRC by its State parties. It also monitors the implementation of two optional protocols to the CRC, on 
involvement of children in armed conflict and on sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography. See generally, http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/ for a comprehensive description 
of the duties of this Committee. [accessed 13 January 2014] 
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State reports to human rights treaty bodies, such as the United Nations Human Rights 
Council, Committee on the CRC and the concluding observations on the reports are 
also consulted. Secondary sources comprise all the materials related to children’s 
rights in general in Africa as well as worldwide, published or unpublished. These 
include books, papers, reports, journal articles, newspaper articles and internet 
sources.  
8. Limitation of the study 
The research methodology adopted in this thesis, as indicated in the sub-section above, 
will assist the author in analysing human rights to participation, as it applies to all 
children and, as prescribed in the CRC and the ACRWC and further expanded in the 
Committee on the CRC’s GC number 12, without limitation to age. The extent to which 
the research methods identified above will assist the author, is not limited to the 
contextualisation of children’s right to participation only. They will also be critical in 
enabling the author to understand the practical aspects of the implementation of the 
right in a family decision-making context especially in health-related decisions.  
This thesis agrees with and supports the no age limit stance of both children’s 
rights treaties because, practically, children of all ages are capable of forming and 
expressing views in several ways. Indeed, for example, little babies speak a peculiar 
“language” and adults or parents who can interpret it can provide suitable and sensitive 
care for the child.24 The no age limit is imposed on children’s right to participation and 
the Committee on the CRC discourages the introduction of any kind of limitation – 
including disability25 – either in law or in practice that restricts children’s right to 
participation in decision-making processes.26 
An inclusive appraisal of children’s right to participation, as promoted and 
protected by the CRC and the ACRWC, inevitably requires a detailed examination of 
each and every aspect related to children’s right to participation ranging from, but not 
limited to, a rights-based perspective to societal influenced issues such as fashion and 
trends. However, this thesis is selective; it is limited to family decision-making processes 
on health-related issues, the role of parents and the state to facilitate children’s 
involvement in such processes. The thesis is also innovative, as it introduces a model 
                                                            
24  Lansdown (n 9 above). 
25  See generally, Committee on the CRC, GC No 9 The rights of children with disabilities UN doc 
CRC/C/GC/9 (2006). 
26  As above. 
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which is narrowed and specifically prescribed to facilitate children’s participation in 
family decision-making processes on all matters that concern them. Other aspects, such 
as piercing and other grey areas, with some health implications but influenced by trends 
and - probably - childhood adventurous tendencies, will be considered as well. The 
raison d'être for this limitation is based on the special role the family plays and occupies 
in the general implementation of children’s rights and the well-being of children in 
Africa.27  
9. Chapterisation 
This thesis is divided into two parts, although not expressly. Part one consists of chapters 
two, three and four. These chapters provide the contextual background to the legal 
protection of children’s right to participation. Each chapter is tailored to feed the 
preceding chapter as the work unfolds. Chapter four in particular, is in the middle of the 
two parts, as it attempts, succinctly, to portray, thanks to classical examples from South 
Africa and Cameroon (reasoning for limitation provided in the introductory paragraph 
of chapter four), the various practical (legal and policy frameworks) and institutional 
support provided by state parties to support, facilitate, and redress any issues related to 
their mandate to promote children’s right to participation in general and specifically in 
family decision-making processes. The second part of this thesis feeds from the context 
laid in the first part and consists of chapters five, six and seven. These chapters are 
complimentary to one another and crucial to the context discussed in the earlier 
chapters. For example, chapter five analyses the role of the state and the parents in giving 
children the space and time to participate in family decision-making processes and to 
give their view due weight. Chapter six builds on such roles in the context of children’s 
right to participate in health and medical decisions concerning them and chapter seven 
introduces a balance model to enable better and comprehensive attainment of children’s 
right to participate in family decision-making processes in Africa. 
                                                            
27  See for example art. 11 of the ACRWC. 
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Chapter Two 
TRACING THE NARRATIVES OF 
CHILDREN’S RIGHT TO 
PARTICIPATION IN AFRICA 
1. Introduction 
The perception of participation, as briefly indicated in the introductory chapter, is based 
on opinion seeking, taking initiative and contributing to a decision-making process in 
certain instances on issues that concern a particular person directly or indirectly. 
Appelstrand holds that participation is about finding a balance in miscellany.1 It is not 
just a means but also a classic means to involve those concerned. The absence of those 
concerned in a decision-making process on issues that concern them could be regarded 
as a flagrant violation of their human rights to participation which is strongly protected 
by several international human rights instruments, such as the ICCPR and CESCR. 
Article 25 of the ICCPR, for example, highlights elements of participation for “every 
citizen” in making decisions on matters that concern them directly or indirectly through 
freely chosen representatives. This provision is critical and applies to any form of 
government that a state subscribes to.  
It obligates member states to espouse legislative and/or other acceptable measures 
as it deems fit and necessary in according its citizens a tangible opportunity to fully enjoy 
the rights protected in the ICCPR in general and article 25 in particular.2 This provision, 
of course, does not have any limitation or restrict certain groups of people and, in effect, 
also involves children. However, it is generally implemented especially around political 
issues such as voting to exclude children, especially as national laws on voting rights 
have been limited by age which in most cases is beyond childhood. Indeed, at its widest 
and most generous level, participation encompasses involvement in activities – and 
there are many different levels of participation – monitored and regulated considerably 
                                                            
1  M Appelstrand ‘Participation and societal values: The challenges for lawmakers and policy practitioners’ 
(2002) 4 Forest Policy and Economics 281–290. 
2  Committee on the CCPR, GC No 25, The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right of 
equal access to public service (1996) UN doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 para 1.  
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by expectations and relations within society.3 Thus, identifying children as benefactors 
of this right through its protection in both the CRC and ACRWC has been well received 
by children’s rights advocates. Alderson, for example, regards children’s right to 
participation as the most important right prescribed to children4 and Lloyd and 
Emerson, in 2016, describe it as a central right to the realisation of other children’s 
rights.5 
At the African level, why, despite ratifying most of these instruments and in 
particular the CRC and the ACRWC, most African states struggle and, in some cases, 
selectively implement provisions of these instruments is concerning. Perhaps the most 
difficult provision yet to be implemented to an accepted standard, despite its centrality 
in children’s rights, is their right to participation. Also, perhaps the level of 
implementing this right is worst at the family level – to some extent this is justified by 
the fact that at the family level, parents are key duty bearers who generally consider 
children as incompetent to effectively participate in all matters concerning them during 
family decision-making processes. The reasons for this reluctance in implementing 
children’s right to participate in family decision-making processes are many and, in 
most cases, they are rooted in cultural and traditional perceptions of children and/or 
childhood within most communities in Africa. Some of these perceptions range from 
the reference of childhood as an “invisible stage” or “transitory stage”, to specific 
reference to children as “irrational beings”, and “leaders of tomorrow”. It is tempting to 
deduce from these perceptions that children are not completely recognised as 
autonomous human beings or as persons capable of making or contributing 
substantively to decision-making processes on issues that concern them. In fact, these 
tags are not specifically African as Parkes, in 2013, writing on children’s rights to 
participation from an international law perspective, laments that for a very long time 
now children have been viewed as “invisible members of society”.6  
Inevitably, this perception has an impact on the way in which power functions in 
adult-child relationships and bears the potential of limiting the credibility of children 
and/or in some cases denying them opportunities to express their views in the eyes of 
                                                            
3  AB Smith ‘Interpreting and supporting participation rights: Contributions from sociocultural theory’ 
(2002) 10(1) International Journal of Children’s Rights 74. 
4   See generally, P Alderson Young children’s rights: Exploring beliefs, principles and practices (2000). 
5  K Lloyd & L Emerson ‘(Re)examining the relationship between children’s subjective wellbeing and their 
perceptions of participation rights’ (2016) Children’s Indicators Research 1-18. See also, M Freeman ‘The 
importance of a children’s rights perspective in litigation’ (1996) 2(4) Butterworths Family Law Journal 
84-90. 
6  A Parkes Children and international human rights law: The right of the child to be heard (2013) 1. 
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adults or parents and the law.7 Such limitation could strain human relationship and, in 
some cases, destroy families and possibly weaken democratic processes and/or 
development within a state. Giving children the opportunity to participate, especially in 
decision-making processes, on issues that concern them exposes them to a learning 
curve that has an undeniable potential of absolute necessity to the continued existence 
and development of every society.8 It is therefore critical that adults or parents and the 
law adopt standards that promote the rights of children to participation especially in 
family decision-making processes. Such legal provisions, should also emphasis the fact 
that children’s views must be taken seriously, with the commitment of valuing them as 
complete human beings “now” rather than later.9 
It is probably in the spirit of classifying and recognising children as full human 
beings with the ability to make their own decisions and/or to contribute as partners in 
making decisions on issues that concern them that the UN adopted the CRC in 1989. 
The CRC is and remains a ground-breaking human rights instrument, not only because 
it is the first to codify children’s rights,10 but also because to date it is the only UN human 
rights instrument that went into force within months after its adoption by the UN 
General Assembly11 and has received almost universal ratification.12 This phenomenal 
normative unanimity endorses a collective universal acceptance of children’s rights 
codified in the CRC and also an approval that the rights of a particular group of people 
                                                            
7  As above. 
8  MG Flekkøy & NH Kaufman The participation rights of the child: Rights and responsibilities in family and 
Society (1997)19. 
9  G Lansdown Can you hear me? The right of young children to participate in decisions affecting them (2005) 
1. See also, G Lansdown ‘The realisation of children’s participation rights’ in A Percy-Smith and N 
Thomas (eds) (2010) A Handbook of children and people’s participation: Perspectives from theory and 
practice 11. 
10  Prior to the adoption of the CRC, children’s rights were protected by the then League of Nations, which 
adopted the Declaration on the Rights of the Child 1924 (available at http://www.un-
documents.net/gdrc1924.htm [accessed 26 December 2013]). The UN GA adopted the new Declaration 
on the Rights of the Child in 1959 (available at http://www.unicef.org/barbados/spmapping/ 
Legal/global/General/declaration_child1959.pdf [accessed 26 December 2013]), which was more precise 
and wider in scope regarding the protection of children. In its Preamble, the latter Declaration stated that 
“the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including 
appropriate legal protection, before as well as after birth.” Both Declarations were non-binding. 
11  Within 9 months only – the Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted 20 November 1989 (entered 
into force 2 September 1990) GA Res. 44/25 (1989), UN doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989).  
12  With a total of 196 ratifications to date, the CRC is the only international human rights instrument that 
boasts this number of State Parties on its ratification list. For a full status of ratification, see 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en 
[accessed 17 October 2013]. See also KA Bentley ‘Can there be any universal children's rights?’ (2005) 9(1) 
International Journal of Human Rights 109. 
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are best protected, implemented and monitored in one instrument.13 In the same spirit 
of the overwhelming acceptance of the CRC and the tremendous impact that this 
instrument had/has on ensuring children’s rights in general, the member states of the 
then Organisation of the African Union (OAU), met and agreed on the legal need and 
importance of protecting and enhancing the rights and welfare of children in Africa,14 
and adopted the ACRWC in 1989.15 Unfortunately, unlike the CRC, the ACRWC was 
not received with such rush. It took almost 10 years for it to be enforced and so far, has 
been ratified by 47 out of Africa’s 54 states.16 
Although some countries are still to ratify the ACRWC, the impact of this 
instrument joint with the CRC cannot be overemphasised. In fact, it cannot be doubted 
that the renewed thinking of promoting and protecting children’s rights within African 
states began with the adoption and ratification of these two key human rights 
instruments. As such, these instruments are critical and progressive instruments in the 
development of the constantly evolving children’s rights jurisprudence in Africa for 
many reasons. From a broad spectrum, both instruments uphold the civil and political 
rights as well as the socio-economic and cultural rights of children. Also, both 
instruments have contributed significantly to a paradigm shift from the traditional 
perception of children as young human beings in need of help and care “welfare based 
approach” and childhood as a “passing stage of life” to a “holistic rights based approach, 
where all children have a right to be involved in all decisions affecting them”.17  
                                                            
13  T Kaime The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child: A socio-legal perspective (2009) 1. 
14  B Thompson ‘Africa’s charter on children’s rights: A normative break with cultural traditionalism’ (1992) 
41(2) The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 433. See also, art. 46 of the ACRWC, which 
assures that the interpretation of the ACRWC “… shall draw inspiration from International Law on 
Human Rights, particularly from the provisions of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 
the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the 
International Convention on the Rights of the Child, and other instruments adopted by the United 
Nations and by African countries in the field of human rights, and from African values and traditions”. 
15  See, generally, http://www.bayefsky.com/pdf/crc_ratif_table.pdf [accessed 20 October 2013]. Contrary to 
the CRC, the ACRWC took a longer time to be enforced, as at November 2009, only 47 out of 53 States have 
acceded to or ratified the Charter. See, generally, http://www.africa- union.org/Official_documents/ 
Treaties_%20Conventions_%20Protocols/List/African%20Charter%20o [accessed 8 July 2011]. Also, it 
should be noted that the idea of protecting children’s rights in Africa was not introduced by the ACRWC or 
even the CRC for that matter. Prior to both instruments in Africa, the first Declaration on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child was adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments in 1979 and of course 
not forgetting the UN Declaration on the Rights of the Child 1959 (n 7 above). Also, there had been a number 
of Declarations and Resolutions adopted by the then OAU organs concerning children, specifically related 
to development, health and children affected by armed conflict. 
16  The list of countries that have ratified is available at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/child/ 
ratification/?s=ratification [accessed 21 October 2016]. 
17  Parkes, (n 6 above). 
17 
Despite their similarities, there are some normative differences between the 
instruments that, before the adoption of the ACRWC, were laid down as reasons for the 
drafting and subsequent adoption of the ACRWC and now delineate the salient features 
of the ACRWC. From a political point of view, the then OAU decried the limited 
involvement of African States in the drafting process of the CRC,18 limited “meaningful 
African contribution” and limited “traditional values and conceptions of human rights” 
critical to the African child.19 From a legal point of view, there was a need to codify in a 
binding instrument at the African regional level the concerns that were of particular 
interest and crucial to the African child.20 Some of the concerns identified as critical to 
children in Africa and narrowly protected and in some cases ignored in the CRC were, 
inter alia, “the situation of […] children living under Apartheid”; disadvantages 
influencing female children; common practices in Africa, such as female circumcision 
were not clearly stated; certain “socio-economic conditions, such as illiteracy and low 
levels of sanitary conditions common in Africa needed more addressing”; “[t]he African 
conception of the community’s responsibilities and duties” was ignored; and “[t]he 
negation of the role of the family by the CRC in the upbringing of the child, and in 
matters of adoption and fostering”.21 However, as Viljoen correctly points out, these two 
instruments are not in an “oppositional but rather complimentary relationship” in the 
context of children’s rights protection in Africa.22  
From these instruments one could identify the significant effort and 
accomplishments of the working groups in constructing legal norms and recognising 
                                                            
18  “[B]y 1989 only nine African States had been participating in the activities of the working group” that 
drafted the CRC. See generally, F Viljoen International human rights law in Africa (2012) 392. Regarding 
other continents’ participation, Europe had sixty-one percent, Latin America had twenty-nine percent 
and in general, third world countries were poorly represented due to lack of financial resources and 
qualified personnel to make substantive contributions to the working group. See also, F Viljoen ‘Supra-
national human rights instruments for the protection of children in Africa: The Convention on the Rights 
of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (1998) 31 The Comparative 
and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 200.  
19  Kaime (n 13 above) 2. 
20  Viljoen International human rights law in Africa (n 18 above). 
21  For details on these issues and the drafting process of the ACRWC, see generally, LG Muthoga 
‘Introducing the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the African Child and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child’, paper delivered at the International Conference on the Rights of the Child, 
Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape (1992). See also, A Lloyd ‘Evolution of the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and The African Committee of Experts: raising 
the gauntlet’ (2002) 10(2) International Journal of Children’s Rights 181; D Olowu ‘Protecting children’s 
rights in Africa: A critique of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child’ (2002) 10(2) 
The International Journal for Children’s Rights 130; F Viljoen ‘The African Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child’ in AT Boezaart (ed.) Child Law in South Africa (2009). 
22  Viljoen (n 20 above). 
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children’s rights that were never protected before.23 Also commendable are the 
mechanisms prescribed in the instruments for the effective protection and enforcement 
of such fundamental and procedural rights through the establishment of committees 
and emphasis on state duties.24 These instruments are undoubtedly the catalyst for a 
paradigm shift in societal attitudes, traditional beliefs, laws and practices across Africa 
intended to undermine children’s ability to reason and make decisions autonomously. 
Despite these remarkable efforts and the general acceptance of both instruments evident 
through the number of state ratification at the African regional level, one critical concern 
is whether African member states possess the political will to effectively and 
comprehensively protect and enforce these rights at national level.  
1.1. Obligations of state parties 
Generally, upon ratification of any international law instrument, states take on the 
obligation under international human rights law to implement it and children’s rights 
are no exception.25 International human rights law prescribes three forms of State 
obligation: to respect, to protect and to fulfil human rights.26 These forms of obligation 
“encompass obligations of result and obligations of conduct”.27 The notion of results and 
conduct is what guides the CRC and the ACRWC in their provisions on obligations of 
states parties to fulfil children’s rights. Under both instruments, the obligation of 
member states is predominantly two-fold, namely the duty to recognise children’s rights 
                                                            
23  See, for example, children’s right to participation – art. 4(2), 7 ACRWC and 12(2) CRC; children’s right 
to freedom of expression – art. 7 ACRWC and art. 13 CRC; children’s right to freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion – art. 9 ACRWC and art. 14 CRC and some rights specifically protected by the 
ACRWC such as children’s right to leisure, recreation and cultural activities – art. 12, children’s right to 
protection against apartheid and discrimination – art. 26. 
24  See for example art. 26 of the ACRWC which calls on state parties to “… individually and collectively 
undertake to accord the highest priority to the special needs of children living under Apartheid…”,  for a 
similar position (State Duties) see for example art 19 of the CRC which calls on States “… to take all 
appropriate legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from all forms 
of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse …”, also see generally Part II of the ACRWC, and Part II 
of the CRC on the creation of Committees and their duties. 
25  See generally, H Steiner et al International human rights in context: Law, politics, morals (2007) 85–94, 
and in the specific context of children’s rights, see generally, T Liefaard & JE Doek (eds) Litigating the 
rights of the child: The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in domestic and international 
jurisprudence (2015). 
26  See generally, Committee on the CESCR, GC No 13 the right to education (1999) UN doc 
E/C.12/1999/10 para 46. 
27  See generally, Committee on the CRC, GC No 16 State obligations regarding the impact of the business 
sector on children’s rights (2013) UN doc CRC/C/GC/16 para 25. 
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and the duty to undertake necessary, appropriate and reasonable steps to enforce these 
rights.28  
Through the provisions of both instruments member states are encouraged at all 
times to demonstrate procedural, psychological, physical and financial urgency in 
executing their mandate. Also, member states are mandated to continuously revise such 
strategies with the prime objective of ensuring better translation and implementation, 
and to find best options to address the continuous rights violations children face in their 
communities. Specifically, children’s right to participation imposes such obligation on 
states and mandates them to ensure and incessantly review or amend domestic 
legislations in order to introduce or refresh mechanisms providing children with access 
to appropriate information, adequate support, and if necessary, feedback on the weight 
given to their views, and procedures for complaints, remedies or redress.29 It is 
imperative to note that in fulfilling such an obligation states must show trends of 
progressive effort in finding synergies to best realise such rights in every society within 
its boundaries, including the family. 
Significantly, both instruments caution that “the best interests of the child” must 
be the prime underscoring principle driving such state efforts in protecting and 
enforcing children’s rights.30 Also of importance is the firm stance taken in the ACRWC 
in which it espouses a slightly stronger standard that “cannot be found elsewhere”,31 
obligating that “in all actions concerning the child […] the best interests of the child 
shall be the primary consideration”.32 The contribution made by the ACRWC in relation 
to the centrality of a child’s best interests, is very crucial in interpreting children’s right 
to participation at the African regional level in general and specifically within African 
families. This is the result of the fact that the instruments are correctly considered as 
complimentary and not oppositional to each other.33 The provision, as stated in the 
                                                            
28  See generally, art. 1 of the ACRWC and art. 2 of the CRC. See also Committee on the CRC GC No 5 
General measures of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (2003) UN doc 
CRC/GC/2003/5. Both the state duties to recognise and implement will be analysed throughout this thesis 
especially in the context of the protection and promotion of children’s right to participation. 
29  See generally, Committee on the CRC, GC No 12 The right of the child to be heard (2009) UN doc 
CRC/C/GC/12 para 48. 
30  See generally, art. 4 of the ACRWC and art. 3(1) of the CRC. 
31  R Murray Human rights in Africa: From OAU to the African Union (2004) 167. 
32  See, generally, art. 4 of the ACRWC. The main difference between these similar but different provisions 
is that while the ACRWC insists on the best interests of the child to be “the primary consideration” the 
CRC on the other hand insists on the best interests of the child to be “a primary consideration”. The use 
of “the” in the ACRWC makes the primary consideration of the child emphatic and compulsory, while 
the use of “a” in the CRC represents a mere consideration which is optional. Murray, (n 31 above). 
33  Viljoen (n 18 above). 
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ACRWC, compliments the “weaker” stance in the CRC34 and makes the principle of the 
best interests of the child an emphatic and compulsory requirement in the general 
interpretation and implementation of children’s right to participation at the African 
regional level.35  
In the case of states who are parties to both instruments, Lloyd holds that the 
provisions of the ACRWC for example are the “bare minimum that will be tolerated…” 
in the enactment of national laws and international agreements relating to children in 
Africa.36 However, any national law and/or international agreement that is not in 
“conformity with the Children's Charter [for example] will only prevail if they are more 
conclusive to the realisation of children's rights”.37 Notwithstanding, states who are 
parties only to the CRC for example are not necessarily confined only within the 
obligations described in the CRC especially because all African States are state parties to 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) and as a result, through 
expansive interpretation, its provisions can be applied in national courts in matters 
concerning children.38  
The attempted analysis of state obligations to ensure children’s right to 
participation above is not exhaustive - other aspects of state obligations will be 
highlighted as this thesis evolves. This section therefore only provides a foretaste of the 
role states are required to play in ensuring this crucial right. Also worth noting is the fact 
that even though state parties bear the obligation to protect, respect and fulfil children’s 
rights, under the CRC and the ACRWC, its implementation is the responsibility of all 
sectors of society which includes but is not limited to civil society, governmental and 
non-governmental organisations and institutions, the family and institutions of 
learning39 and, of course, children themselves.40  
                                                            
34  Murray (n 31 above). 
35  See generally, D Chirwa ‘The merits and demerits of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the 
Child’ (2002) 10(2) International Journal of Children’s Rights 157. 
36  Lloyd (n 21 above) 185. 
37  As above. 
38  Olowu (n 21 above) 134. 
39  It should be noted that the ARCWC, for example, does not make any reference to the "State" in its 
protection of children’s right to non-discrimination. This, therefore, implies that the obligation not to 
discriminate for example is binding not only on the State but also on other members of society. 
40  See generally, Committee on the CRC, GC No. 5 (n 28 above) para 1. 
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2. Conceptualisation of childhood 
The intention of the UN, the AU and state parties to the CRC and the ACRWC to protect 
children’s rights in Africa (in this case) is vivid through the adoption and ratification of 
both instruments. As indicated earlier, both instruments, cumulatively at the African 
level hold the highest number of ratifications received by an international human rights 
instrument. Indeed, at the corresponding time of writing this chapter, all African States 
have ratified the CRC and most of the ACRWC.41 Despite this near general acceptance 
of both instruments, there is still a great deal of controversy surrounding the 
participatory principle enshrined in both instruments. Critics have argued that children 
do not possess the poignant or intellectual competence needed to make sensible choices 
or to make a substantive contribution in a decision-making process, whereas adults have 
the responsibility and should paternalistically make decisions on children’s behalf.42 
Although the angle from which this argument stems is accepted based on the fact that 
adults are said to have a strong rational judgment on issues, the reasoning of this thesis 
is that the rationale for side-lining children is limited and rooted in the restricted 
understanding of childhood and the difference that could exist between adulthood and 
childhood.  
The conception of childhood that most adults hold as only natural may actually be 
a social, historical and/or psychological construction. Indeed, Freeman asserts and 
articulates the need for such diverse perceptions to be merged in children’s rights 
discourse given that these disciplines enjoy congruent interest and understanding of 
children.43 Specifically, he points out that sociological arguments relating to the social 
constructionist notion of childhood will to a great extent provide a measure of clarity in 
unpacking most of the assumptions that adults have about the nature of children.44 Such 
development is essential in not only developing the concept of childhood but also in 
taking the children’s rights debate, especially the debate on their right to participation 
in decision-making processes, forward, because it allows classic trends of determining 
                                                            
41  This is because while every African State is a party to the CRC, seven of them (the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic, Somalia, Sao Tome and Principe, South Sudan and 
Tunisia) are not parties to the ACRWC. For a detailed breakdown of the member states to the ACRWC 
(n 15 above). 
42  L Purdy In their best interest? The case against equal rights for children (1992) 223–241. 
43  M Freeman ‘The sociology of childhood and children’s rights’ (1998) 6 International Journal of Children’s 
Rights 440-442. 
44  As above 442. 
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the extent to which children’s autonomy can be reasonable within the context of 
sociological findings.45 
The importance of such debate in contemporary time is justified by Ariès’s 
assertion which locates the fact that during the Middle Ages childhood was not 
recognised as an important stage of human life.46 He justifies his argument by drawing 
upon historical evidence such as artistic representations of children in a French 
miniature of the late eleventh century - during which children were merely portrayed as 
small human beings who possessed the expressions and features of adults. In 
constructing his argument, he makes a vivid analysis of historical facts which 
demonstrate that children were often represented in previous societies with adult-like 
characteristics – recognised on the similar level of competence as adults and only 
differentiated in size and body features. Based on his book Centuries of childhood, the 
scale of the difference that exists today between children and adults may not have existed 
at the same magnitude three or more centuries ago. However, he regrets that such a 
stance did not help the general protection that children need and the furtherance of their 
well-being. 
Indeed, although Ariès does not entirely expunge the ideology that certain 
characteristics of childhood may have been recognised during the medieval era, he 
sustains however that childhood was not valued, and not given a distinct place in artistic 
work.47 Through his work, one quickly grapples with the fact that all human beings were 
regarded as competent and the only difference that distinguished them was based on 
size and body features. Ariès’s conceptualisation of childhood is extremely important in 
not only ascertaining the historical image of childhood but also in establishing the fact 
that childhood is a natural phenomenon. Archard concurs with this assertion and adds 
that the absence of a standardised concept of childhood in medieval times does not mean 
that it was completely different from what it is perceived to be today. He also argues that 
even though Ariès shows that there existed some similarities between children and 
adults that are not vividly visible today, such as the feeling for a child and an adult to be 
happy in similar outfits, does not verify that medieval societies lacked a concept of 
childhood – rather, they merely lacked our concept and the reverse is probably equally 
true.48 Unfortunately, not all scholars agree with this claim.  
                                                            
45  L Johnny ‘Reconceptualising childhood: Children’s rights and youth participation in schools’ (2006) 7(1) 
International Education Journal 18.  
46  P Ariès Centuries of childhood: A social history of family life (1962) 28-30. 
47  As above 34–36. 
48  D Archand Children: Rights and childhood (1993) 19. 
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Unlike Archard, Cunningham, for example, , in his 2005 contribution 
demonstrates that, like today, during the medieval period there was a clear and traceable 
difference between childhood and adulthood and that such difference transcended 
beyond size, body features and feelings to include the recognition of age differences.49 In 
supporting his argument, he demonstrates that the medieval period did not only 
recognise infantia (7 years and below) as a critical and separate stage but that religious 
writings also encouraged parents to raise their children with love and compassion.50 This 
does not only demonstrate that medieval societies may have had affection for children 
but that there was also a clear concept of childhood based on age difference.51 
This concept of childhood (age distinguished) is what is common in recent times, 
as in most cases childhood has been known as “the early part of the life-course; the 
institutional arrangements that separate children from adults and the structural space 
created by these arrangements that is occupied by children”.52 This concept has largely 
influenced and shaped contemporary constructions of childhood, which enjoin that 
children should be protected from the cruel happenings of the adult world.53 However, 
despite being well established and acknowledged as a group within society, children in 
contemporary time are easily identified through characteristics such as invisible, 
undefended, unprotected, incapable and immature, in essence, susceptible members of 
society.54  
The concept of childhood attempted above is similar to the African ideology of 
childhood. Contemporary African societies share particular notions of childhood – 
traversing birth (infantia) to teens and confined as a unique period of the life-course. 
The African conception of childhood could also be described through the African theory 
of the universe, which, according to Nsamenang writing in 2013, is embodied in the 
“circular path to human ontogenesis” entrenched in cultural norms rather than 
biological trends that activate them.55 It also presumes that childhood is that stage in 
human life where smaller human beings are best described as incomplete human beings 
who are not fully competent to determine and safeguard their interests. Thus, an African 
                                                            
49  H Cunningham Children and childhood in Western society since 1500 2nd edn (2005) 3-16. 
50  As above 22–35. 
51  As above. 
52  A James & A James Key concepts in childhood studies (2008) 22. 
53  H Hendrick ‘Constructions and reconstructions of British childhood: An interpretative survey, 1800 to 
the present’ (1997) in A James & A Prout (eds) Constructing and reconstructing childhood 34-62. 
54  See generally, James & James (n 52 above). 
55  AB Nsamenang ‘Dilemmas of right-based approaches to child well-being in an African cultural context’ 
(2013) in DJ Johnson et al (eds) Vulnerable children: Global challenges in education, health, well-being, 
and child rights 14. 
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notion of childhood is deep-rooted in a socio-genic progression, which recognises 
cultural and historical principles characterised by maturity and methodical socialisation 
as key components to one’s ability to reasonably participate in a decision-making 
process.56  
Indeed, the African conception of childhood detects that key components that 
conceptualise childhood, such as its shape and experience, depends on how society, 
culture and tradition understand them. This of course stamps the fact that as society, 
culture and tradition evolve – which they do over time – so too might the concept of 
childhood.57 Boakye-Boaten affirms and adds that the African concept of childhood 
transcends beyond the notion of merely an epoch in a human being’s life, and should be 
understood as part of the social construct of every society.58 Literally, the classification 
of what period of a life-course is considered as childhood has expanded and this is 
common across the world. Nevertheless, age classification has gained prominence and 
varies from continent to continent and in some cases from country to country.  
At the African regional level, both the CRC and the ACRWC have set the standard 
and defined a child as any human being below the age of 18.59 This is the general rule; 
the CRC provides an exception in cases where in a particular state legal majority is 
attained earlier.60 This probably whispers the effect that in contemporary Africa, 
childhood should end at 18 unless under a particular law applicable to the child, majority 
is attained earlier.  
Notably, in the case of early attainment of majority relating to a particular case, for 
instance the permission to vote or to drive, a child does not lose his or her status as a 
child. Rather, such a child is still a child and a child competent and privileged with some 
rights enjoyed by adults to exercise such duties as provided by the law of the state in 
question. This definition may call into contention different minimum ages, for example 
on issues related to, but not limited to sexual consent, criminal responsibility, driving, 
                                                            
56  As above. 
57  For further analyses on childhood in Africa, see for example, T Kaime (n 10 above) 59–92. For general 
reading see also, R Boyd & P Richerson ‘Culture and the evolution of human cooperation’ (2009) 10(2) 
The Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 3281–3288. 
58  A Boakye-Boaten ‘Changes in the concept of childhood: Implications on children in Ghana’ (2010) 10(3) 
The Journal of International Social Research 105.  
59  See generally, arts. 1 of the CRC and 2 of the ACRWC. 
60  See art. 1 of the CRC. 
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employment and marriage.61 In principle since both instruments (the CRC and the 
ACRWC) place very little emphasis on the exact minimum age applicable to certain 
issues relating to children, the setting of minimum age is largely the responsibility of 
state parties in the national Constitutions, Acts of parliament or decrees applicable to 
children at national level. Indeed, several pieces of legislation in Africa have codified 
different age groups (some lower than 18 years of age and others above 18 years of age 
– for example 21 years of age) under different aspects that relate to children.62 Reasons 
for such variation in age classification are many and range from cultural, traditional, 
social and political factors and also in some cases even influenced by doctrines acquired 
from former colonial masters.63  
Indeed, the CRC and the ACRWC are umbrella pieces of international law 
applicable to the States that have ratified one or both instruments in Africa. However, 
the domestication of the age identified for children (18 as cut-off) at the national level 
has not in all instances been consistent with the CRC and the ACRWC. It is possibly due 
to this plurality of ways of conceptualising childhood that the Committee on the CRC 
opted not to limit children’s right to participation in matters that concern them. 
Crucially, a child’s ability to participate in decision-making processes should be 
nurtured concomitantly with their development and this has been ingrained in both the 
CRC and the ACRWC. Arguably, this is largely based on the belief that granting children 
the full capacity to participate in decision-making processes is a concept that defies 
                                                            
61  See also for example art. 38 of the CRC which prohibits the use and recruitment of children below the age 
of 15 in armed conflict or hostilities and art. 22 of the ACRWC which provides a stricter provision by 
prohibiting recruitment to the armed forces for all persons below the age of 18. Art. 21 of the ACRWC 
also require the setting of the minimum age of marriage at 18, while a similar provision is not found in 
the CRC. 
62  In the case of marriage, for example, in Niger, under the Civil Code, the minimum age for marriage is 18 
for boys and 15 for girls, while in Cameroon, the minimum age for both boys and girls is 21 - but sec. 
52(1) of the 1981 ordinance governing Civil Status provides for an exceptional situation where a girl of 15 
years or a boy of 18 years can get married under a waiver granted by the President of the republic for 
serious reasons. This ordinance unfortunately does not give details of instances that would warrant a 
waiver form the President. For a detail analyses of the dissymmetrical manifestations of the minimum age 
in Cameroon, see, Akonumbo, A ‘Excursion into the best interests of the child principle’ in family law 
and child-related laws and policies in Cameroon’ (2010) The International Survey of Family Law 63-94.  
63  In Cameroon, for example, there is no legal age of majority applicable nationwide. In fact, in civil matters, 
the French Civil Code of 1804 is applicable to French Cameroon and refers to “anyone below the age of 
21 a ‘minor’ and under the English Common law applicable to Anglophone Cameroon, the age of majority 
is 18 years, whilst the draft Child Protection Code defines a child as everyone below the age of 18 for 
electoral and criminal majority, and 21 for civil majority”. For details on these inconsistencies and more, 
see generally, African Child Policy Forum In the best interests of the child: Harmonising laws on children 
in West and Central Africa (2011) available at http://www.acerwc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/English-
ACERWC-Harmonising-Laws-on-Children-in-west-and-central-Africa.pdf [accessed 13 January 2014]. 
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adulthood and African ideology of the nature of childhood. However, if one assumes 
that childhood is a construct, as demonstrated above, and also takes into consideration 
marginal concepts of children as protected by international law, it could be imperative 
to question whether it is in the best interests of children to be excluded from any 
decision-making processes – especially within the family on matters that concern them. 
Significantly, it would be in the best interests of the child if the age that relates 
principally to protection issues (for example in cases of forced marriage or recruitment 
as a child soldier) is set as high as possible and, on the other hand, is reduced as low as 
possible in connection with participation issues. That should be the case if age is used as 
the measuring rod to determine capacity, which this thesis is slightly against, arguing 
that the determinant of capacity in the case of a child should weigh more on a child’s 
maturity than on age. The way in which childhood is contextualised currently, has a 
severe impact on the manner in which power operates between children and adults in 
society and, of course, on the allocation of the freedom that children are accorded to 
participate in decision-making processes especially in the private space.64  
3. The protection of children’s rights to participation 
The “right to participation” is not overtly mentioned as such in international children’s 
rights law but rather, there is a general agreement that the concept is multi-facetted and 
applicable across a variety of activities.65 As a result, aspects of participation can be traced 
through several rights protected in the ACRWC and the CRC. However, in the CRC for 
example, as seen below, this right is a “stand-alone” right protected under article 12 and 
in the ACRWC it is firstly mentioned under article 4(2) and in an almost exact wording, 
nature and scope under article 7 but referred to as the right to freedom of expression.  
At a glance, this thesis observes that the protection of this right under the CRC is 
preferred, because it exerts a stronger protection. This is not only because the 
phraseology of the right is progressive and includes crucial caveats (the ability to form 
and express an opinion and the maturity and due weight consideration), but also 
because as a “stand-alone” right the potential of a critical legal analytical development 
of the normative content of the right is feasible. However, the ACRWC’s article 4(2) 
does not offer such huge potential. This is visible in the manner in which the right is 
                                                            
64  S Moses Children and participation in South Africa: Overview (2008) 16 International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 331. 
65  K Winter ‘The participation rights of looked after children in their health care: A critical review of the 
research’ (2006) 14 International Journal of Children’s Rights 85. 
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protected and couched under the banner of the best interests of the child. Sloth-Nielsen, 
writing in 2012, laments that such “second class” codification is problematic because it 
unfortunately shields the visibility of a right recognised as one of the four general 
principles of children’s rights – alongside the best interests of the child, non-
discrimination and the right to life and development.66  
In hindsight, although a stand-alone protection of this right would have been 
preferred, this thesis reckons that the combination of both principles is not completely 
negative and in many ways, re-affirms the fact that they (both principles) are, rightly so, 
interrelated – for, it is in the best interests of the child to promote and protect his/her 
right to participation. In fact, Sloth-Nielsen, in a deeper consideration to her earlier 
assertion, reasoned that the link between children’s best interests and their right to 
participation as captured in the ACRWC “elevates the participation right of the child 
quite significantly to the role of being the beneficiary of a bearer of party status in legal 
proceedings”.67 It is such elevated status that this thesis takes advantage of when 
advocating that a comprehensive recognition and implementation of what is in the best 
interests of a child is not limited to the public space only but also to the private space 
which includes the family environment. Sloth-Nielsen further correctly adds that the 
joint force of the best interests of the child and his or her right to participate – in family 
decision-making processes, for example – makes the normative context of a child’s right 
to participation stricter and explicit as opposed to the implicit nature in which it is 
captured under article 12 of the CRC.68 
Generally, despite such strong claims, it still does not defeat the fact that a stand-
alone provision is preferred for reasons already stated above and because children’s 
rights are interrelated, there is no need to group legal provisions to justify their 
connection. However, it is not completely flawed as it is generally thanks to such 
generous linkages that the right to participation is, justly so, considered as a “cluster of 
rights”, because it embodies and relates with every children’s right.69 The inclusion of 
this right in mainstream children’s rights instruments provides an undeniable 
opportunity for international human rights law to operate as a catalyst in propelling 
fundamental change on the competence and value which society, and specifically the 
family, places on children’s contribution. It is therefore not surprising that several legal 
                                                            
66  J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Children’s rights in Africa’, in M Ssenyonjo (ed) The African Regional Human Rights 
System; 30 years after the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (2012) 165. 
67  As above 165. 
68  As above. 
69  K Hanson & A Vandaele ‘Working children and international labour law’ (2003) 11(1) The International 
Journal on Children’s Rights 84. 
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analyses of this right as it applies to children and is protected in the ACRWC and the 
CRC have heaped praise on its inclusion and hold it as the most innovative and crucial 
element in understanding children’s rights contained in both instruments.70 Children’s 
right to participation cuts across all other children’s rights and could be regarded as a 
right which provokes the discussions on related aspects to children, such as childhood 
(discussed above), questioning the present role of children in society and within families. 
Extending such rights into the family environment and highlighting its functionality and 
acceptability through the introduction of the balance model in chapter seven of this 
thesis remains a critical aspect which will ensure that children enjoy this right 
comprehensively.  
Theoretically, as will be seen in later chapters of this thesis, there is a significant 
degree of uncertainty regarding the exact meaning, implication and extent for children 
to participate in all decision-making processes on matters that concern them. This 
uncertainty is mostly reflected in the wording of the provisions that protect this crucial 
right. According to Schlemmer, the vagueness of children’s rights provision is visible 
especially in the sense that the CRC for example sometimes remains trapped in general 
wordings which, in most cases, betray the absence of maturity of the reflection of its 
content.71 By implication, the recognition of children as social actors and as principal 
actors in their own right has not benefitted from thorough analysis even with the 
inclusion of articles 4(2) of the ACRWC and 12 of the CRC.72 This theoretical 
uncertainty unfortunately bears implications such as determining the maturity and 
giving due weight to a child’s opinion that have hampered the proper understanding 
and implementation of children’s right to participation in decision-making processes 
within the family, for instance.   
Notwithstanding, as indicated above, the inclusion of this right in international 
human rights law is worth praising – such an act affords children, at least on paper, a 
better enjoyment of their rights and probably a better life and development. In the 
wording of the provisions that protect this right, the following articles state: 
                                                            
70  See for example, F Ang et al Participation rights of children (2006); R Bosisio ‘Children’s rights to be heard: 
What children think’ (2012) 20(1) International Journal of Children’s Rights 141-154; L Ehlers & C Frank 
‘Child participation in African context’ in J Sloth-Nielsen (ed) Children’s rights in Africa: A legal 
perspective (2008) 116-122 and G Van Bueren The international law on the rights of the child (1995) 145. 
71  B Schlemmer “General introduction” in The exploited child (2000) 12–13. See also, B Milne Rights of the 
child - 25 years after the adoption of the UN Convention (2015) 87–90. 
72  See for example, Freeman (n 41 above) 433-443.  
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12 (CRC) 
States Parties shall assure to the child who is capable of forming his or her own views the right 
to express those views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given 
due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child. 
For this purpose, the child shall in particular be provided the opportunity to be heard in any 
judicial and administrative proceedings affecting the child, either directly, or through a 
representative or an appropriate body, in a manner consistent with the procedural rules of 
national law. 
4(2) (ACRWC)73  
In all judicial or administrative proceedings affecting a child who is capable of communicating 
his/her own views, and opportunity shall be provided for the views of the child to be heard 
either directly or through an impartial representative as a party to the proceedings and those 
views shall be taken into consideration by the relevant authority in accordance with the 
provisions of appropriate law (sic). 
In the light of these provisions, it is probably clear that the wordings of the provisions 
do not make any reference, or emphasis for that matter, on children’s right to 
participation within families or in family decisions-making processes. However, 
research has established and the Committee on the CRC has confirmed that there is an 
undeniable link and need for these provisions to be interpreted as protecting and 
encouraging children’s right to participation within the family.74 Indeed, the Committee 
on the CRC lays emphasis on the important role a family plays in the implementation 
of this right and calls on state parties to encourage parents, guardians and child-minders 
through legislation and policy, to listen to children and give due weight to their views in 
matters that concern them.75 
As a result, the contextual interpretation of this right in many ways dictates an 
inclusive approach. This is justified in the fact that these provisions have been, rightly 
so, described through the right they protect as bearing the core value to children’s rights 
                                                            
73  It should be noted that, unlike the CRC, art. 7 of the ACRWC on children’s right to freedom of expression 
espouses a striking similarity to its art. 4(2). 
74  See generally, Committee on the CRC, GC No 12 (n 29 above) paras 90–96, in which the Committee 
emphasised amongst others that “[a] family where children can freely express views and be taken seriously 
from the earliest ages provides an important model, and is a preparation for the child to exercise the right 
to be heard in the wider society. [The Committee goes on to encourage stakeholders to ensure that such 
practice takes place as it further states that] … State parties should encourage parents … to give due weight 
to the view of a child… [and] the media should play a strong role in communicating to parents that their 
children’s participation is of high value for the children themselves, their families and society”. 
75  Committee on the CRC, GC No 12 (as above) para 93. 
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protection,76 and also one of its common challenges.77 All children who are capable of 
forming and communicating their views have the right to be involved in the decision-
making process of all matters concerning them. Unfortunately, both provisions, 
especially the ACRWC, is not without blemish. In the case of the ACRWC, the fact that 
the provision requires a child to be capable of communicating his or her views for him 
or her to be heard has been referred to by some scholars as inappropriate.78 Plainly, this 
condition makes it clear that a child who can form an opinion, which is required by the 
CRC,79 and cannot communicate such an opinion, should not be involved.80  
However, the normative contextual overlapping of article 4(1) (the best interests 
of the child) and article 4(2) of the ACRWC is well fashioned in this case. By implication, 
a comprehensive implementation of article 4(2), irrespective of its limitations when 
compared to the same provision in the CRC (i.e. the requirements that the child must 
be able to communicate his or her views, that the child must be a “party to the 
proceedings” directly or indirectly,81 and that the views of the child must be considered 
“in accordance with the provision of appropriate law” in all judicial and administrative 
proceedings), mandates that article 4(1) is taken into consideration. This intersection in 
interpretation also extends to a similar situation in the CRC, namely in the case of 
articles 3 (the best interests of the child) and article 12. However, unlike articles 4(2) of 
the ACRWC and 12 of the CRC, the notion of the best interests of the child is rather 
passive since, in most cases, the person who decides what is in the best interests of the 
child is an adult.82  
As a matter of fact, there is thus a potential conflict both in interpretation and 
application of children’s rights in general between these provisions. It is based on this 
conflict that Freeman asserts that it would be plausible to argue that a child’s right to 
form and communicate an opinion in matters that concern him or her “… should stop 
at the point where adults do not consider such expression to be in the child’s best 
interests”.83 Even though this could not be regarded as an easy intervention to make, the 
                                                            
76  C O’Kane Children and young people as citizens: Partners for social change, exploring concepts (2003) 10. 
77  MS Pais The Convention on the Rights of the Child (1997) United Nations manual human rights reporting 
under six major international human rights instruments 427. 
78  See for example, Chirwa (n 35 above) 161.  
79  The CRC is preferred in this respect as it simply requires a child to be able to form an opinion – See 
Chirwa (as above). 
80  Chirwa (n 78 above). 
81  In this case, the qualification in the CRC has been regarded as progressive because it merely provides that 
the views of the child should be given “due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child”. 
82  M Freeman ‘The right to be heard’ (1998/99) 22(4) Adoption and Fostering 56. 
83  As above. 
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evolving capacity of adults and children (article 5 of the CRC)84 in the opinion of this 
thesis, although not enough, has the potential to strike a balance which in turn could 
determine when and how an adult or parent should grade what is in the best interests of 
child. It therefore goes without saying that just like the best interests of a child can lead 
to the rejection of a child’s opinion, the same best interests, correctly understood, can 
lead decision-makers to derail from a view made by a child.85  
Understanding children’s right to participation in Africa within the context of 
these provisions entails two key aspects: forming and expressing an opinion, a wish 
and/or an affirmation to an opinion within the context of a conversation or decision-
making process especially in a matter that concerns the child. Significantly, such 
expression does not mean that the child replaces the adult(s) in the decision-making to 
exonerate the latter from their responsibility. A key requirement here will be that a 
partnership between adults and children is critical in ensuring that a child participates 
and his or her views are taken into account and given due weight based on his or her 
maturity – because adults or parents are central in assisting children to protect 
themselves and make reasonable decisions.86  
From a contextual viewpoint, relating to the framework of children’s right to 
participation under international law, children’s developing capacity and ability to make 
critical contributions to the development of the family and society in which they live at 
large, for instance, epitomises only one side of the balance. The other side consists of 
adults' evolving capacity and willingness to listen to and learn from a child, to appreciate 
and ponder the child's opinion.87 It also involves adults’ willingness to revisit their own 
thoughts and attitudes and to consider solutions that address children's opinion.88 Fairly, 
both parties (children and adults) should demonstrate some level of willingness to listen 
to one another, in the process respecting and valuing another’s opinion as a human 
being with rights, for concrete and factual communication to be achieved.89  
                                                            
84  Discussed broadly below in Chapter 3 of this thesis.   
85  MF Lucker-Babel ‘The right of the child to express views and to be heard: An attempt to interpret article 
12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (1995) 3 International Journal of Children’s Rights 
400. 
86  C Feinstein & C O’Kane ‘Children’s and adolescents’ participation and protection from sexual abuse and 
exploitation’ 2009, UNICEF Inocentia Research Centre, Inocentia Working paper 1 available at 
https://www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/iwp_2009_09.pdf [accessed 16 September 2013]. 
87  UNICEF fact Sheet: The right to participation, available online at www.unicef.org/crc/files/Right-to-
Participation.pdf [accessed 15 April 2013]. 
88  As above. 
89  Bosisio (n 70 above) 143. 
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The CRC and the ACRWC are two key binding instruments that have legally and 
overtly acknowledged children’s right to participation in Africa. Both instruments 
espouse the view that children have the right to participate in deciding on issues that 
concern them, rather than being regarded simply as beneficiaries of adult protection, 
and that their right to participation mandates that they (children) themselves are eligible 
to participate in any decision-making process on a matter which affects them.90 This is 
an indubitable critical shift in the paradigm which has defined adults’ perception of 
children now compared to before the adoption of these instruments. More so, because 
amongst others, a child’s right to participation as protected by the CRC and the ACRWC 
presupposes adults’ readiness and willingness to change their opinions and attitudes 
towards children, especially during decision-making processes on matters that concern 
children or a particular child in question. Adults (parents) have an implicit and explicit 
responsibility to promote and protect such rights especially within the family 
environment.  
Undeniably, the catalyst of children’s right to participation in Africa rests in the 
specific provisions of both the CRC and the ACRWC. However, it is also sporadically 
covered, in the context of specific rights or in the context of some vulnerable groups in 
the ICCPR, ACHPR, CESCR, CERD, CRPD and some national constitutions, Acts of 
parliament or decrees. The provisions in the CRC and the ACRWC, as analysed above, 
expedite the fact that the nature and scope of children’s right to participation are 
interrelated. Both provisions also espouse substantive and procedural rights aspects of 
children’s rights in general. It has been recognised that as a substantive right, it 
empowers children to take part and contribute in decision-making processes on matters 
concerning their lives.91 As a procedural right, children’s right to participation empowers 
children to take action in promoting and enforcing all aspects of their rights protected 
in the CRC and the ACRWC. It also provides children with the tool to promote and 
protect their rights by themselves.  
Through this empowerment, children in Africa, for example, are allowed to attain 
justice, influence outcomes in decision-making processes and expose abuse of power92 
within governmental and family93 structures. Parkes adds that as a procedural right, 
children’s right to participation empowers children to contest any misapplications or 
disregard of their right in society.94 Perhaps it is important to stress that from a 
                                                            
90  G Landsdown Promoting children’s participation in democratic decision-making (2001) 1. 
91  Landsdown (n 9 above)1. 
92  As above. 
93  The family is and remains the first opportunity a child has to exercise their right to participation. 
94  Parkes, (n 6 above) 31. 
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procedural right perspective it is possibly only through children’s participation in 
decision-making processes within the family, schools and governmental structures, such 
as national assemblies and local councils95 that children will learn about their rights and 
duties and respect of others’ opinions and decisions. They will most probably also learn 
that their freedom of expression, for instance, is limited by other persons’ freedom of 
expression and that through their acts other persons’ rights might be violated.96 
Based on the practicalities and requirements of this right, it is important to give 
credit to the African States who are party to the CRC and the ACRWC and the 
conceptualisation of children’s right to participation in the ACRWC in particular. The 
ratification of these instruments by African States is bold and significant especially 
considering the fact that children in Africa, in most cases within the family and some 
“adults’ only fora”, are not perceived as capable of constructively participating in 
decision-making processes.97 Possibly as a relief to parents and/or adults within African 
State parties to these instruments or one of the instruments, it is imperative to recognise 
that both provisions do not grant children in Africa or anywhere else in the world the 
right to full autonomy. Landsdown emphasises that children’s right to participation 
“does not give children the right to control over all decisions irrespective of their 
implications either for themselves or others. It does not give children the right to ride 
roughshod over the rights of their parents”.98 Rather, the right simply grants children the 
opportunity to share their opinion on matters that concern them and could affect their 
full development and also imposes on adults the responsibility to give such views due 
weight based on the maturity of the child.  
Therefore, the worry that such children’s right will empower children and 
undermine parental authority is discarded, since the extent to which a child’s view 
affects any family-decision on a matter that concerns the child is incumbent on the level 
of weight parents accord to such views. This is probably why Hart insists that it is crucial 
for families to be “encouraged to open up traditional practices to the greater 
involvement of their children as part of a general move towards creating a more 
democratic society, with greater opportunities and equal rights for all”.99 Such a move 
will justify the content of these provisions – which in some ways introduces a 
fundamental and weighty test to traditional attitudes and opinions in the manner in 
                                                            
95  Children’s participation at governmental level should be more consultative and related to pending 
decisions on issues that concern them – this will be elaborated on in detail below. 
96  Bosisio (n 70 above) 144. 
97  Chirwa (n 35 above) 160.  
98  Landsdown (n 90 above) 2. 
99  R Hart ‘Children’s participation: From tokenism to citizenship’ (1992) 4 UNICEF Innocenti Essays 5. 
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which decisions are made within families. Some communities in Africa have for a long 
time assumed childhood as a phase during which children are seen and not allowed to 
be involved in decision-making processes in matters which affect them.100 
3.1. Forms of children’s participation 
Probably evident in the analyses provided above, the notion of participation alone 
depicts several shapes, styles and types. From a political perspective, it could take the 
shape of political participation which in many instances entails political debates, 
education and voting.101 Relating to children’s participation in family decision-making 
processes, children’s participation can conveniently be classified under three 
categories.102 First, it could take the form of a collective or collaborative participatory 
process.103 In essence, this process does not require children to take part, rather, it 
mandates and requires them to be part of the process. The typical characteristic of this 
process is that it is complimentary in nature and requires that both adults and children 
collaborate in the process to achieve a common goal or outcome. Also, this process 
requires a greater partnership between a child(ren) and adults or parents with the typical 
prerequisite of active leveled engagement at any stage of a decision-making process.104 It 
could be initiated by any member of the family but must include all who are directly 
concerned or could be affected by the outcome - especially children. The collaborative 
participatory process empowers children or a particular child to influence or challenge 
an outcome or a process on a matter that concerns the child.   
Secondly, another process crucial in ensuring children’s participation is through 
consultation.105 Unlike the collaborative process, this process is opinion seeking oriented 
- which might or might not be considered in making a decision. This process is adult 
initiated and intended to assist adults to gain knowledge through seeking children’s 
opinion on a particular matter that concerns them when making a decision on an issue 
that concerns children. While this process is also commendable because it empowers 
children to express their views, and probably give expert opinion on matters that 
                                                            
100  Landsdown (n 90 above), see also, J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Seen and heard? New frontiers in child participation 
in family law proceedings in South Africa’ 2009(2) Speculum Juris 1–19. 
101  M Riekkinen Pursuing substantive participation in Russia: A perspective from international legal obligation 
and comparative law (2013) 72–118. 
102  For details on these categories, see Landsdown (n 9 above) 14–16. In her contribution, she justifies these 
categories with substantive examples from different parts of the world, including Uganda.  
103  As above. 
104  See the balance model in chapter 7 below. 
105  Lansdown (n 9 above). 
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concern them, it does not give them the opportunity to control or influence the outcome 
as in a collaborative process. 
The third process of participation considered in this thesis is a self-initiated or 
child-led participatory process.106 Unlike the other two discussed above, this process 
grants children total power and control over proceedings and outcomes. It noticeably 
takes place not in the absence of adults, but rather in their presence. However, the role 
of adults, if any, is merely supportive with little or no direct influence over the process 
and outcome thereof. Children or a particular child could take the initiative to, for 
example, seek medical advice on a health-related issue without necessarily seeking his 
or her parent’s authorisation to do so.107  
All three processes identified and discussed above are crucial and recommended 
depending on the issue or matter to be decided upon. Noteworthy, the aftermath of any 
participatory style is extremely crucial because it represents the opinions of those 
concerned, and is dependent on the method the process adopts. Generally, each process 
uses an array of different specific methods, each with its own strengths and flaws. 
However, good practice correctly dictates that whatever the process(es) adopted, it 
should be tailored to the specific context, with special consideration of the level of 
engagement required from those concerned. In the case of children, such level of 
engagement should be measured well beyond their age but with specific regard to their 
levels of maturity and understanding of the subject matter. 
In this way, parents or adults will not question a child’s capacity to understand the 
context of the issue discussed, because children’s level of understanding will be 
dependent on the devotion of parental explanation and disclosure of the information 
required to trigger a child’s understanding of the subject matter and subsequent weight 
and relevance in his or her opinion. In fact, parents should, in the case where the issue 
is complex, ensure that the child understands the issue especially if the matter is very 
central to, and concerns the child in question. Another significant consideration 
includes the availability of resources (financial and human), and the limitations on 
implementing probable conclusions. In order words, no decision-making process at the 
family level should be initiated for the sake of it but must bear every intention of acting 
on the decision arrived at. This is because not acting on a decision arrived at in a 
collaborative family decision-making process, for instance, could weaken family trust, 
unity and to a great extent, parental authority. 
                                                            
106  As above. 
107  For example, in the case of a pregnancy related decision, see Christian Lawyers association discussed in 
chapter five below. 
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3.2. Unpacking children’s right to participation in Africa 
As will be seen in chapter 4, the African legal system, both at the regional and national 
levels, has embraced children’s right to participation with some, for example South 
Africa and to some extent Ghana, providing provisions stronger than those in 
mainstream treaties. Generally, the provisions (article 4(2) of the ACRWC and 12 of the 
CRC) protect children’s right to participation without imposing any age limit and the 
Committee on the CRC discourages state parties from imposing any age limit either in 
law or in practice which may affect or hinder the effective application of this 
fundamental right.108 The no age limitation criterion to this right by the Committee on 
the CRC is bold and depicts the Committee’s commitment to ensure that this right is 
applicable and enjoyed by all children irrespective of their age. As a guiding principle, 
this right could be said to provide the yardstick with which state parties could be assessed 
in their effective and a comprehensive interpretation and implementation of all 
children’s rights. At the family level, it is probably safe to hold that from the provisions 
in mainstream children’s rights treaties only two levels are required to ensure that 
children effectively participate in family decision-making processes, and these are: a 
child’s ability to form and communicate an opinion which depends on the child’s 
maturity, and parental duty to give due weight to such an opinion expressed by the child. 
3.2.1. Children’s ability to form and communicate their opinion freely 
As indicated earlier, both provisions accentuate the fact that a child’s ability to form and 
communicate an opinion is a critical pre-condition for his or her right to participate in 
decision-making processes on matters that concern him or her. Indeed, both provisions, 
in asserting this criterion, do not impose any duty on the child; rather they require the 
duty bearer, parents, to presume and uphold every child’s ability to form a view.109 By 
implication, the onus is not on the child to prove his or her ability to form a view. Neither 
is the child obliged to fully understand the crux of the issue affecting him or her. 
However, the duty bearer should be competent enough to ascertain a child’s ability to 
form and communicate an opinion.110 Also, the insistence on the child’s capability to 
form and communicate his or her own views, Lansdown argues, should not be restricted 
to verbal communication only. The reason for this view is communication, especially 
                                                            
108 Committee on the CRC (n 27 above) para 21.  
109  As above para 20. 
110  As above para 21(2). 
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amongst some disabled children and tiny babies could take several forms, including art, 
body language, facial expression and action.111  
In order for a child’s opinion in a decision-making process to be recognised as full 
participation, it is required that such an opinion must be expressed freely.112 A family 
decision making-process presents a child with the perfect environment, an environment 
probably worth the category of a golden space due to the familiarity of the environment 
and persons to whom the children could express their views on all matters that concern 
them usually without fear or pressure. However, because human behaviour and attitude 
are generally difficult to regulate or speculate with precision, the outcome of children’s 
views within the family environment remains an interesting debate both in law and 
related social sciences. 
Generally, accepted participatory norms dictate that, in the case of a child, he or 
she should not suffer from any form of pressure, constraint or influence that might 
hinder the free expression of an opinion and/or lead to the manipulation of the child’s 
mood or feelings.113 Such an opinion should be without interference and a child must 
have the liberty to communicate his or her opinion(s) or not.114 In fact, psychologists 
insist that for a child’s opinion to be obtained, the child must be granted the opportunity 
to think and/or ask questions freely in peace and quiet.115 This is very vital, because it is 
only in such an environment that shy children will also have the opportunity to exercise 
their right to participation.  
Noteworthy, as demonstrated in chapter 6 of this thesis, to some extent, especially 
in health-related issues such as surgery, children do require an impartial additional 
guidance from adults to be able to form and express their opinions. Ang et al. avow and 
insist that in such circumstances it is critical for the adult (school, government or 
community leaders) and parents to strike a balance between letting children form and 
express their views freely and providing appropriate guidance.116 In obtaining such a 
                                                            
111  G Lansdown The evolving capacities of the child, (2005) 20. 
112  It should be very similar to adults, ‘free of influence’ when they exercise their right to participation. See 
for example, Riekkinen (n 101above) arguing the case of adult participation. 
113  MS Pais ‘Child participation’ 2000 Documentação e Direito Comparado 95. 
114  Legally speaking, and based on the provisions of art. 19 of the ICCPR, which protects everyone’s right to 
freedom of expression, “… this right includes the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, 
receive and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers”.  
115  L Runeson et al. ‘Children's participation in the decision-making process during hospitalization: an 
observational study’ (2002) Nursing Ethics 597. See also P Lanier et al ‘Parent-child agreement of child 
health-related quality-of-life in maltreated children’ (2016) Children Indicators Research 3 in which they 
support this aspect by purporting that it should be promoted because “children have ‘access’ to their own 
personal experience”. 
116  Ang et al. (n 70 above) 15. 
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balance, adults will have to act beyond just listening117 to children - to grooming their 
willingness (within themselves) to allow their initial stance to be modified or completely 
depleted, if necessary, by a child’s opinion on a matter that concerns the child. 
3.2.2. The due weight criterion and assessing the age and maturity of the child118  
There is constant growth in the recognition of the fact that no one suddenly becomes a 
responsible citizen after attaining a certain age or maturity. In fact, it has been proven 
that the quality of a responsible citizen is attained through learning and participating 
experience within the family, school and society in general.119 The inclusion of the terms 
age and maturity120 in children’s right to participation, for example, should not be seen 
as a limitation on their rights to participation but rather as a caveat which guides states 
parties’ and/or parental or adult interactions with children to be more sensitive to the 
implementation of their rights to participation in, for example, family decision-making 
processes.121 
In fact, the inclusion of the due weight criterion is a crucial indication that age and 
maturity alone cannot determine the importance of a child’s opinion.122 However, in 
practice, in some African countries, age has continuously been used as a crucial basis in 
deciding what weight is given to the views of a child, such that older children’s views are 
considered weightier than those of younger children.123 Irrespective of age, a child’s 
opinion is a key factor in decision-making processes, especially on matters that concern 
him or her – it is therefore insufficient to listen to the child but it is crucial to take what 
he or she says seriously.124 This, of course, does not mean that whatever children say 
must be complied with or that the views of young or female children will automatically 
                                                            
117  See for example, A Clark ‘Listening to and involving young children: a review of research and practice’ 
(2005) 175(6) Early Child Development and Care 491 in which she holds that “listening begins with the 
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119  See generally, UN report The state of the world’s children: A fair chance for every child (2016) 41-51 
available at http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/UNICEF_SOWC_2016.pdf [accessed 8 September 
2016]. 
120  See generally, art. 12(2) of the CRC.  
121  Committee on the CRC, GC No 5 (n 38 above) para 12. 
122  Committee on the CRC, GC No 12 (n 29 above) para 29. 
123  See for example, BK Twinomugisha Fundamentals of health law in Uganda (2015) 208 – 212 for the 
practice in Uganda. 
124  Committee on the CRC, GC No 12 (n 122 as above) para 28. 
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be given less weight; rather, it requires that their views must be considered properly and 
taken into account.125  
Besides children’s combined age and maturity, the CRC, or any human rights 
instrument for that matter, and the Committee on the CRC do not set out standards to 
be considered in giving due weight to a child’s opinion. Willow, in 2010, draws attention 
to some crucial factors essential and useful in deciding the amount of weight to be given 
to a child’s opinion.126 These include: the extent to which a child’s decision will affect the 
child and other children; the strength to the child’s views and correspondingly the 
detriment to the child, if such views are ignored; if the views are complied with, how will 
this affect the child’s rights and the rights of other children generally; and if the views 
are not complied with, to what extent can they be followed in part?127 These factors are 
indeed critical to the general consideration given to children’s views and point to the 
fact that respecting a child’s right to participation generates basic human components 
of competence, respect and tolerance to other fellow human beings. Indeed, the weight 
given to children’s opinion should be based on their level of understanding of the issues 
involved and not on their age linked to their presupposed maturity.128 This is so because 
human values such as competency, respect and tolerance do not grow homogeneously 
according to rigid stages of growth – rather, the social perspective, the nature of the 
decision, the background of the child and the level of support an adult provides to a child 
are key determinants of the capacity of a child’s understanding of the issues affecting 
him or her.129 
4. Conclusion 
In a nut shell, children’s right to participation is a complex right and perhaps the reason 
why a comprehensive implementation of this key children’s right in both the public and 
private space (family) remains an open conversation. Indeed, the fashion in which it has 
been ascribed to children is no doubt praiseworthy, but whether it has been understood 
and implemented as required by the international community in general and the 
ACERWC and Committee on the CRC in particular has left most scholars with more 
                                                            
125  As above para 53. 
126  C Willow Children’s right to be heard and effective child protection. A guide for Governments and children 
rights advocates on involving children and young people in ending all forms of violence (2010) 40. 
127  As above. 
128  Lansdown (n 90 above). 
129  As above 3. 
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questions than probably anticipated, as will be seen in the following chapters. Indeed, 
prior to the contribution of Herbots and Put in 2015,130 the definition of, or the 
diagnostics of what constituted children’s right to participation, how it should be 
understood, was based on methods and models of implementation,131 and not 
necessarily on the core content of the right as protected by international law and to a 
reasonable extent, national laws. However, the respect expected to be derived from the 
protection of this right in contemporary children’s rights instruments ought to be based 
on the fact that although it existed before the adoption of these mainstream children’s 
instruments, its identity, scope, and protection can be matched with any acceptable and 
balanced participatory procedure which most probably formed the basis for the 
recognition of the right to participation.  
It has indeed been protected in several legal instruments at the global, regional and 
national levels.132 Its wide protection also demonstrates that the expected comprehensive 
implementation of the right as it applies to children bears no reticent connotation of 
distorting moral or political structures extant in society. Rather, it bears the possibility 
to strengthen them – through enhancing inclusivity and development. It is almost 
inevitable to presume that a child’s development, just as that of any adult for that matter, 
unfolds in response to the environmental influence to which he or she is exposed. In 
fact, it goes without saying that the protection, promotion and fulfilment of children’s 
right to participation mandate that it is related to other children’s rights for the effective 
and proper development of a child to be attained.  
                                                            
130  K Herbots & J Put ‘The participation disc: A concept analyses of (a) child (’s right to) participation’ (2015) 
23(2) International Journal of Children’s Rights 154–188. See also chapter 7 below. 
131  See chapter 7 below. 
132  See chapter 4 below. 
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Chapter Three 
IT IS NOT A ‘STAND-ALONE’ RIGHT 
1. Introduction 
It is probably common knowledge within human rights discourse that no human right, 
irrespective of its benefactor, content and scope under international and human rights 
law is meant to be interpreted as a stand-alone right. Indeed, in the very definition of 
human rights and what they entail, international human rights law, for example, is very 
firm on the fact that the understanding and implementation of human rights must be 
inclusive, because human rights are interrelated.1 In the particular case of children’s 
rights, the debate might be a little stronger because unlike the different categories of 
human rights, children’s rights are governed by four guiding principles2 of which their 
right to participation is one of them. Indeed, children’s right to participation is not only 
a right, it is also a guiding principle according to which other children’s rights are 
protected, promoted and fulfilled.  
2. Other children’s participatory rights in the CRC and the 
ACRWC 
It is important to emphasize again that children’s right to participation is not confined 
to the provisions of articles 12 of the CRC and 4(2) of the ACRWC only, although there 
is a proclivity to assume this is the case.3 As a guiding principle of children’s rights in 
Africa, children’s right to participation as protected by these two front line children’s 
human rights instruments does not only epitomise the foundation of these crucial 
children’s rights but also serves as a pivot on which all children’s rights are 
                                                            
1  See for example, A Clapham Human rights: A very short introduction (2007) 1-36; H Steiner et al 
International human rights in context: Law, politics, morals (2007) 475–496 and A Skelton ‘Children, 
young people, UNICEF and participation’ (2007) 5 Children’s Geographies 165-181. 
2  See chapter 2 above. 
3  MG Flekkøy ‘A Framework for children’s participation’ in Verhellen E (ed) Understanding children's 
rights: Collected papers presented at the fifth international interdisciplinary course on children's rights 
(2000) 131. In her paper, she emphasises the fact that art. 12 of the CRC, for example, is the most 
significant participation article. 
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implemented. Noteworthy, its prime objective is to encourage state parties to grant 
opportunities to all children to learn, understand and apply democratic principles in 
all areas of their lives, including but not limited to the family, schools and their 
community in general.4  
The inclusion of children’s right to participation in the CRC and ACRWC, and the 
identification of this right as one of the four key pillars of children rights, depicts a clear 
indication that the drafters of both instruments moved away from the authoritarian 
approach adopted in the preceding children’s rights declarations5 to a more democratic 
approach which recognises the right of everyone to participation, especially on matters 
concerning them. Essentially, the indivisible and interdependent nature in which human 
rights and children’s rights in particular apply to children makes it critical to analyse 
these provisions together with other children’s rights protected in these instruments. 
The indivisibility and interdependence in the interpretation and application of, 
generally required for human rights, is critical especially when attempting to completely 
gauge the extent to which children are allowed to exercise their right to participation at 
all levels of society and especially within the family setting.6 For example, other or related 
children’s rights to participation are codified separately throughout the CRC and 
ACRWC and other human rights instruments, such as the CRPD, ICCPR and the 
CESCR, as seen below. Although its scope can be related to every other children’s right, 
a handful of these rights accentuate a stronger relation and have been classified by some 
scholars, for example Flekkøy, as the conditions and the requirements to enhance and 
facilitate children’s right to participation.7 
                                                            
4  See for example, L Krappmann ‘The weight of the child’s view (Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child)’ (2010) 18(4) International Journal of Children’s Rights 501-513. 
5  G Lansdown Can you hear me? The right of young children to participate in decisions affecting them (2005) 
1. See also, G Lansdown ‘The realisation of children’s participation rights’ in A Percy-Smith and N 
Thomas (eds), (2010) A Handbook of children and people’s participation: Perspectives from theory and 
practice 11. 
6  Committee on the CRC, GC No 12 The right of the child to be heard (2009) UN doc CRC/C/GC/12 para 
2, which, referring to the specific provision of art. 12 of the CRC provides that “[t]he right of all children 
to be heard and taken seriously constitutes one of the fundamental values of the Convention. The 
Committee on the CRC has identified participation as one of the four general principles of the 
Convention, the others being the right to Non-Discrimination, the right to life and development, and the 
primary consideration of the child’s best interests, which highlights the fact that this article establishes not 
only a right in itself, but should also be considered in the interpretation and implementation of all other 
rights”. 
7  Flekkøy (n 3 above) 131-132. 
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2.1. Conditions 
2.1.1. Freedom of expression 
Children’s right to freedom of expression is perhaps, in terms of its scope and intended 
resultant outcome, more closely related to children’s right to participation than any 
other right. Legally, it is protected by articles 7 of the ACRWC8 and 13 of the CRC.9 
Article 13 of the CRC, for example, extrapolates a much stronger protection of children’s 
right to freedom of expression than the ACRWC does – this is because it includes 
children’s right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless 
of frontiers.10 Article 7 of the ACRWC, on the other hand, simply affords any child 
capable of communicating his or her views the right to express those views freely. The 
difference in scope is not the issue because these instruments are complimentary in their 
application in Africa.11 However, children’s right to freedom of expression could face 
similar, if not the same, implementation challenges as children’s right to participation, 
because both rights are central in the protection and promotion of children’s ability to 
have a view on all matters that concern them. 
Indeed, at first glance, children’s right to participation as protected in the CRC 
appears as a sheer replication of their right to freedom of expression, since the latter 
grants children the opportunity to express their opinions, an opportunity equally 
provided to children by article 12 of the CRC. The difference between the two provisions 
lies in the fact that article 12 offers an extra dimension to their right to freedom of 
                                                            
8  Art. 7 provides that “[e]very child who is capable of communicating his or her own views shall be assured 
the rights to express his opinions freely in all matters and to disseminate his opinions subject to such 
restrictions as are prescribed by laws”. It is worthy nothing that these rights are so related that the wording 
of the ACRWC is almost identical to that of art. 12(1) of the CRC. 
9  Art. 13 provides that “1. [t]he child shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, 
in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of the child's choice. 2. [t]he exercise 
of this right may be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and 
are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; or (b) For the protection of national 
security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals”. 
10  Undeniably, the non-limitation on the type of information children can have access to, is brave and 
indicates the ardent intention of the CRC to grant children full access to information on all matters that 
concerns them and to allow them to express their opinion thereof. 
11  F Viljoen International human rights law in Africa (2012) 392. 
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expression.12 This is evident in the fact that children’s right to participation transcends 
beyond mere recognition of children’s right to seek, receive and impart information of 
all kinds – in fact, their right to participation highlights their right to express views freely, 
and further to have those views taken into consideration and given due weight in all 
matters concerning the child everywhere, including within the family. The inclusion of 
the requirement that the views of the child should be given due weight is cardinal to the 
whole process of participation, as it emphasises the fact that simply expressing an 
opinion is not enough, and calls on parents for example to listen to such expressions and 
give them due consideration based on the issue for which a decision is due.13  
Generally, the underlying intention of children’s right to freedom of expression is 
to grant children the right to hold and express opinions through any media – and this 
expression could take the form of drawing, writing or speaking. It emphasises children’s 
right not to be hindered or refrained by adults (the state and society) and parents in 
general in the opinion a child holds and/or wishes to express.14 These are very central 
issues related to children’s right to participation and constitute one of the reasons why 
children’s right to freedom of expression is considered as a condition to facilitate their 
right to participate, for example, in family decision-making processes. Indeed, as a 
condition, it is not ignorant of the fact that a child, in some cases, could be represented 
directly or indirectly in proceedings that concern him or her.15 This consideration is 
critical because, for example, it gives children who can express themselves through other 
means than verbal ones the opportunity to be represented by experts who understand 
and can explain their views to a broader audience. Significantly, every child, irrespective 
of his or her size, age, disability or creed should be granted the opportunity to express 
himself or herself in the “language” he or she can best speak.  It is the duty of parents or 
legal guardians who can interpret “language” to translate it to a broader audience, if 
necessary, and to give it due weight. It probably goes without any saying that the 
intricacies that such broad assertions hold could in most cases require further skills in 
parenting. Although, broadly, tracing such skills is very critical to the general debate on 
children’s rights to participation, the objective of this thesis is not to concentrate on 
                                                            
12  MS Pais ‘The Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (1997) United Nations manual human rights 
reporting under six major international human rights instruments 94. Worth noting, on the other hand, 
article 7 of the ACRWC requires children to express their opinions freely, which in a way reflects a 
stronger replication of children’s rights to participation – but it is limited in that it does not (on paper) 
include the consideration of their views in all judicial and administrative proceedings concerning a child. 
13  See Lundy (n 43 below). 
14  Committee on the CRC, GC No 12 (n 6 above) para 81. 
15  See, for example, art. 5 of the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on a 
communications procedure. 
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finding such balance (attaining such skills) but to analyse ways through which children’s 
opinions can best be listened to within family decision-making processes on matters that 
concern the child. Indeed, this thesis capitalises on this last assertion as it analyses in 
detail - especially in chapter seven where it introduces the balance model of participation 
in family decision-making processes - the role parents and the state should play in 
ensuring that children enjoy their right to participation in family decision-making 
processes. 
Generally, children’s right to participation imposes a positive obligation on states 
to establish significant legal frameworks and mechanisms to facilitate children’s active 
participation in decision-making processes on matters that concern them and for their 
views to be taken into account.16 Despite their slight contextual differences, in tandem, 
both rights grant children, especially those who cannot express themselves verbally, the 
opportunity to do so in other forms, including works of art, writing or in print. Indeed, 
because articles 13 of the CRC and 7 of the ACRWC jointly outline alternative means 
for children to express themselves, these articles supplement articles 12 of the CRC and 
article 4(2) of the ACRWC in the application and interpretation of children’s right to 
participation in Africa.17  
2.1.2. Freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and leisure, recreational and 
cultural activities18 
Children’s right to participation in Africa is further strengthened by their right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion19 and also by their right to leisure, 
recreational and cultural activities20 as it grants them the opportunity to think, 
participate in the artistic, cultural and religious life of their community and to express 
themselves in those activities.21 These rights should contribute immensely to facilitating 
                                                            
16  As above. 
17  J Fortin Children's rights and the developing law (2009) 42. See also, Committee on the CRC, GC No 12 (n 
6 above) para 80 which states that “[a]rticle 13, on the right to freedom of expression […] is a crucial 
prerequisite for the effective exercise of the right to be heard. [This article establishes] that children are 
subjects of rights and, together with article 12, [it asserts] that the child is entitled to exercise those rights 
on his or her own behalf, in accordance with her or his evolving capacities”. 
18  See generally arts. 9 and 12 of the ACRWC and art. 14 of the CRC. 
19  As above. 
20  Art. 12 further adds that “States Parties recognize the right of the child to rest and leisure, to engage in 
play and recreational activities appropriate to the age of the child and to participate freely in cultural life 
and the arts.  
21  R Hart ‘Children’s right to participate: Some tools to stimulate discussion on the issue in different cultures’ 
in Verhellen E (ed) Understanding children's rights: Collected papers presented at the second international 
interdisciplinary course on children's rights (1997) 227. 
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the implementation of children’s right to participation. However, in practice, the fact 
that the relationship between children’s right to participation as defined in this thesis 
could mean that children express their views on, for example, their choice of religion is 
almost impossible because generally, children do not have a right to religion. This is 
regardless of the position of, articles 9 of the ACRWC and 14 of the CRC which affords 
children the right to form views and beliefs. However, as discussed above, it cannot be 
ignored that on paper these provisions are critical rudiments to the actual 
implementation of children’s right to participation especially in decision-making 
processes on all matters that concern them.  
In fact, at the African level, there exists the possibility that this condition could 
clash with parental duty to guide a child to learn and participate in cultural and religious 
activities, as commonly, parents would prefer that children participate in the way they 
(the parents) dictate.22 What could send through a contradictory vibe in the codification 
of certain provisions in the ACRWC for example is that whilst one holds that a child has 
the right to express his or views on issues relating to beliefs, the same instrument 
obligates parents to direct the path of children to participate in religious and cultural 
practices. However, through these rights, applied here as a condition to facilitate 
children’s participation, as a condition it requires adults (parents) to quell their 
continuous dominance and domineering approach on matters that concern children or 
in their attempt exercise their creativity and to grant them the freedom to think and to 
express themselves in various ways. Indeed, article 12 of the ACRWC emphasises the 
crucial contribution play, recreation, physical and cultural activities play in a child’s 
development and socialisation. Also, the Committee on the CRC calls on state parties to 
consult children in designing such activities and that their preferences and capacities 
should be considered23- thus, encouraging participation. 
2.1.3. Freedom of assembly and association 
Both articles 8 of the ACRWC and 15 of the CRC protect children’s right to freedom 
of assembly and association, thus recognising and granting them the opportunity to be 
part of a forum within which they can freely express their views and interact with other 
children and/or members of their community. This right encourages the aspect of 
children to also form tangible relations out of the biological or legal family 
environment. Indeed, Pais asserts that this right gives children the chance to express 
                                                            
22  See for example, arts. 20 & 21 of the ACRWC. 
23  Committee on the CRC, GC No 12 (n 6 above) para 115. 
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political opinions and/or engage in political processes and participate in decision-
making processes.24  
2.2. Requirements25 
2.2.1. The best interests of the child 
It has been proven and accepted through extensive and thorough research that the best 
interests of the child principle is and remains one of the key corner stones of children’s 
rights implementation.26 Indeed, it pre-dates the CRC and the ACRWC.27 This principle 
has been described by many as a “golden thread” that runs through the CRC and 
ACRWC and should seat at the epicentre of any planning, interpretation and 
implementation of children’s rights. It is this very strong link and binding force that this 
principle exhorts with children’s rights in general and particularly its strong relationship 
with children’s right to participation that makes it a crucial requirement in the 
implementation of children’s right to participation. Indeed, almost like a rhyme, it is in 
the best interest of a child for a child to be allowed to participate - in family decision-
making processes in a matter that concerns him or her.  
Indeed, empirical and/or theoretical studies conducted over the years have pointed 
to the fact that any attempt to allow or to disallow a child from expressing his or her 
views must be guided by his or her best interests.28 These studies have established the 
fact that the best interests of the child and his or her right to participation are clear 
examples of two children’s rights and principles that complement one another. Further, 
                                                            
24  Pais (n 12 above) 97. 
25  These requirements are based on certain aspects of children’s rights protected in both instruments and 
identified under four categories.  
26  It should be noted that the best interests of the child principle is one of the guiding principles in the 
implementation of children’s rights. Others are: Non-discrimination; The life, survival and development 
of the child; Child participation; providing for the responsibilities that every child has with regard to his 
or her society, the state and the international community. See generally, Committee on the CRC, GC No 
14 on the rights of the child to have his or her best interest taken as a primary consideration UN doc, 
CRC/C7GC714 paras 41-45. 
27 Unlike most provisions in the CRC and the ACRWC, the best interests of the child had formal recognition 
in the 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child - para 2, and elsewhere. It is also recognised in the 
CEDAW – art. 5(b) and 16(1)(d). 
28  See for example, K Lloyd & L Emerson ‘(Re)examining the relationship between children’s subjective 
wellbeing and their perceptions of participation rights’ (2016) Child Indicators Research 1-18; J Eekelaar 
‘The role of the best interest’s principle in decisions affecting children and decisions about children’ (2015) 
23(1) International Journal of Children’s Rights 3–26 and A Lewis ‘Silence in the context of ‘child voice’ 
(2010) 24 Children and Society 14-23. 
48 
the best interests of the child is a crucial requirement for a child’s right to participation, 
not only because it aims to ensure a child’s best interests, but also because it strengthens 
the functionality of a child’s right to participation and decisions arrived at that must 
benefit the child, by facilitating the critical role of a child in all decision-making 
processes on matters that affect his or her life.29  
The responsibility of parents and/or adults to ensure the best interests of the child 
mandates that they should not ignore the irreplaceable contribution a child can make to 
the greater understanding of his or her welfare. Indeed, it is probably common 
knowledge that making a decision on what is deemed in the best interests of the child, 
obligates that all necessary information relating to that particular issue is acquired.30 It 
follows, therefore, that any reluctance in drawing from the principal source (child) for 
information about what a child wants, needs and believes could jeopardise the entire 
initiative of ensuring his or her best interest. Crucially, whatever the decision attained 
is, it is in the best interests of the child to be informed in a manner commensurate with 
his or her age and maturity why his or her decision was considered or rejected – this 
practice will go a long way in strengthening a child’s critical mind and trust. Actually, 
the Committee on the CRC warns that “[a]ny decision that does not take into account 
the child’s views or does not give their views due weight according to their age and 
maturity, does not respect the possibility for the child or children to influence the 
determination of their best interests”.31  
2.2.2. The evolving capacities of the child and adult32 
One other accepted requirement in the implementation of children’s right to 
participation is that parental or adult control and guidance over children diminish as 
their capacities evolve in life. However, it is important to note that parental or adult 
guidance over a child in decision-making processes varies according to the capacity of 
the child, irrespective of his or her age and also depends, largely so, on the type of 
decision and/or opinion that is required from a particular child at a particular time and 
place. The evolving capacity of a child is a key component to the development of his or 
                                                            
29  See generally, Committee on the CRC, GC No 12 (n 6 above) paras 70–74.  
30  Exceptions in this case will apply when a child is completely unable to contribute to a decision-making 
process due to acute ill health (e.g. when the child is in a coma). 
31  See generally, Committee on the CRC, GC No 14 (n 26 above) para 53. 
32  See generally, art. 5 – CRC which calls on State parties to respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of 
parents and adults “…to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving capacities of the child, 
appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present 
Convention”.  
49 
her capacities; his or her empowerment to take greater responsibilities and confidence 
in making informed choices in life.33 This requirement dictates that there is great need 
for adults to be consistent in their evaluation and balancing of all aspects necessary to 
make a particular decision on a matter that concerns a specific child or group of children. 
A child’s evolving capacity, guided by adults, has the potential to develop a child’s 
reasoning and decision-making ability. 
Remarkably, the encouragement given to children in Africa to develop their 
capacities varies. Indeed, most children in African cities and those born in “rich families” 
spend most of their childhood in full-time education during which they are socially and 
economically dependent on their parents, since work and schooling are “strongly” 
discouraged. As a contrast, most children in rural areas in Africa experience something 
completely different. For instance at the age of 10, Tonga children (as perhaps is the case 
with most children in Africa) in Zimbabwe take part in household agricultural activities, 
some are livestock owners and cash earners, and often own and control both land and 
livestock – boys would be expected to own a house while girls would be considered 
capable of managing the household in the absence of the eldest woman.34 This is certainly 
not what children’s right to participation as analysed in chapter two above and further 
throughout this thesis is all about, because, given the opportunity to express their 
opinions, children from both situations would have the opportunity to participate in 
such decisions rather than just flow with events as probably dictated by society, customs 
and adults. 
Since the family is the first point of social contact for a child, it is crucial for parents 
and, where applicable, legal guardians to continuously encourage and facilitate the child 
to freely express himself or herself from an early age. Indeed, article 9(2) of the ACRWC 
bestows on parents, and where applicable, legal guardians, the “… duty to provide 
guidance and direction in the exercise of [children’s rights] having regard to the evolving 
capacities … of the child”. A child’s evolving capacity is just one side of the equation. 
Balancing the equation would, however, require adults (parents, legal guardians, 
government) to be willing not only to listen to the child, but also to understand and 
consider the views of the child, and to reconsider his or her own opinions and attitudes 
and provide possible solutions that attend to a child’s views in the child’s best interest.35 
It is crucial to strike this balance because, after all, children are entitled to protection in 
                                                            
33  G Lansdown The evolving capacities of the child, (2005) 3.  
34  P Reynolds Children in Zimbabwe: Rights and power in relation to work (1995) 1(3) Royal Anthropological 
Institute of Great Britain and Ireland 17. 
35  UNICEF fact Sheet: The right to participation, available online at www.unicef.org/crc/files/Right-to-
Participation.pdf [accessed 15 April 2013]. See also chapter 7 below. 
50 
accordance with their relative immaturity.36 The Committee on the CRC avows and adds 
that every child has a right to “direction and guidance, which have to compensate for 
the lack of knowledge, experience and understanding of the child and are restricted by 
his or her evolving capacities”.37   
2.2.3. Freedom of information 
Generally, access to information is a key requirement for anybody to make an informed 
decision or provide consent in a particular situation. The case of children is not different. 
In fact, both the CRC and the ACRWC are persistent (even though the CRC accentuates 
a much stronger protection) on this requirement as it applies to children in the 
enjoyment of their right to participation. A child’s right to freedom of information 
reinforces his or her right to participation. Indeed, the CRC holds that State parties 
should recognise the important function performed by the mass media to ensure that 
the child has access to information and material from a diversity of national and 
international sources, especially those aimed at the promotion of his or her social, 
spiritual and moral well-being and physical and mental health38 and to develop 
appropriate guidelines for the protection of the child from information and material 
injurious to his or her well-being, bearing in mind the provisions of a child’s right to 
freedom of expression39 and parental responsibilities for the upbringing and 
development of a child.40 Indeed, Pais holds that it is through providing a child with 
adequate information on a particular issue(s) concerning him or her, that a child obtains 
the necessary tools, confidence and maturity required to express his or her views and 
possibly influence decisions.41 It is this linkage between providing adequate information 
to a child and the confidence and capability in expressing himself or herself in matters 
that concern him or her that makes this requirement crucial and essential in the 
implementation of children’s rights to participation in Africa. Indeed, the Committee 
on CRC highlights that the more a child knows, the more he or she acquires experience 
and understands issues and their implications.42 Even though this assertion by the 
Committee seems general, it is intended and limited only to information on issues that 
concern a child and not information on issues that concern adults only. In this regard, 
                                                            
36  Lansdown, (n 33 above) ix. 
37  Committee on the CRC, GC No 12 (n 6 above) para 84. 
38  See art. 17 of the CRC. 
39  See art. 13 of the CRC. 
40  See art. 18 of the CRC. 
41  Pais, (n 11 above) 96. 
42  Committee on the CRC, GC No 14 (n 26 above) para 44. 
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it is logically the responsibility of parents, legal guardians or other legally responsible 
persons to be progressive, thus starting from providing guidance and direction which 
would later transform into reminders and advice, and later to partners in decision-
making as the child develops.  
2.2.4. Space, voice, audience and influence43 
Lastly, beside children’s evolving capacities and access to adequate information, ‘one’ 
other key requirement for the effective implementation of their right to participation in 
Africa is the allocation of space (the opportunity to express their views), voice (assistance 
in expressing their views), audience (to listen to their views) and influence (the 
consideration of their views).44 Engaging meaningfully with children in Africa, for 
example, strongly points to these four components. The creation of a conducive space 
for children, for example, will go a long way in building self-confidence and freedom to 
express views that are adequate and appropriate in a particular issue that concerns them. 
The allocation of a child-friendly space has huge psychological impetus on abetting a 
particular child to air his or her view(s) calmly and with certainty. Certainly, the creation 
of space without an audience to listen to a child’s views would be insignificant because, 
as analysed above, a child’s view, in a matter that concerns him or her needs to be given 
due weight. This can only be achieved if there is an audience who can seriously consider 
children’s views as necessary contributions to the conclusion that may be attained on 
issues that concern them. At the level of the state, this is a requirement that most state 
                                                            
43  See generally, the provisions of arts: 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16 of the CRC and arts: 4(2), 7, 8, 9 and 12 of the 
ACRWC. For further details on this requirement, see L Lundy ‘‘Voice’ is not enough: Conceptualising 
article 12 of the United National Convention on the rights of the Child’ (2007) 33(6) British Educational 
Research Journal 933. According to Lundy, there is an overlap amongst these four components and 
especially between space and voice, and audience and influence. Also, they depict the fact that there is an 
explicit chronology in the implementation of children’s right to participation. The first stage is ensuring 
the child's right to express a view. Following on from this is the child's right to have the view given due 
weight. However, in recognition of the fact that the decision-making processes are rarely static, the model 
acknowledges that, once the child is informed of the extent of influence, the process may begin again. 
Finally, the model represents the fact that children’s right to participation can only be understood fully 
when it is considered in the light of other relevant provisions in the CRC, in particular their rights to non-
discrimination (art. 2), the protection of their best interests (art. 3), their right to guidance (art. 5), and 
their right to freedom of expression (art. 13). Although Lundy refers only to the CRC, her comments are 
just as relevant in respect of the corresponding provisions of the ACRWC (arts. 3, 4(1), 9(2)(3) and 7 
respectively. 
44  Lundy (as above) 933. 
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parties to the CRC and the ACRWC have met through involving children in parliament 
sessions both at national and provincial levels.45 
3. Other participatory rights under other international and 
regional instruments related to children’s right to 
participation 
Elsewhere, besides the rights mentioned in the CRC and the ACRWC and several 
others not articulated above, children’s participatory rights also enjoy coverage in 
other international human rights instruments. Notably, article 25 of the ICCPR,46 
articles 13 and 15 of the CESCR and article 7 of the CRPD protect children’s right to 
participation. In fact, the context of the CRPD is worth a special mention, as it expands 
the scope of both the CRC and the ACRWC to protect disabled children’s right to 
participation. Also, children’s right to participation enjoys significant protection 
under some African regional human rights instruments. A case in point is the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). The ACHPR protects, in article 
7(1)(a), the right of every individual to have his or her cause heard (including 
children); to receive information in article 9(1) and subsequently in article 9(2) to 
express and disseminate his or her opinion within the law. Also, article 8 protects 
everyone’s right to freedom of conscience, and to free practice of religion, and article 
13(1) protects the right of “[e]very citizen … to participate freely in the government of 
his country, either directly or through freely chosen representative”. Although these 
provisions are significant in the broad analysis of children’s right to participation, it is 
common knowledge that a stronger protection of this right as it applies to children can 
be found in the CRC and the ACRWC.  
The protection afforded by these instruments is enough to ensure that children 
do enjoy this right in family decision-making processes. However, recognising 
children as equal beneficiaries to these other treaties takes nothing away from the 
fundamental aspect and protection of children’s right to participation; rather, it 
                                                            
45  BD Mezmur & J Sloth-Nielsen Advocating for child participation in NEPAD (2008) 19 - 21. Available at 
<http://www.africanchildinfo.net/documents/ADVOCATING%20FOR%20CHILD%20PARTICIPATI
ON%20IN%20NEPAD%20-%20Final%20Copy.pdf> [accessed 26 December 2013]. See also, L Ehlers & 
C Frank ‘Child participation in African context’ in J Sloth-Nielsen (ed) Children’s rights in Africa: A legal 
perspective (2008) 116-122. 
46  Attention, however, should be paid to the provision of art 25(b), which protects the right to vote. In most 
African countries children are not allowed to vote – the youngest voter is 18 in some African countries.  
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strengthens such rights. Indeed, instead, their consideration bears the potential of 
redirecting parental perceptions of children’s rights as not only protected in an 
instrument intended for children but also found and applicable in instruments 
intended for adults. This accentuates key international human rights law doctrines, 
such as the doctrine that human rights is for every human being irrespective of their 
creed, race or age.   
4. Conclusion 
At the international and regional levels, it seems, at least from the analysis provided 
above, that children’s right to participation, especially in family decision-making 
processes, is a necessity in the proper development of a child. In fact, it is deducible 
that the nature and scope of children’s right to participation, as the right and a guiding 
principle, should give meaning and guide the effective implementation of all children’s 
rights – without discrimination based on disability47 or creed. As a right, it obligates 
state parties, society and parents to grant children the opportunity to participate in all 
decision-making processes on matters that affect them.  
In all, these conditions and requirements are merely basic aspects which are 
required for children to best enjoy this right. At the family level, parents or legal 
guardians have a significant part to play in ensuring that this right is delivered to 
children when needed. Indeed, a combination of both the requirements and conditions 
stated above will ensure that a child is meaningfully engaged in the decision-making 
process of a matter which concerns him or her. However, the protection of this right is 
not without challenges; cultural, traditional, gender and age based discrimination could 
frustrate its implementation, especially at the family level. This is because meaningful 
engagement is of core significance in promoting active participation and gives content 
to a child’s right to participation while embracing other related participatory principles, 
such as transparency and accountability.48 To ensure such attainment, international law 
has not limited the protection of this right only in these mainstream children’s rights 
instruments, as it can also be traced in other international human rights instruments not 
                                                            
47  See also, art. 7 of the CRPD.  
48  It should be emphasised that the aspect of meaningful engagement has been richly developed under Socio-
economic rights jurisprudence and considered broadly as a process that creates a voice for the 
marginalised and impoverished. For details, see for example, L Chenwi ‘‘Meaningful engagement’ in the 
realisation of socio-economic rights: The South African experience’ (2011) 26 South African Public Law 
Journal 128–156. 
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directly attributed to children but equally important to children. As will be noticed in 
the chapter below, despite its broad recognition and acceptance, it remains a challenge 
for this right to be implemented within the family and this thesis intends to confirm this 
fact and to make possible suggestions on which this right, dominantly expressed within 
politics,49 should be groomed within family decision-making processes. In the chapter 
that follows, this thesis attempts an analysis of the domestication of children’s right to 
participation. 
 
                                                            
49  See art. 25 of the ICCPR. 
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Chapter Four 
A COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL AND 
POLICY REFORM OF CHILDREN’S 
RIGHT TO PARTICIPATION 
1. Introduction 
Legal and policy reforms at national level are, jointly, a key component to the effective 
implementation1 of the specific intent of any provision under international law. In the 
case of children, the translation of children’s rights in general into reality in Africa, is 
largely dependent on the national action of the state parties to the CRC and the ACRWC 
as well as other treaties that include rights relevant to children.2 Indeed, article 4 of the 
CRC, for example, calls on state parties to take all appropriate legislative, administrative 
and other measures to implement the rights recognised in the Convention. The 
Committee on the CRC in interpreting the scope of article 4 declares that the request 
that states parties take appropriate measures, to ensure that the rights in the Convention 
are given legal effect within domestic legal systems “should be considered of 
fundamental importance for the implementation of the Convention”.3 Such measures, 
the Committee continued “should include effective remedies for the parents and other 
                                                            
1  The Committee on the CRC has defined implementation as “the process whereby States parties take action 
to ensure the realization of all rights in the Convention for all children in their jurisdiction.” See 
Committee on the CRC, GC No 5 (2003) General measures of implementation of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, UN doc. CRC/GC/2003/5 (2003) para 1. Implementation, in the context of 
international human rights law, has also been defined by the UN OHCHR as “moving from a legal 
commitment, that is, acceptance of an international human rights obligation, to realization by the 
adoption of appropriate measures and ultimately the enjoyment by all of the rights enshrined under the 
related obligations’. See United Nations, Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights on 
implementation of economic, social and cultural rights, UN doc. E/2009/90 (2009) para 3. 
2  See generally, L Lundy et al ‘Incorporation of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 
in Law’ in M Freeman (ed.) The future of children’s rights (2014) 305. See also, J Donnelly Universal human 
rights in theory and practice (2nd edition) 171 in which he asserts that, “the fate of human rights – is largely 
a matter of national, not international, action”. 
3  Committee on the CRC Report on the twenty-second session UN doc CRC/C/90 (1999) para 291(d). 
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relevant individuals or groups, and be in accordance with Article 27 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties”.4 5 
The ACRWC echoes similar measures in its article 1(1), in which it calls on state 
parties “to adopt such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect 
to the provisions of [the] Charter”. Although similar to the provision of article 4 of 
the CRC mentioned above, the weight of the obligation to state parties in the ACRWC 
is different and weaker as compared to the weight of the obligation in the CRC. The 
ACRWC uses “or” as opposed to “and” as is the case in the CRC. The use of “or” in 
the ACRWC gives state parties the option to either take only legislative measures or 
other measures, whereas the CRC is stricter, as it requires state parties to adopt both 
legislative and other measures in implementing the CRC. Both measures are crucial 
and relevant in the effective implementation of children’s rights and should be 
embraced concomitantly. It is crucial that African states, in implementing children’s 
rights in general, take all appropriate measures into consideration. Goonesekere holds 
that any legal reform with the ordinary objective of “putting the law in place” is 
insufficient to achieve both harmonisation of national legislation with the CRC [and 
the ACRWC] and to give any effect to the appropriate implementation of children’s 
rights.6 Sloth-Nielsen concurs and rightly points out that a comprehensive 
domestication of the CRC and the ACRWC is not only the preserve of a parliamentary 
activity through the enactment of laws but also the jurisprudence and activities 
emanating from the courts.7 Also beyond the courts other institutions, both state and 
private owned, are crucial actors in ensuring the comprehensive domestication of 
children’s rights. 
Cautiously, international human rights treaties do not, in general, prescribe how 
state parties are to give effect to their duties at national level – but it requires them to 
take all appropriate measures in doing so.8 Hence, it is entirely up to states to device the 
method within their discretion in the implementation of the treaties they have ratified, 
                                                            
4  Art 27 of the Vienna Convention provides inter alia that, “A Party may not invoke the provisions of its 
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty”.  
5  Committee on the CRC (n 3 as above). 
6  See generally, S Goonesekere Protecting the world’s children: Impact of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child in diverse legal systems, Introduction and Overview (2007). 
7  J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Children’s rights in Africa’, in M Ssenyonjo (ed) The African Regional Human Rights 
System; 30 years after the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (2012) 171. 
8  See generally, Human Rights Committee, GC No 3 (1981) Article 2 Implementation at the National Level 
UN doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 4 (1994) para 1. See also, CRC Committee Report on the twenty-second 
session UN doc CRC/C/90 (1999) para 291. 
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subject to the satisfaction of those duties in practice.9 According to Doek, the preferred 
method chosen by a state, at the African regional level, at the minimum, entails “… 
activities of a government to ensure that national laws and related administrative 
regulations are in full compliance with the CRC, the African Charter and the [three] 
optional protocols to the CRC (where ratified)”.10 These children’s rights treaties 
provide a platform for African state parties to adopt an approach based on the full 
recognition of children as rights holders guided by the principles and provisions 
protected therein. As such, they remain fundamental reference points for the content 
and process of any legal reform a state might pick.  
Generally, the collective acceptance of children’s rights (through the ratification 
of these treaties) at the African level guarantees the foundational phase of any legal 
reform that may take place within a state in respect of protecting and promoting 
children’s rights and children’s right to participate in a family decision-making process 
in particular. Such assurance has been recognised by most children’s rights advocates 
as depicting a manifestation of the necessary benefits of the general protection of 
children’s rights, especially in the family. Pupavac, for example, seems convinced that 
the interest in children displayed through the ratification of the CRC, can be regarded 
as “transcending political and social divides and able to mobilize societies to confront 
social problems”.11 On the one hand, evidence of the veracity of this assertion can be 
found in the fact that for the first time, thus far, there was a mass acceptance (through 
ratification) of an international human rights instrument within a short space of time 
(nine months)12 – thus depicting general acceptance, one voice and stance in protecting 
and promoting children’s rights in general. However, on the other hand, the lack of a 
universal consensus on how to formulate and accept a united structure on the form 
                                                            
9  Committee on the CESCR, GC No 3 (1990) The nature of States Parties obligations UN doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 14 (2003) para 4. See also, Human Rights Committee (n 8 above).  
10  J Doek Harmonisation of laws on children: Some practical guidance (2007) 2 available at 
https://app.box.com/s/ca19481c7d5dc225abff [accessed 30 December 2014]. 
11  V Pupavac ‘Misanthropy without borders: The international children’s right regime’ (2001) 25(2) 
Disasters 95. 
12  The first countries to ratify the CRC during the nine months period were: Bangladesh (3 August 1990), 
Belize (2 March 1990), Benin (3 August 1990), Bhutan (1 August 1990), Bolivia (26 June 1990), Chile (13 
August 1990), Ecuador (23 March 1990), Egypt (6 July 1990), El Salvador (10 July 1990), France (7 August 
1990), The Gambia (8 August 1990), Ghana (5 February 1990), Guatemala (6 June 1990), Guinea (13 July 
1990), Guinea-Bissau (20 August 1990), Honduras (10 August 1990), Kenya (30 July 1990), Mauritius (26 
July 1990), and Mongolia (5 July 1990). On a different note, the closest treaty ratification to this milestone 
is that of the CRPD (also very crucial to the protection of disabled children’s rights), which entered into 
force 16 months after adoption. At the corresponding time, it now has an impressive 150 State 
Ratification. Its track record leaves me with no doubt that it would gain a universal ratification in no 
distant time. 
58 
the protection and promotion of children’s rights should take,13 and especially how to 
enforce such rights at the family level, is worrying and makes Pupavac’s assertion to 
some extent questionable. 
At the national level, as displayed in this chapter, several state parties have adopted 
strategies to ensure the successful implementation of children’s rights in general and 
within the family in particular in their respective countries. In fact, some have enacted 
legislation that supports and strengthens the rights enshrined in the CRC and the 
ACRWC as well as children’s rights in other treaties that they have ratified. However, as 
the Committee on the CRC puts it, “this inclusion does not automatically ensure respect 
for the rights of children”.14 The Committee further adds that “[i]n order to promote the 
full implementation of these rights, including where appropriate the exercise of rights 
by children themselves, additional legislative and other measures may be necessary”.15 
The recognition of the possible “exercise of rights by children” is critical because it 
speaks directly to an acceptable extent to rights, such as children’s rights to participate 
in family decision-making processes. This is worth noting, because it is not only the crux 
of this thesis but more so a right which gives children the possibility to access other rights 
through participating in, for example, family decision-making processes on matters that 
concern them. 
From this background, the purpose of this chapter is first to appraise the legal and 
administrative reforms that African states have adopted to ensure the promotion and 
protection of children’s right to participation in general and in the family in particular. 
If possible, emphasis will be placed on the extent to which states recognise such rights 
for children within the family. Secondly, the chapter attempts a detailed comparative 
analysis of both the legal and administrative reforms in South Africa and Cameroon. 
The rationale of this second part is to highlight the differences both in structure and 
implementation of children’s rights that could be found in Africa. The countries are not 
directly representative of the entire continent, but both share characteristics such as bi-
jural legal systems, Civil law in the case of Cameroon, Common law, Islamic law 
(Shari’a) in the case of Cameroon, and languages, cultural and religious practices which 
are traceable in most parts of the Continent. Also, based on the statistics provided by the 
                                                            
13  T Kaime The Convention on the Rights of the Child: A cultural legitimacy critique (2011) 18. However, 
there are common denominators across cultures and governmental systems which in turn validate a 
common contextual development of the CRC. One of such is the general knowledge of children’s rights 
and the inclusion of such on governmental agendas. Indeed, today, any discussion on children’s rights is 
almost ludicrous without reference to the CRC. This is the case irrespective of the cultural or traditional 
context in which such discussions take place. 
14  Committee on the CRC, GC No 5 (n 1 above) para 21. 
15  As above. 
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ACPF16 and UN reports analysed in this chapter, the countries represent the worst group 
and the best group at the African regional level in terms of child protection legislation, 
implementation and budget allocation. 
2. Integrating children’s right to participation in national laws in 
Africa17  
Generally, children’s rights have had a gaugeable influence on the legal and policy 
frameworks in Africa. Although a comprehensive integration, formulation, 
modification, specialisation and application is far from complete, the extent and speed 
at which African states have domesticated children’s rights after the adoption of both 
the CRC and the ACRWC deserves some credit.18 There is substantial disparity, 
however, between African states and jurisdictions in the extent to which they have 
domesticated children’s rights to participation in their respective legislations and in the 
guidelines for practice, and how they have met their obligations under international 
children’s rights law. Indeed, such effort has also been manifested in shifting the trend 
of the concept of children’s rights protection in Africa from the general inclusion of 
specific children’s rights in Constitutions19 to the enactment of Acts of law and decrees 
specifically dealing with a range of children’s rights. This shift does not only highlight 
the intent of African states to domesticate children’s rights but it also shows the lengths 
to which they are willing to go to ensure that besides mainstream international children’s 
rights instruments, children’s rights enjoy a wider coverage at domestic level. 
Indeed, the recognition and acceptance of both the CRC and the ACRWC at the 
African regional level is a clear indication of states parties’ commitment to protect and 
promote the rights of children in Africa. Specifically, unlike the CRC and the ACRWC, 
                                                            
16  The African Child Policy Forum, The African report on child wellbeing: Towards greater accountability to 
Africa’s children (2013) 39–47. 
17  It is worth noting that the countries listed in this sub-section is not exhaustive of national laws that protect 
children’s right to participation – others have been mentioned throughout this thesis. 
18  The ACERWC is cognizant of the need to improve the scope of a comprehensive protection of children’s 
rights at the national level and aspires, through its recent publication on Africa’s agenda for children: 
Fostering an Africa fit for children by 2040 – and specifically goal No 2 which provides that: “An effective 
child-friendly national legislative, policy and institutional framework is in place in all member States”. 
19  In fact, 36 Constitutions can be identified in which Children’s rights feature. These include Algeria, 
Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, 
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Sao Tome et Principe, Senegal, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, Uganda, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
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many of the children’s rights Acts20 that have been enacted by several African states make 
explicit mention of children’s right to participation, including the extension of such 
rights in the family environment. This drives home the point that even though it is not 
explicitly mentioned in mainstream children’s rights instruments, this crucial children’s 
right is deeply rooted in legal discourse both at the global and African regional level. The 
need to consider children’s opinions in matters that concern them, in family decision-
making processes for example, is indeed a legal obligation to all African State parties to 
the instruments mentioned above. 
Encouragingly, even though the ACRWC was born out of concerns from African 
states based on the lack of adequate African representatives in the drafting process of the 
CRC and the lack of enough African ideologies included in the rights it protects, both 
instruments share striking similarities in some of the rights they protect at the African 
regional level.21 These similarities, coupled with the fact that they are meant to protect 
children’s rights, has led many scholars to confirm that both instruments complement 
one another in protecting children’s rights in Africa. This thesis adds that its existence 
at the African regional level puts Africa in a better child protection situation (on paper), 
not only because unlike in other regions there exists two binding exclusively dedicated 
children’s rights instruments in Africa, but more so because they provide a wider 
coverage of issues related to children at the regional level not covered elsewhere.22  
With an estimated total of 43 per cent of its population under the age of 15, the 
assertion of children as the leaders of tomorrow is more intensely true in Africa than 
elsewhere in the world.23 However, as analysed above, ensuring the well-being of a child 
and his or her rights in general is not about nurturing him or her to be a leader of 
tomorrow but also as a leader of today.24 Unfortunately, this has been characterised by 
children being abused as labourers, soldiers and sex-workers. Worse, the relaxed and 
slow-paced implementation of children’s rights in some African states vindicated, to 
some extent, by culture and tradition (displayed in this thesis) often aggravates the 
                                                            
20  Discussed sporadically in this chapter and throughout this thesis. 
21  See, for example, the protection of children’s right to privacy. 
22  Jointly, both instruments accentuate a higher standard to children’s rights protection. Credit must be 
given to both instruments, but specifically to children in Africa – the ACRWC provides valuable weight 
to the CRC in its provisions on culture, tradition, religious practices and customs. 
23  This percentage contrasts largely with the world’s percentage which as of 2013 stood at 29 per cent. See 
generally, Population Reference Bureau, World Population Data Sheet 2013, http://www.prb.org/pdf13/ 
2013-population-data-sheet_eng.pdf [accessed 3 January 2014].  
24  UNICEF, State of the world’s children 2011: Adolescence: An age of opportunity available at 
http://www.unicef.org/sowc2011/pdfs/SOWC-2011-Main-Report_EN_02092011.pdf [accessed 4 January 
2014]. 
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vulnerability of children in Africa. Such characteristics are also easily identified within 
the family which in many ways dictates and instructs whether children are included in 
decision-making processes on matters that concern them. 
Noteworthy, all is not doom and gloom. In fact, there are glimpses of both formal 
and informal recommendable examples of children’s participation in decision-making 
processes in Africa. This section is intended to highlight such recommendable examples 
in selected (random) countries and also to highlight in detail the efforts made by the 
countries under scrutiny in this study in their attempt to protect children’s right to 
participation. A greater detail of instances of respect for children’s views within family 
decision-making processes will be analysed in the chapters that follow.  
To start with, from a cultural perspective, several aspects of some African 
traditions make it possible for children to have access to useful information, to learn 
from the wisdom of elders, and to participate in decisions within the family (more so on 
matters that concern the child) and their communities in general.25 Indeed, classic 
African practices such as storytelling, folklores, songs and sitting around fire sites 
provide a relaxed and conducive environment for children in particular to express 
themselves and for their parents and other adults to listen and consider their views. 
Unfortunately, such practices have become formalities in some communities and 
abandoned in others over time. Even though still very popular in rural areas and/or poor 
families, city families and/or rich families are increasingly falling behind. 
From a statutory point of view, some countries have transcended beyond the 
ratification of the CRC and ACRWC and their Constitution26 to codify children’s rights 
at the national level with express provisions protecting children’s right to participation 
in general and in the family in particular. For example, the Rwandan Law relating to 
Rights and Protection of the Child against Violence27 is designed specifically to protect 
children in Rwanda and it obligates that before any decision is made regarding a child 
in an administrative or judicial proceeding, the views of the child must be heard, either 
                                                            
25  Through classic African traditional practices such as sitting around the fire-site, sharing folklore, stories 
and songs, elderly (adult) people always gave children the opportunity to participate actively. In fact, 
among the Lomwe people of Malawi, children are encouraged to participate in decision-making within 
the family and through other forms of participation such as song and dance, recitals and role play, 
communicating directly to parents and communication through intermediaries. Although encouraging, 
this is not always “indicative that children’s views were taken into account. It nevertheless provides 
evidence that children were not only seen but also heard”. See Kaime (n 13 above) 131. 
26  See for example, secs 33 (freedom of thought, opinion, conscience, religion, belief and public 
demonstration), 34 (freedom of the press and freedom of information) and 35 (freedom of association) 
of the 2003 Constitution of Rwanda. 
27  Law No. 27/2001 of 28 April 2001, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/46c423cb2.html [accessed 
4 January 2014]. 
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directly or indirectly through a representative.28 This law also specifically calls on parents 
and guardians to grant children the opportunity to participate in family decision-
making processes on matters that concern his or her welfare including good living 
conditions, healthcare and education. In doing so, the law encourages families to allow 
the child to develop physically, in his or her thinking ability, intellectually, culturally and 
in life in general.29  
This example is also reflected in other African states. For example, in Botswana, 
children aged between 11 and 18 years were consulted during the review of the 
Children’s Act in 2001,30 during which their perspectives regarding how the legislation 
should be changed were listened to.31 Even though this is a display of children’s 
participation in a public matter, it is encouraging that the children involved could share 
their views on how they would like their rights to be protected through the Children’s 
Act in Botswana. Indeed, this Act has a devoted provision on children’s participation 
which mandates the participation of children who are “of such age, maturity and level 
of understanding as to be able to participate in decisions” on all matters that concern 
them.32 The Act does not create any specific context in which such rights should be 
promoted and protected – its broad context is, however telling of the state parties’ 
intention to ensure that such right is practiced in every decision-making process and the 
family is no exception. Elsewhere, in Sierra Leone, children between the ages of 12 and 
18 were not only consulted, but were equally allowed to produce and present their own 
version of the State report on Children to the Committee on the CRC in 2006.33 
Remarkably, this was before the State adopted its Child Right Act in 2007, which 
generously flaunts a range of children’s participatory rights.34 However, based on the 
focus of this thesis, article 45 of the Child Right Act of Sierra Leone35 is worth 
highlighting as it grants children the right to participate towards family cohesion and 
the responsibility to respect parents. Granting children in Sierra Leone, such an 
opportunity to influence the protection of their rights at the family level, is a bold 
statement which accentuates the fact that children’s rights are protected even at the 
                                                            
28  As above art. 9. 
29  As above art. 14. 
30  The end product of this process was the passing into law of the Botswana Children’s Act 08 of 2009, available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/83322125/Botswana-Children-Act-08-of-2009 [accessed 4 January 2014]. 
31  The African Child Policy Forum, (n 16 above) 23. 
32  See generally, art. 9(1) of the Act. 
33  Committee on the CRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States parties under Article 44 of the 
Convention – Sierra Leone - UN doc CRC/C/SLE/3-5 para 87. 
34  See for example arts. 23–46 of the Child Right Act, 2007. 
35  As above. 
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family level. Indeed, through such rights children will also get the opportunity to express 
their views on matters that concern them in family decision-making processes. 
Also, in line with the CRC and the ACRWC, Mozambique has adopted a children’s 
Act which mandates that the views of the child must be heard and given weight in all 
situations where the child faces instances of the administration of justice.36 The 
protection in Mozambique is limited, as it does not make any direct reference to the 
recognition of such right within the family. However, broadly speaking, its recognition 
within the administration of justice could, for example, redress such gaps for example 
in child custody matters. Unlike Mozambique, the Ghanaian Children’s Act specifically 
mandates that no child capable of forming views shall be denied the right to express 
those views in a matter that concerns him or her and this includes family decision-
making processes.37 However, the State (and this is also common in most African states), 
reporting to the Committee on the CRC in 2012, highlighted the fact that there is 
compelling media reports to the fact that children in some Ghanaian communities and 
families are still seen and not heard.38 
In the United Republic of Tanzania, the principle that the views of the child have 
to be respected has also been translated into a statutory obligation by the State party. In 
this context, the 2011 Zanzibar Children’s Act, in section 5, obliges the State to ensure 
that the “views expressed by the child may be given due consideration”. In terms of 
section 11 of the 2009 Law of the Child Act of the Mainland, a child has the “right of 
opinion and no person shall deprive a child capable of forming views the right to express 
an opinion, to be listened to and to participate in decisions which affect his well-being”. 
Other states that have enacted children’s codes include Togo (who enacted their 
Children’s Code in 2007), The Gambia (who enacted a broad Children’s Act in 200539), 
and Benin40 and Sierra Leone (who enacted their Children’s Acts in 200741). These Acts 
                                                            
36  See generally, Promotion and Protection Law on Child Rights No 7/2008, of 9 July 2008. 
37  See generally, sec 11 of the Act No. 560 of 1998. In its recent (2016) State report submitted to  
the ACERWC, the State party emphasised that this provision also extends to children expressing  
their views in family life. The report is available on http://www.acerwc.org/download/ 
ghana_initial_report_under_the_acrwc/?wpdmdl=8775 [accessed 21 November 2016]. 
38  Committee on the CRC, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the 
Convention –Ghana (2012) UN doc CRC/GHA/288/3-5 para 76. It is worth noting that though the state 
presented this unfortunate finding, it was quick to highlight that “traditions die hard, despite that fact that 
general recognition of children’s views may be increasing”. 
39  See generally, Children’s Act 38 of 2005. 
40  See generally, Code de l’enfant du Bénin de 2007. 
41  For a comprehensive update on the countries that have domesticated the CRC and the ACRWC, see, 
http://www.africanchildforum.org/clr/Harmonisation%20of%20Laws%20in%20Africa/other-
documents-harmonisation_16_en.pdf [accessed 6 January 2014]. 
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enjoy a nationwide application status within the boundaries of the countries examined 
above and so, too, is the case in several other African states. What is worth emphasising 
here is the fact that most of these laws are generally required to be applicable without 
restrictions. However, reality has a different perspective as will be indicated in the 
forthcoming chapters. Conversely, exceptions to such nationwide status in the 
application of laws (related to children in this case) lie in countries that practice strict 
federal systems of government such as Nigeria. 
The transition from a military rule of government to a democratic and civilian rule 
of government in Nigeria was not per se a peaceful one. However, since in place, the 
latter system of government has been hailed for its effort in ensuring “peace” in Nigeria 
and enacting laws that are pro-democracy and human rights centred. One such law is 
the Child’s Rights Act.42 Through this Act, specific children’s rights, such as their right 
to participation, have been protected. Indeed, the Act requires the courts, for the 
purpose of any specified proceedings, to appoint a guardian ad litem for the “child 
concerned to safeguard the interests of the child, unless it is satisfied that it is not 
necessary to do so”. Also, the courts can “consult the wishes of the child in considering 
what order ought to be made in protective proceedings”.43 It should be noted that these 
rights afforded to children in Nigeria never existed in national laws prior to 2005. 
Generally, the Act, particularly the specific provision protecting children’s right to 
participation, along with similar provisions in the CRC and the ACRWC, are worth 
celebrating because they give children in Nigeria the right to have an influence on 
matters that concern them in family decision-making processes. 
Nonetheless, unlike the other examples mentioned above, this Act has struggled to 
enjoy a nationwide impact. This is due to the federal system of government on which 
Nigeria operates coupled with the fact that children’s rights protection is on the residual 
list of the Nigerian Constitution, giving states exclusive responsibility and jurisdiction 
to make laws relevant to their specific situations. Indeed, not every state in Nigeria has 
accepted the Act, let alone acknowledges the specific aspect and context of children’s 
rights to participate in the decision-making processes on matters that concern them.44 
Resultantly, the promotion of this historic Act in the context of Nigeria has not and will 
not in a great rush attain the impact which is expected of it. 
                                                            
42  See generally, Child’s Rights Act 2003. 
43  As above, secs 72 – 91.  
44  For example, Nigerian States especially those in the North have rejected the Act, claiming it contradicts 
Islamic laws. The good news though is Federal Government Institutions such as courts (even those based 
in States that have not accepted the Act) have the mandate to implement the Act and entertain cases 
related to the Act. 
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In all, the countries highlighted above are a snapshot of the current status quo of 
African states who have attempted to domesticate children’s right to participation 
especially in the family. It is encouraging to note that every African state has ratified the 
CRC and most the ACRWC, as will be noted later in this thesis. However, regrettably, 
the legislative assurance or certainty in the domestication of children’s rights is far from 
certain in some African countries.45 In Mali, for example, the process to enact a child-
related law has not yet been instituted. However, in the absence of any domestic law 
expressly protecting children’s rights, the government has successfully involved children 
in parliament sessions and has continuously implemented the principle of children’s 
right to participation through awareness-raising campaigns over the years. The 
Committee on the CRC has commended such sessions and campaigns in its concluding 
observation on Mali, but raised concerns about the traditional societal attitudes that 
have contributed to limiting the ability of children in Mali to express their views freely 
within the family, schools, communities, courts and other institutional settings.46   
3. Structural Practicality 
3.1. Legislative and administrative procedure in South Africa and Cameroon 
The impressive acceptance and enactment of laws at national level in Africa intended to 
strengthen children’s right to participation is not surprising. Indeed, the rush at which the 
CRC was ratified by African states47 and the zeal that the then OAU (now the AU) had in 
adopting an African specific children’s rights instrument are both strong indicators of why 
children’s rights legislations are popular on the continent. Also, these are factual 
indicators to the fact that African member states are willing to ensure that the rights are 
delivered to children. However, there is a significant disjuncture between the intent and 
actual implementation and outcomes of the laws in question. From a general point of 
view, children’s right to participation has not been satisfactorily schematised as an 
obligatory state funded democratically prescribed process in political and social spaces in 
                                                            
45  The ACERWC is aware of this limitation and has undertaken in its agenda 2040 to ensure that there is a 
comprehensive ratification, domestication and implementation of children’s rights by 2020.  
46  Committee on the CRC, ‘Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: second 
state party report: Mali’ UN Doc CRC/C/MLI/CO/2 para 33. 
47  Currently, all 54 African states have ratified the CRC and Ghana, is on record as the very first Country 
globally to ratify the CRC on 5 February 1990. 
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Africa and, consequently, it remains principally an ad hoc one.48 As indicated and 
objectively justified in chapter one, this sub-section intends to provide as in-depth analysis 
of the situation in South Africa and Cameroon. The majority of the issues discussed below, 
in general, highlight the strengths and weaknesses of the measures put in place within 
these countries to guarantee the implementation of children’s rights in general and their 
right to participation in particular within family decision-making processes. 
3.1.1. The status of children’s right to participation under South African legislation  
Following South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy, the notion of 
childhood and which members of society are considered children and in need of legal 
protection changed drastically. The emergence of a human rights protection framework 
for all children became a reality with the adoption of the Constitution in 1996,49 and 
South Africa’s ratification of the CRC in 1995 and the ACRWC in 2000. These legal 
guarantees are surrounded and supported by an array of legislative, policy and 
institutional frameworks such as the Children’s Act50 and institutions such as the South 
African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), the Commission for Gender Equality 
(CGE), the Office of the Public Protector (OPP) and the children’s court.  
Despite these developments in South Africa underscored above, and discussed 
further below, children in South Africa, as in Cameroon and many other African 
countries, are not necessarily only affected by the operation of a variety of “modern” 
laws.51 It is reported that the lives of a considerable percentage of children in South Africa 
are also governed by a plurality of religious and customary laws and practices extant in 
South Africa.52 Some cultural practices, such as male circumcision and virginity testing 
for girls, offer little or no options for children to express their views, as children are only 
required to obey.53 The truth is, even though these practices are required by culture, the 
                                                            
48  S Moses “Children and participation in South Africa: An overview” (2008) 16 International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 333–337. 
49  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
50  Act 38 of 2005. 
51  Most African States practice civil, common and Muslim laws. This is the case with Ivory Coast, Nigeria, 
and Ghana. See generally, In the Best interest of the Child, Harmonising Laws on children in West and 
Central Africa, available at http://www.acerwc.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/English-ACERWC-
Harmonising-Laws-on-Children-in-west-and-central-Africa.pdf [accessed 13 January 2014]. 
52  R Songca ‘Theorising children’s rights as a multi and inter-disciplinary field of study’ (2012) in F Viljoen 
(ed) Beyond the law: Multi-disciplinary perspectives on human right 151. For details on the various cultural 
practices extant in South Africa, visit South African History Online available at 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/defining-culture-heritage-and-identity [accessed 29 April 2015]. 
53  See generally, the African Child Policy Forum report (prepared by Julia Sloth-Nielsen) Harmonisation of 
laws relating to children – South Africa 9–11. 
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final decision whether to commit or not to commit them is made at the family level and 
generally, children are afforded neither space nor time to express their views. 
A limitation of the impact of such cultural and religious laws and practices that could 
restrict children’s right to participation, especially in the family, is afforded in the 
Constitution. The 1996 Constitution expressly recognises such diversity of laws and 
practices co-existing in South Africa. Nonetheless, the relevant provision54 provides that 
the freedom to practice such religious and customary laws is only permitted to the extent 
that those laws are consistent with the fundamental rights protected generally in the Bill 
of Rights and specifically under section 28 of the Constitution (which protects the rights 
of children). Also, by extension, section 15 (on freedom of religion, belief and opinion) of 
the constitution also calls families to practice cultural and religious practices that are not 
repugnant to children’s rights treaties, or related treaties duly ratified by South Africa. 
The laws enacted at the national level in South Africa (the Constitution and other 
children’s laws) analysed below are progressive laws and have contributed immensely to 
South Africa’s impressive ranking in 2008 (top 10 in Africa)55 as a child-friendly 
country.56 A follow-up ACPF report in 2013 shows that South Africa maintained its 
child-friendly status.57 The outstanding performance of South Africa is also motivated 
by the allocation of adequate budgets both at national and provincial levels, for sectors 
targeting children. This is also supported by the fact that the state has mechanisms in 
place to ensure that those budgetary allocations are translated into better child well-
being outcomes.58 In 2015, the then South African Finance Minister, during the inaugural 
national budget speech presented to Parliament, remarked that the expenditure on “health 
and social protection will continue to grow steadily … Health spending will reach R178-
                                                            
54  See, sec 15 – freedom of religion, belief and opinion of the Constitution of South Africa. 
55  The other countries in the top 10 list are, Mauritius, Tunisia, Egypt, Cape Verde, Rwanda, Lesotho, 
Algeria, Swaziland and Morocco. 
56  African Child Policy Forum (2008), The African Report on Child Wellbeing: How child-friendly are African 
governments? Addis Ababa: The African Child Policy Forum 7. See also, A Bequele Monitoring the 
commitment and child-friendliness of governments: A new approach from Africa (2010) 34 Child Abuse & 
Neglect 7. 
57  See, ACPF’s report (prepared by A Bequele et al) The African Report on Child Wellbeing 2013 Towards 
greater accountability to Africa’s children xv Available at http://a-dtap.awepa.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/12/ARCW2013-English.pdf [accessed 10 January 2014]. 
58  As above. 
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billion in 2017/18 … [South Africa has] seen a marked reduction in child mortality over 
the past five years, supported by improved access to antenatal services”.59 
It is also welcoming that in her second periodic report to the Committee on the 
CRC submitted under article 44 of the CRC, the government of South Africa expressly 
indicated that it has also encouraged the respect of the views of the child in schools, 
families and in judicial and administrative matters concerning a child.60 It is worth 
noting that the respect for the views of the child is also protected by law in South Africa, 
as demonstrated below.  
The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
The 1996 Constitution of South Africa is one of the first in Africa to give recognition to 
a host of rights, including specific provisions on children’s rights, in its Bill of Rights.61 
Noticeably, articles 9 (equality), 10 (human dignity), 11 (life), 12 (freedom and security 
of person), 15 (freedom of religion, belief and opinion), 16 (freedom of expression), and 
18 (freedom of association) are all applicable to children not only because these are also 
protected in the CRC and the ACRWC but also because they are central to their right to 
participation, as seen in chapter three of this thesis.62 It is probably safe to hold that this 
array of rights along with some government social policies for children,63 such as the 
                                                            
59  At the corresponding time, the Minister of Finance was Mr. Nhlanhla Nene. For details on this  
speech, go to: http://www.mediaclubsouthafrica.com/economy/4165-south-africa-s-budget-2015-the-
full-text#ixzz3Yn41oVDq [accessed 30 April 2015]. See also the 2017 budget speech presented to 
parliament by the then Finance minister Mr. Pravin Gordhan at the corresponding time when this thesis 
is being updated as the minister reports on further increases – 20 – 22 available at 
http://www.heraldlive.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/speech.pdf [accessed 4 April 2017]. 
60  Committee on the CRC, Consideration of report submitted by South Africa under article 44 of the CRC, 
CRC/C/ZAF/2 para 121. 
61  One recent Constitutional development that has followed in South Africa’s footsteps is the Kenyan 
Constitution of 2010 (see, for example, s 53), available at http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/ 
LCIL/ documents/transitions/Kenya_19_2010_Constitution.pdf  [accessed 12 May 2015]. 
62  See for example the Teddy Bear Clinic case (2014 (2) SA 168 (CC) para 38, in which J Khampepe asserted 
that “In my view, the correct approach is to start from the premise that children enjoy each of the 
fundamental rights in the Constitution that are granted to “everyone” as individual bearers of human rights”. 
63  For details on these social policies for children, see Child Gauge 2016 available at http://www.ci.org.za/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1166&Itemid=922 [accessed 4 April 2017]. 
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Child Support Grant,64 the Forster Child Grant,65 and the Care-dependency Grant66 have 
improved, on a general note, the situation of children in South Africa compared to that 
of children in Cameroon, for instance, analysed below.    
Section 28(1) of the Bill of Rights provides specifically for children’s right to a name 
and nationality from birth; to family, parental or appropriate alternative care; to basic 
nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services; to protection from 
maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation; to protection from exploitative labour 
practices; to be protected from providing services that are inappropriate or place their 
well-being, education, physical or mental health or spiritual, moral or social 
development at risk; to be detained only as a last resort and then with special rights; and 
to legal representation. Section 28(2) accentuates that the child’s best interests are to be 
rendered paramountcy in every matter concerning the child. The importance of having 
a separate provision protecting children’s rights, in addition to general rights provisions, 
is that at least, in theory, it recognises children as legitimate rights holders. Although not 
included in the list of children’s rights under section 28, children’s rights to participation 
in decision-making processes on matters that concern them, is widely recognised and 
legally protected in South Africa through other legislations and international treaties 
that South Africa has ratified.  
                                                            
64  The South African Child Support Grant (CSG) was first introduced in 1998. Over the past 16 years, South 
Africa’s social grant programme has evolved into one of the most comprehensive social protection systems 
in South Africa. The CSG is an important instrument of social protection in South Africa, reaching over 
10 million South African children every month. For details, see, The South African Child Support Grant 
Impact Assessment: Evidence from a survey of children, adolescents and their households (2012), available 
at http://www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/dsd_The%20South%20African%20child%20support %20 
grant%20impact%20assessment%20report.pdf [accessed 15 April 2015].   
65  Under this grant, a foster child is a child who has been placed in someone’s custody by a court as a result 
of being orphaned, abandoned, at risk, abused, or neglected. Details on this grant can be found here 
http://www.sassa.gov.za/index.php/social-grants/foster-child-grant [accessed 15 April 2015]. 
66  This grant is intended for a child who has a severe disability and is in need of full-time and special care. 
Details on this grant can be found here: http://www.gov.za/services/child-care-social-benefits/care-
dependency-grant [accessed 15 April 2015]. 
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International children’s law in South Africa 
The consideration of international law in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights is 
mandated under section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution.67 Also, section 233 of the 
Constitution requires courts to afford preference to “any reasonable interpretation of … 
legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation 
that is inconsistent with international law”. Taking into consideration both provisions, 
the absence of an express inclusion of children’s rights to participation in the 
Constitution does not diminish or distort the implementation of the right. Besides, by 
ratifying the CRC and the ACRWC, South Africa has assumed obligations in relation to 
ensuring that children are granted the opportunity to participate and for their opinions 
to be taken into consideration in all matters that concern them, both in the public and 
the private space (family).  
In addition to the CRC and the ACRWC, South Africa has ratified other 
international treaties which also obligate the State to ensure children’s right to 
participation. These include the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) (1995), the ACHPR (1996), the ICCPR 
(1998), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) (1998), the CRPD (2007), the African Women’s 
Protocol (2004) and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
on the involvement of children in armed conflicts (CRC-OP-AC) (2009). These 
                                                            
67  The Constitution, in encouraging the courts to consider international law, does not indicate whether the 
international law considered should be binding or not. However, the Constitutional Court has held that this 
would include a consideration of both binding and non-binding international law. See Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC) para 26 where the Constitutional Court 
restated its position in S v Makwanyaye and Another 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) para 35 as follows “… public 
international law would include non-binding as well as binding law. They may both be used under the section 
as tools of interpretation. International agreements and customary international law accordingly provide a 
framework within which [the Bill of Rights] can be evaluated and understood, and for that purpose, decisions 
of tribunals dealing with comparable instruments, such as the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the 
European Commission on Human Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights, and, in appropriate 
cases, reports of specialised agencies such as the International Labour Organisation, may provide guidance as 
to the correct interpretation of particular provisions of [the Bill of Rights]”. See also, J Dugard ‘The role of 
international law in interpreting the Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10 South African Journal on Human Rights 213, in 
which Dugard underlines that the main advantage of section 39(1)(b) (previously sec 35(1) in the interim 
Constitution) is that courts will not have to go through the processes of verifying whether such laws are binding 
and acceptable at the national level but will merely apply what is reasonable and acceptable in the context of a 
particular case before the court. The indication of a compulsory consideration of international law – both 
binding and non-binding – in the interpretation of the Bill of Rights is breath-taking and highlights the extent 
to which the State is willing and committed to protecting rights. 
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instruments, alongside the specific provisions which relate to children’s right to 
participation, have been indicated earlier in chapter two.68  
In a recent development, in 2015, the State ratified the CESCR.69 According to 
Nolan, the CESCR is a crucial treaty in the general protection of children’s ESC rights – 
not only because the ESC rights, as captured in the CRC, for example, are drawn from 
the CESCR but also because these rights are very critical to children as a vulnerable 
group. Further, the CESCR grants a broader protection of ESC rights to ‘everyone’ than 
the CRC.70 The two factors, according to Wringe, which underscore the importance of 
ensuring a better protection of ESC rights to children are their vulnerability and their 
lack of skills or capacity to negotiate their stake in accessing these rights for themselves 
within their communities.71 The ratification of this treaty adds more weight to the 
government’s effort to effectively ensure children’s ESC rights in South Africa. It also 
puts children in South Africa in a better position to claim the rights protected in the 
CESCR in the same way as they would the rights protected in the other international 
treaties listed above. In the context of this thesis, these rights are also very crucial because 
they give children better options to have a legitimate claim to be involved in a family 
decision-making process on matters that concern them, for example, their right to 
health which is also a recognised ESC right and discussed in this thesis. 
Other children’s laws in South Africa 
It would be fair to assert that the South African Constitution discussed above sets an 
encouraging precedence in the general protection of children’s rights in South Africa, 
and provides a legal basis, drawing from international law, in protecting children’s right 
to participation applicable in the family as well. Moreover, several laws, policies and 
programmes, as illustrated below, have subsequently been enacted that elaborate on 
children’s rights, including further provisions on their right to participation in family 
                                                            
68  See the section on other children’s participatory rights under other International and Regional 
Instruments. 
69  The importance of ratifying the CESCR, especially relating to children, cannot be overstated. For example 
see, L Chenwi ‘Putting flesh on the skeleton: South African judicial enforcement of the right to adequate 
housing of those subject to evictions’ (2008) 8(1) Human Rights Law Review 105–137; S Liebenberg, ‘The 
value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human 
Rights 1–31, and D Brand, ‘Introduction to socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution’ in 
D Brand & C Heyns (eds) Socio-economic rights in South Africa (2005) 1–56. 
70  See generally, A Nolan ‘Economic and social rights, budgets and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child’ in M Freeman (ed) The future of children’s rights (2014) 121–150. See also P Proudlock ‘Children’s 
socio-economic rights’, in T Boezaart (ed) (2009) Child law in South Africa 291–308. 
71  C Wringe Children’ rights: A philosophical study (1981) 135–6. See also, A Nolan Children’s socio-economic 
rights, democracy and the courts (2011). 
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decision-making processes on all matters that concern them. The laws that have been 
enacted expressly recognise children’s right to participate in decision-making processes 
within the school, community, and government. Unfortunately, such protection has 
been dominantly within the public space and the family decision-making process has 
enjoyed very limited recognition. However, just as in the case of Cameroon below, some 
of the laws that are analysed in this sub-section are intended to show the extent to which 
children’s right to participation has been protected in the public space, as this thesis 
hopes that the next step will be to extend such laws as well into the family space. 
For instance, the National Education Policy Act (NEPA),72 which is designed to 
regulate the procedures for the determination of national education policy, is one such 
law. In it, the Minister of Education is mandated to consult with national student 
representative bodies as part of the policy development process.73 This requirement is 
laudable because for the first time, students and learners74 in South Africa are accorded, 
equally and without any distinction, the opportunity to be consulted in the designing of 
national education polices in South Africa. Even though this Act grants enormous power 
to the Minister to select and constitute the consultative groups, it provides students 
(especially children) in South Africa with an undeniable and value-added responsibility 
to participate in the designing of national education policies.  
Another legislative development in South Africa aimed at ensuring children’s right 
to participation within schools is the South African Schools Act (SASA).75 This Act 
provides for the regulatory framework within schools and obliges learner participation 
in both the governance and disciplinary processes, in this way encouraging inclusivity. 
Specifically, this Act obligates compulsory consultation of leaners during the 
development of a code of conduct. Further, when facing suspension, they must be given 
the space (fair hearing) to present their views to the school governing body, the 
membership of which includes learners as well.76 The importance of complying with the 
above is illustrated in the case of Antonie v Governing Body, Settlers High School and 
Others.77 The case was brought before the Cape High Court by a learner, after she had 
been suspended for five days by her school’s governing body for breaching the school’s 
                                                            
72  National Education Policy Act (NEPA) 27 of 1996. 
73  As above, sec 5(1). 
74  Art. 1, of the South African Schools Act defines a learner as “any person receiving education or obliged to 
receive education”. 
75  South African Schools Act (SASA) 84 of 1996. 
76  See generally, SASA secs 8, 9, 23 & 24. 
77  Antonie v Governing Body, Settlers High School and Others 2002(4) SA 738 (CPD). 
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code of conduct (wearing dreadlock hairstyle under a cap).78 The court set aside the 
decision of the school’s governing body, highlighting in the process that it failed to give 
adequate recognition to the right of the learner to freedom of expression and a fair 
hearing. A child’s right to freedom of expression, as analysed in chapter three79 is closely 
related to his or her right to participation. Participation involves not just hearing of 
someone’s view but giving due consideration to the view, which the governing body 
failed to do in this case. 
Perhaps a more related Act to the trend of analysis in the context of family 
decision-making processes in this thesis is South Africa’s Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act (CTPA - 1996).80 The Act protects the right of pregnant minors (“any 
female under the age of 18 years”)81 to consent to an abortion, provided that the medical 
practitioner or registered midwife or registered nurse advises her to consult with her 
parents, guardian, family members or friends before the pregnancy is terminated.82 
Remarkably, the Act further stipulates that “termination of the pregnancy shall not be 
denied because such minor chooses not to consult” her parents, guardian, family 
members or friends.83 It should be noted that this Act is not only ground-breaking 
because it repealed a similar but restrictive law promulgated during apartheid,84 but also 
because of its progressiveness and nation-wide coverage regardless of the cultural, 
traditional and/or religious beliefs or practices that may exist in South Africa on this 
issue. The Act also allows for a high level of protection for a pregnant minor who may 
have fallen pregnant because of sexual abuse, as the mandatory consent of an adult is 
not required if the minor chooses to terminate the pregnancy.85 Through the protection 
of a child’s right to make a decision in a pregnancy-related case, the Act accentuates a 
child’s ability to make personal and reasonable decisions and when the child chooses to 
                                                            
78  See also, Radebe and Others v Principal of Leseding Technical School and Others [2013] (1821/2013) 
ZAFSHC 111. 
79  See section on other children’s participatory rights in the CRC and the ACRWC. 
80  Act 92 of 1996. 
81  As above, sec 1, which defines a minor 
82  As above, sec 5(3), see also sec 5(1) which requires the informed consent of the pregnant woman and no 
one else as a critical aspect in the termination of pregnancy. The inclusion of this provision empowers 
pregnant children equally. 
83  As above.  
84  The preamble of the Act provides that “[t]his Act … repeals the restrictive and inaccessible provisions of 
the Abortion and Sterilization Act, 1975 (Act No. 2 of 1975), and promotes reproductive rights and 
extends freedom of choice by affording every woman the right to choose whether to have an early, safe 
and legal termination of pregnancy according to her individual beliefs”.  
85  RE Mhlanga ‘Abortion: Developments and impact in South Africa’ (2003) 67(1) British Medical Bulletin 
118-119. 
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collaborate with his/her parents in a family decision-making process on a very critical 
matter such as pregnancy termination. 
In fact, the acceptance of this provision and its legality was tested in the case of 
Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health.86 In this case, the complainants 
challenged the constitutionality of the CTPA and whether it complies with the 
constitutional right of the child to parental or family care in section 28(1)(b) of the 
Constitution. The High Court based its decision on the legislative requirement of 
informed consent and held that valid consent can only be obtained from a person with 
the intellectual and emotional capacity to interpret and understand the intricacies that 
surround such a choice – a capacity the court acknowledges children do not have.87 
However, the court proceeded to state that the CTPA serves in the best interest of a 
pregnant girl child because it is flexible to recognise and accommodate the individual 
position of a girl child based on her “intellectual, psychological and emotional make up 
and actual majority”.88  
Other relevant pieces of legislation include the Local Government Municipal 
Systems Act (LGMSA),89 which grants the local community90 the right to participate in 
the planning, review and monitoring of municipal services.91 This was closely followed 
by the National Health Act (NHA),92 which obligates the inclusion of children in local 
health planning and requires that consent to research and experimentation conducted 
on them be given by their parents or legal guardians and the child if the child, is capable 
of understanding.93  
                                                            
86  Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 2004 (10) BCLR 1086 (T). For more analyses of the 
facts of this case, see H Kruger ‘Traces of Gillick in South African jurisprudence: Two variations on a 
theme’ 2005 (46)1 Codicillus 1-14. 
87  Christian Lawyers Association (as above) para 1093H. 
88  As above, 1105F. 
89  Local Government Municipal Systems Act (LGMSA) Act 32 of 2000. 
90  The term local community is generic and thus includes children. Art 1 of the Act states: “‘local 
community’ or ‘community’, in relation to a municipality, means that body of persons comprising - (a) 
the residents of the municipality; (b) the ratepayers of the municipality; (c) any civic organisations and 
non-governmental, private sector or labour organisations or bodies which are involved in local affairs 
within the municipality; and (d) visitors and other people residing outside the municipality who, because 
of their presence in the municipality, make use of services or facilities provided by the municipality, and 
includes, more specifically, the poor and other disadvantaged sections of such body of persons.” 
91  See generally, LGMSA (n 89 above) ch 4. 
92  National Health Act 61 of 2003. 
93  As above, sec 71. 
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To date, one of the most progressive of the laws that have been promulgated is the 
Children’s Act.94 Generally, this Act provides the legislative framework for a 
comprehensive child protection strategy which contains provisions necessitating the 
consideration of children’s opinions in all matters that affect them. The Act stipulates 
that children’s right to participation extends to “all proceedings, actions and decisions 
by any organ of state in any matter concerning a child or children in general”.95 It goes 
on to add that “[e]very child that is of such an age, maturity and stage of development 
as to be able to participate in any matter concerning that child has the right to participate 
in an appropriate way and views expressed by the child must “be given due 
consideration”.96 Noteworthy is the Act’s meticulous classification of children – it 
emulates the concept of the CRC and the ACRWC without introducing any age 
checkpoints to a child’s ability to express his or her view and to participate in “any 
matter” concerning him or her. The inclusion of “age and maturity” in section 10 of the 
Act should not be considered as a limitation but as a barometer in weighing a child’s 
opinion. The broadness of this Act is what distinguishes it from other legislation passed 
in South Africa. In fact, the content of the Act is neither too broad nor too narrow; it is 
purely intended to protect, amongst others, children’s right to participation in “all 
matters” that concern them. 
Closely followed, is the Prevention of and Treatment of Substance Abuse Act 
(PTSAA),97 which obligates authorities to consult children in the treatment of substance 
abuse - most of the provisions encouraging children’s participation are delineated and 
corroborated throughout the PTSAA with reference to sections in the Children’s Act. 
For instance, the Act’s requirement for children to be included in discussions aimed at 
identifying solutions to substance abuse problems for the prevention and early 
intervention programmes is linked to section 148 of the Children’s Act; probably as a 
regulatory mechanism.  
Also, linked to the Children’s Act is the Child Justice Act (CJA).98 This Act grants 
children the right to be heard when they are in conflict with the law in all processes that 
concern them.99 The chain reaction created by linking other laws to the Children’s Act 
                                                            
94  Children’s Act 38 of 2005. Generally, the Act covers a vast array of issues relating to children in South 
Africa, including the family, matters relating to adoption, marriage (forced marriage), health care, medical 
procedures and treatment, social services and justice. 
95  As above, sec 6(1)(a) read with sec 10. 
96  As above, sec 10. 
97  Prevention of and Treatment of Substance Abuse Act (PTSAA) 70 of 2008. 
98  Child Justice Act (CJA) 75 of 2008. 
99  The Act actually mandates the magistrate to encourage the participation of a child before making any 
decision(s) on any issue that concerns the child – see for example s 47(7).  
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echoes unity in these laws both in theory and practice (including interpretation). It also 
reaffirms the foundational concept of children’s rights as indivisible in fact and law.  
Last and not least among South Africa’s collection of progressive children’s 
participatory right protection is the National Youth Development Agency Act 
(NYDAA).100 The Act requires the participation of all youth (between 14 and 35 years 
old)101 in democratic processes, community and civic decision-making processes, and 
development at all levels.102  
Although it is different, the protection of children’s right to participation is 
consistently developed in all these national laws, policies and programmes applicable in 
South Africa. Indeed, these pieces of legislation, although very limited in their protection 
of children’s right to participation in family decision-making processes, have, from a 
general view point, nonetheless paved the way for an expected expansion and 
recognition of children’s right to participation which extends to family decision-making 
processes in South Africa.  
Institutional development in South Africa 
Besides the cluster of laws enacted by South Africa identified above, there are several 
institutions in South Africa, both public and private, that act as watchdogs to South 
Africa’s constitutional democracy. At the national level, the famous of these institutions 
are regulated by chapter 9 of the Constitution - credited for the creation of the so-called 
chapter nine institutions.103 Although state funded, these are ‘independent’ watchdogs 
                                                            
100  National Youth Development Agency Act (NYDAA) 54 of 2008. 
101  It should be noted that it is beyond the scope of this thesis, based on the definition of ‘youth’ provided in 
the Act, to rely on the age group specified. Rather, the author will limit further analysis of this provision 
as it applies to children between the ages of 14 to 18 years old. 
102  See generally, sec 4 of the NYDAA. 
103  These include: The Office of the Public Protector (OPP), the South African Human Rights Commission 
(SAHRC), the Commission for the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and 
Linguistic Communities (CRL Rights Commission), the Commission for Gender Equality (CGE), the 
Auditor-General and the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC). Sec 181(2) of the Constitution states 
that ‘these institutions are independent, and subject only to the Constitution and the law, and they must 
be impartial and must exercise their powers and perform their functions without fear, favour or prejudice’. 
Section 181(3), on the other hand, underscores the need for their independence, and calls on all other 
organs of state to assist and protect these institutions and to ensure their independence, impartiality, 
dignity and effectiveness. Furthermore, s 181(4) prohibits any person or organ of state from interfering 
with the functioning of these institutions. Section 181(5) states that these institutions are accountable to 
the National Assembly and requires them to report on their activities and the performance of their 
functions at least once yearly. Importantly, as per ch 9 of the Constitution, all these institutions, though 
interrelated in their task, have independent tasks. 
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to South Africa’s constitutional democracy.104 Three of these institutions - the SAHRC, 
the CGE and the OPP - are relevant to the general investigation and monitoring of 
children’s rights violations. These institutions have national coverage with offices in all 
nine provinces of South Africa.105 They are centrally mandated to expose unlawful and 
corrupt practices and to uncover failures of the executive, the legislature or government 
officials, for example on issues related to children’s rights violations.106  
They also play an educational role through the promotion of the values of 
openness, accountability and respect for children’s rights, in government and amongst 
ordinary citizens.107 As De Vos points out, they have the “duty to reveal weaknesses and 
problems by collating and publishing information” on matters that relate to, for 
example, children’s rights violations.108 The OPP, for example, has over the years 
investigated and published reports on issues that are related to children’s rights.109 The 
CGE has also carried out several studies and investigations on human rights violations, 
predominantly on violations on the rights of the girl child in the broader context of 
gender.110  
The most well-known of the three institutions indicated above is the SAHRC. This 
institution has conducted more research and investigations on children’s rights in 
                                                            
104  See for example, P de Vos ‘Balancing independence and accountability: The role of chapter 9 institutions 
in South Africa’s constitutional democracy’, available online at https://www.academia.edu/3005430/ 
Balancing_Independence_and_Accountability_The_Role_of_of_Chapter_9Institutions_in_South_Afric
a_s_Constitutional_Democracy [accessed 3 January 2015]. 
105  These provincial offices have greatly facilitated accessibility to these institutions. For the provincial offices 
of the CGE, see http://cge.org.za/contact-2/, for the SAHRC, see, http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/ 
index.php?ipkContentID=2&ipkMenuID=2 and for the OPP, see, http://www.pprotect.org/contact_us/ 
provincial_regional_offices.asp.  
106  For further details on the mandate of these institutions see, ch 9 of the South African Constitution. See 
also J Cherry et al “The role of chapter 9 institutions and the Pan South African Language Board”, available 
at http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/docs/pcsa/social/legacy/chapt4a.pdf [accessed 17 April 2015]. 
107  The SAHRC, for example, has conducted several seminars and workshops on children’s rights. It also has 
as one of its main focus areas “Children’s rights and basic education”.  
108  P de Vos (n 104 above) 173. 
109  See for example, “Report of the Public Protector in Terms of Section 182(2)(b) of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 and Section 8(1) of the Public Protector Act, 1994”, available at 
http://www.pprotect.org/library/investigation_report/Report%20No.%2038%20Signed.pdf [accessed 17 
April 2015]. 
110  See for example, Report by the CGE, (2012) Combatting domestic violence against women and children in 
the Western Cape by Increasing Access to Shelters and Improving the Quality of Services, available at 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B43RY8hVdugGZ25SX1NmTVpfWW8/view [accessed 24 April 2015]. 
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general than any other chapter nine institution.111 The SAHRC is also unique because it 
has the mandate to summon human rights abusers and to conduct hearings and make 
recommendations to the government and the legislature.112 Since its inception, and as an 
institution established to support constitutional democracy, the SAHRC has monitored 
the realisation of children’s rights in South Africa through investigating complaints 
alleging violation of children’s rights and embarking on numerous advocacy and 
research initiatives.113 Reporting in 2011, the SAHRC held that more attention should be 
given to South African children’s meaningful participation in the decisions taken on 
matters that concern them to ensure that the conclusions arrived at truly reflect their 
needs and have the desired impact.114 
Also, the State has created special courts for children only.115 The children’s court 
affords an opportunity for children to participate during proceedings on matters that 
concern them. Generally, the court’s competence is on matters related to children who 
are in need of care and protection and to make decisions about children who are 
abandoned, neglected or abused. Other courts, such as High Courts, the Supreme Court 
of Appeal and the Constitutional Court in South Africa have also dealt with a 
considerable number of children’s rights related cases.116 In fact, as demonstrated above 
the courts are mandated to listen to the views of the child on matters that concern the 
child. Such practices have been discussed in detail in the preceding chapters, especially 
in the context of state intervention into the family environment to settle or investigate 
issues related to failed or absent children’s participation in matters that concern them at 
                                                            
111  This could be as result of many issues, but the most common is that the SAHRC has identified children’s 
rights and basic education as one of its key focus areas. Visit for example, the SAHRC page on general 
reports, available here http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/index.php?ipkContentID=17&ipkMenuID= 
20[accessed 27 April 2015] and http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/index.php?ipkContentID= 
121&ipkMenuID=104. 
112  See for example the SAHRC’s Report of the Public Hearing on the Right to Basic Education available at 
http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/Reports/Right%20to%20basic%20education%202006.pdf. See other 
Public hearings reports of the SAHRC here, http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/ 
index.php?ipkContentID=15&ipkMenuID=19 [accessed 29 April 2015]. 
113  C Murray “The human rights commission et al; what is the role of the South Africa’s Chapter 9 
Institutions?” (2006) 9(2) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 122 -197. 
114  SAHRC Report, (2011) South Africa’s Children: A review of equity and child rights (see section on 
Message by Commissioner Lindiwe Mokate) Available at http://www.sahrc.org.za/home/21/files/ 
SA%20CHILDREN%2024%20MARCH%202011%20SAHRC%20_%20UNICEF%20REPORT.pdf 
[accessed 27 April 2015]. 
115  See generally, ch 4 of the Children’s Act, 2005 (Act No 38 of 2005). 
116  Some of the cases dealt with by these courts have been analysed in this thesis. 
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the family level. Also, the Children’s Act grants a child the competence to approach the 
court in person or through a representative.117  
Elsewhere, a steering committee has been created at the National Prosecuting 
Authority (NPA)118 to monitor and improve the NPA’s implementation and 
commitment to the principle of First Call for Children in an effort to promote the well-
being of children. Through this committee, the NPA is giving children political priority 
and visibility, implementing and monitoring the impact of coordinated and effective 
action, and promoting children’s rights to protection, development, survival and 
participation in society.119 
Another crucial institution which promotes children’s rights is Parliament. The 
Children’s Parliament120 sessions create a platform for children’s participation in 
democracy and affords them an opportunity to express their views on policies as well as 
programmes and strategies intended to realise their rights. In 2014, the children used 
the opportunity to voice their concerns on a range of issues, such as poor education 
especially for disabled children, sexual violence and abuse, lack of safety in their homes 
and alcohol and substance abuse.121   
3.1.2. The status of children’s right to participation under Cameroonian legislation  
From a geo-political and legal point of view, Cameroon has factual differences from the 
situation in South Africa and such differences have been highlighted in this sub-section 
with the main focus on highlighting its strength in the protection and promotion of 
children’s rights in general and their right to participation in particular. From a 
legislative point of view, Cameroon has little legislative protection in place for children. 
As will be indicated in this sub-section, the limited legislative protection afforded to 
children in Cameroon weakens their claims and protection of their rights in general and 
their right to participation in particular at the national level. Further, the struggles of 
                                                            
117  See generally art. 53(2) of the Act.   
118  Established under sec 179 of the Constitution, the NPA is governed by the National Prosecuting Authority 
Act (Act No. 32 of 1998). The Constitution, read with this Act, provides the NPA with the power to 
institute criminal proceedings on behalf of the State, to carry out any necessary functions incidental to 
institution of criminal proceedings and to discontinue criminal proceedings. It is accountable to the 
Minister of Justice and Correctional Services. 
119  Committee on the CRC, Consideration of report submitted by South Africa under art. 44 of the CRC, 
CRC/C/ZAF/2 para 233. 
120  The Children’s Parliament is co-hosted by the Nelson Mandela Children’s Fund, the Department of Social 
Development and the Parliament of South Africa. In total, the children’s parliament is made up of 108 (12 
per province) children aged between 11 and 17 years old. 
121  See generally, The Nelson Mandela Children’s Parliament 2014, available at 
http://www.nelsonmandelachildrensfund.com/what-we-do/youth-parliament/ [accessed 1 May 2015]. 
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Cameroonian children are aggravated by several bureaucratic challenges hindering 
them from thriving beyond the normal “difficult childhood”. These include, but are not 
limited to, inadequate implementation of the limited existing sectoral laws and policies 
intended to assist children, unsatisfactory budgetary allocation for services related to 
children, such as education and health care, compounded by an endemic 
mismanagement of resources by officials.  
Indeed, it is therefore not surprising that the ACPF122 has categorised Cameroon 
as a “less child friendly”123 State in its 2008 report, which considers African States’ legal 
and policy frameworks for child protection, States’ budgetary allocation to services 
related to children, and noticeable successes at state level for children’s rights 
protection.124 Cameroon’s less child friendly status is not based on its per capita income, 
but on its failure to put in place appropriate child-friendly legal and policy frameworks 
to protect children from abuse and exploitation.125 Four years after the ACPF’s report, 
the 2012 United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy’s Human Rights 
Report on Cameroon paints a rather regrettable picture.126 In that report, child abuse 
amongst others is highlighted as a major problem.127 Remarkably, when the ACPF 
reported again in 2013, Cameroon was still classified a less child friendly State and 
further labelled as one of the countries that “showed a sharp fall in ranking” from the 
2008 index. Its sharp fall was chiefly based on limited significant efforts to improve 
access to basic services to achieve positive child-related outcomes128 and shrinking 
spending on sectors such as health and education that benefit children, as well as 
relatively low performances with regard to domestication of international children’s 
rights treaties compounded by limited efficient and effective translation of resources 
into better child well-being outcomes.129  
                                                            
122  The African Child Policy Forum is an independent, not-for-profit, pan-African institution of policy 
research and dialogue on the African child. The Forum has a rich track record in data analysis and 
comparative and analytical research on children’s rights in Africa. 
123  As per the ACPF’s report (2008) the other countries were, Congo (Brazzaville), Angola, Cote D’Ivoire, 
Zimbabwe, Equatorial Guinea, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Benin and Ethiopia. 
124  See also, ACPF’s report (2008), The African report on child wellbeing: How child-friendly are African 
governments? Addis Ababa: The African Child Policy Forum 7. See also, A Bequele, “Monitoring the 
commitment and child-friendliness of governments: A new approach from Africa” (2010) 34 Child Abuse 
& Neglect 34–44. 
125  As above ACPF’s report (2008). 
126  See generally, United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy 2012 report on human rights in Cameroon 
available at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/204309.pdf> [accessed 26 January 2014]. 
127  As above 29. 
128  See ACPF’s report (prepared by A Bequele et al.) The African Report on Child Wellbeing 2013 Towards 
greater accountability to Africa’s children (n 57 above). 
129  As above 53. 
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From a legislative point of view, the progress of human rights protection and 
promotion in Cameroon has been questioned by many in the international 
community.130 Most children in Cameroon are the most marginalised, oppressed and 
vulnerable to diseases, poverty and death.131 The physical and mental ability of children 
living in such perilous conditions cannot be said to be at its best and, at the minimum, 
requires that special protections are set up to enable them to age and mature properly. 
This condition is perhaps common knowledge to the government and society in general 
in Cameroon. Yet, Cameroon has a poor human rights protection (laws) and fulfilment 
(implementation) record, especially concerning its children.132 
This record is aggravated by the severe lack of legislative protection for children, 
compounded by its complex legal system. Cameroon has a unique legal system (mix-
jurisdiction)133 in Africa, which is a reflection of her colourful past of colonialisation 
combined with an enormous resource of customary law (including Islamic law). The 
country is composed of about 250 ethnic groups with an equal number of tribal 
languages.134 Most notably, common law (applicable in English-speaking Cameroon) 
and civil law (applicable in French-speaking Cameroon) co-exist. In most cases, the 
differences that exist between these two legal systems are so glaring that they are in some 
cases completely at odds with one another “because of their differing language, 
constitutional backgrounds and methodologies, treatment and interpretation of laws, 
and judicial training”.135 For instance, the two legal systems do not seem to agree on who 
                                                            
130  See generally, Committee on the CRC, Written replies by the Government of Cameroon to the list of 
issues prepared by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in connection with the consideration of the 
second periodic report of Cameroon (CRC/C/CMR/2). 
131  M Dicklitch ‘Failed democratic transition in Cameroon: A human rights explanation’ (2002) 24 Human Rights 
Quarterly 152–176. See generally The State of The World’s Children 2012, available at http://www.unicef.org/ 
sowc2012/pdfs/SOWC%202012-Main%20Report_EN_13Mar2012.pdf [accessed 20 January 2014].  
132  See generally, ACPF’s report (prepared by A Bequele et al.) The African Report on Child Wellbeing 2013 
Towards greater accountability to Africa’s children (n 57 above). Read also the interview granted by the 
former High Commission for Human Rights (Ms Navi Pillay) in Yaoundé at the end of her first visit to 
Cameroon in which she said: “The next step for Cameroon is to focus on rigorous implementation of 
recommendations from treaty bodies, special procedures and the Universal Periodic Review, so as to put 
in place a strong and inclusive human rights protection system for the benefit of its entire population”. 
Full transcript of the Interview available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID= 
45329#.VUjFamNfZ8E [accessed 5 May 2015]. 
133  For further readings on Cameroon’s mix-jurisdiction, see for example, M Azevedo, Cameroon and its 
national character (1984). C Anyangwe The Cameroonian judicial system (1987), CM Fombad, ‘An 
experiment in legal pluralism: The Cameroonian Bi-Jural/Uni-Jural imbroglio’ (1997) 16(2) University of 
Tasmania Law Review 209. 
134  EN Ngwafor Family law in Anglophone Cameroon (1993) in OM Inglis (ed) 1. 
135  S Cziment “Cameroon: A mixed jurisdiction? A critical examination of Cameroon’s legal system through the 
perspective of the Nine interim conclusions of worldwide mixed jurisdictions” (2009) 2(2) WINTER 2009 1. 
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a child is. Under the French Civil Code of 1985 (applicable in French Cameroon), a child 
is anyone below the age of 21 years136 and under common law a child is anyone below 
the age of 18 years.137 Generally, a glance at Cameroon’s judicial track record leaves one 
with no option but to concur with Fombad that, though sporadic, Cameroon does not 
entirely recognise conflicts of laws within its mix-judiciary system138 when applying laws 
from the common and civil systems.139 
The Constitution of Cameroon 
The 1996 Constitution of Cameroon140 is a classic prototype of an aged ideological 
constitution existent in the 21st century, marred by huge rights-based gaps and 
proliferated with rigid governmental arms141 regulations. The rights protected in the 
Constitution are all inscribed in the preamble142 of the Constitution. These are the right 
to education, health, freedom of expression and communication, life, and Non-
Discrimination. By extension, the Constitution admits to concur with the provisions of 
the UDHR, the UN Charter and the ACHPR143 and any other instrument ratified by 
Cameroon.144 The protection of children’s rights in the Constitution is almost non-
                                                            
136  See generally, art. 488 of the Civil Code (legal capacity, consent, medical counselling without parental consent, 
sexual consent). A minor may, however, be emancipated by court order or automatically by marriage. 
137  Even though the State is aware of the impact of this difference in the definition of a child and has cleared 
this ambiguity in stating that in ratifying the CRC, Cameroon endorses the definition of the child given 
therein (any person below 18), the State also acknowledges the possible challenges it may face in the 
application of this definition within its bi-jural system. 
138  Two examples of the confused nature of the application of laws in Cameroonian courts, in coming to grips 
with conflicts of laws are as follows. In Lelpou v Lelpou (Suit No BHC/SW/73 - unreported) a divorce suit 
was brought before the Buea High Court (in the Anglophone legal district) by two Francophones working 
within that court’s jurisdiction, concerning a monogamous marriage contracted in accordance with the 
civil law in Yaoundé (in the Francophone legal district). The husband asked the court to dissolve the 
marriage on the ground that the parties had been living apart for five years. The court, without taking into 
account the fact that the parties were Francophones and that their marriage was contracted according to 
the civil law, thus raising a problem of conflict of laws, mechanically applied the relevant sections of the 
Matrimonial Causes Act (1973), that is the lex fori, and not the lex causae. In the same way, the Douala 
High Court (in the Francophone legal district) in Affaire Mme Neba nee Juliette Bih c. Neba Arron Suh 
(Judgement civil No 335 du 3 Avril 1989, de TGI Douala – unreported) mechanically applied the French 
Civil Code to a divorce petition brought by two Anglophones concerning a marriage contracted under 
the English common law, without alluding to any possible conflict of laws. 
139  Fombad (n 133 above) 221. 
140  Amended in 2008 by Law No. 2008-1 of April 14, (to Amend and Supplement some Provisions of Law 
No. 96-6 of January 18, 1996 to Amend the Constitution of June 2, 1972.) 
141  The executive, the legislature and the judiciary. 
142  Art. 65 states that the Preamble is part and parcel of the Constitution. 
143  Preamble of the Constitution. 
144  See generally, art. 45: all ratified treaties shall override national laws. 
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existent and the Constitution does not clarify the ambiguity in the definition of a child 
in both common and civil law systems. However, and safely so, the State, in its report to 
the Committee on the CRC concurred with the definition in the CRC and regards a child 
to be any person below the age of 18.145 Also, as per article 45 of the Constitution, treaties 
override national law. Consequently, the definition in ratified treaties will override 
national law.146 
Apart from the child’s right to education captured under paragraph 18 of the 
preamble, which states that “the State shall guarantee the child's right to education. 
Primary education shall be compulsory. The organization and supervision of education 
at all levels shall be the bounden duty of the State”, the Constitution bears no other right 
directly ascribed to children. As a result, one way of deducing any form of protection for 
children in the Constitution is through reading into expressions generally used in the 
Constitution like ‘everyone’, ‘all citizens’, ‘every person’.147 These expressions are 
inclusive and, thus, indeed mean everyone and by extension underline one of the key 
objectives of the ACRWC and the CRC, which is that children are human rights holders 
alongside adults. However, as the Committee on the CRC rightly points out, the test 
must be in the application of the rights and whether they are truly realised for children 
and directly invoked before the courts.148  
Another approach to relate the rights protected in the Constitution to children is 
through an expansive interpretative approach149 with children as beneficiaries. This 
method of interpretation will give a wider coverage of these rights and include children 
as beneficiaries of the rights without distorting the textual context in the Constitution. 
The obvious responsibility of legal representatives in courts will be to stretch the 
normative content of these rights, convince the court and then in the process claim these 
rights for children. This, in the opinion of this thesis, could be the plausible way to 
maneuver over such loose constitutional rights existent in the Cameroonian 
                                                            
145  Committee on the CRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the 
Convention – Cameroon UN doc CRC/C/28/Add.16 para 19. 
146  See generally, sec 45 of the Constitution of Cameroon which states that: “Duly approved or ratified treaties 
and international agreements shall, following their publication, override national laws, provided the other 
party implements the said treaty or agreement”. 
147  These terminologies are the most popular expressions used in the Constitution. The terms are of course 
inclusive and indeed mean everyone – but key to the general development of rights denotes specific 
protection of specific groups of people. The term ‘children’ does not exist in the Cameroonian 
Constitution, rather it is engulfed in these phrases.  
148  Committee on the CRC, GC No 5 (n 1 above). 
149  This approach gives a wider effect to a legal provision both subjectively and objectively. For details on this 
method of interpretation see, S Dothan ‘In defence of expansive interpretation in the European Court of 
Human Rights’ (2014) 3(2) Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 508- 231. 
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Constitution. Thus, any attempt to relate or suggest such rights (initially intended for 
adults) to children, for example, is barely a matter of technical ability. Indeed, such 
interpretation can only draw from treaties duly ratified by Cameroon as per article 45 of 
the Constitution. 
The effectiveness of the rights protected in the Preamble (especially freedom of 
expression and communication – because they relate closest to their right to 
participation), read with the knowledge of the provisions of articles 45 and 65 of the 
Constitution provides for the justiciability of children’s right to participation in 
Cameroon. This is because the formal recognition of ratified international treaties over 
national laws is timely and crucial in such cases and provides protection for children’s 
rights in general and compensates for their limited coverage in national laws. Decisively, 
article 45 simply mandates that in case of conflict of laws in Cameroon, the provisions 
of the CRC and the ACRWC should prevail.  
International children’s law in Cameroon 
Perhaps because the State is conscious of its children’s rights legislative lacuna at the 
national level, Cameroon has ratified some significant instruments that protect 
children’s rights. Indeed, Cameroon’s ratification of the ICCPR (1984), the CESCR 
(1984), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT) (1986), the CRC (1993), CEDAW (1994), the ACRWC 
(1997), the CRPD (2008), African Women’s Protocol (2012) and the CRC-OP-AC 
(2013) portrays pre-emptive intentions from the State to protect its citizens and 
especially children.150 Through article 45 of the Constitution, which recognises ratified 
international law instruments at the highest echelon of legally binding instruments in 
Cameroon – with or without national law protection, ratified international laws are 
prioritised in courts of law and in the general protection of children’s rights in this case. 
Hence, thanks to article 45 (which insinuates Cameroon’s monist approach to 
international law) and the ratification of these instruments, children can now claim, 
through a legal representative,151 their rights through direct application and 
interpretation of the provisions of any of these international treaties in proceedings on 
matters that affect them. The benefits of the ratification of these international treaties 
are enormous. Indeed, rightly so, the legislative improvement of the protection of 
                                                            
150  All these instruments, as indicated earlier in chapter two [See the section on other children’s participatory 
rights under other International and Regional Instruments], are relevant to the general protection of 
children’s rights and their right to participation. 
151  MD Afuba ‘The constitutional protection of civil and political rights in Cameroon’ (2006) University of 
Botswana Law Journal 68-69.  
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children’s rights in Cameroon has expanded through such ratification. Suggestively, 
adherence to these instruments can and should be seen as a quick fix attempt by the 
government to fill the legislative gap extant at national level due to the severe shortage 
of laws that protect children’s rights in Cameroon and in particular their rights to 
participation.152  
Other children’s laws in Cameroon 
Unlike the South African Constitution, where a cluster of children’s rights has been 
protected, as demonstrated above, the Constitution of Cameroon, as analysed above and 
under this section, is different and rather paints a “care free picture” and almost does 
not recognise children as right holders. However, the Cameroonian Constitution is a 
foundational legislation within its legal system and article 45 makes international 
children’s treaties ratified by Cameroon as points of reference in the protection of 
children’s rights at national level. Also, unlike South Africa, some of the national laws 
enacted in Cameroon or borrowed from neighbouring Nigeria do not specifically or 
directly protect children’s right to participation. 
However, several laws (decrees, orders, ordinances and ministerial instructions) 
have been adopted that protect issues related to children in Cameroon.153 Unfortunately, 
some of these laws are outdated154 or imported – outdated laws from neighbouring 
Nigeria and applicable mostly in Southern (common law) Cameroon.155 In the second 
half of the 20th century, four pieces of legislation intended to protect children where 
promulgated into law in Cameroon: these are Circular on pre-trial detention of 
minors,156 Circular on juvenile delinquents and runaway children,157 Circular on 
                                                            
152  There is no specific national law in Cameroon that codifies children’s right to participation. However, 
aspects of children’s right to participation are mentioned sporadically in other national laws regulating 
issues such as marriage, divorce and others. 
153  Committee on the CRC, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the 
Convention – Cameroon (n 145 above). 
154  For example, the 1804 Napoleonic Civil Code, the Act of 24 July 1889 of the protection of ill-treated and 
abandoned children, the Act of 19 April 1898 on the punishment of violence, assault, acts of cruelty and 
offences against children, the Decree of 30 November 1928 establishing special courts and the probation 
system for minors, the Decree of 30 October 1935 on the protection of children, the Decree of 23 
September 1954 on the family record book. 
155  For example, Juveniles Courts Rules, CAP 32 of the 1958 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria. The irony 
here is that Nigeria has long consolidated and improved its child law legislation in the Child’s Right Act 
of 2003. 
156  No. 9062/DJAS of 15 July 1967. 
157  No. 300018/DJAS/of 8 July 1968. 
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methods of investigation in relation to the adoption of children158 and Circular on the 
authorization of temporary child custody.159 These were also captured in the State’s 
report of 2009 to the Committee on the CRC as current legal protection accorded to 
children in Cameroon.160 Unfortunately, access to these laws is almost impossible and 
any attempt to quote them as protecting children’s right to participation will be mere 
speculation. It is, based on the context of children’s right to participation analysed in 
chapter two and three, expected that in matters relating to custody, a child’s opinion is 
vital to arrive at any decision.161 Technically, some of these laws could be excused 
especially as they were promulgated before the CRC and ACRWC. Equally, the drafters 
had no real international law (child law) foundation to rely on when drafting these laws.  
However, an effort was made to incorporate children’s right to participation in 
some of Cameroon’s aged legal instruments. The inspiration to do so was probably based 
on the influence from ICCPR (article 25), which led to the adoption of Ordinance No. 
81/02 of 19 June 1981162 and the French Civil Code.163 Through these instruments, 
children’s right to participation is guaranteed, directly or through a representative 
(parent, guardian, legal representative), in legal and administrative proceedings, in cases 
related to custody, divorce or separation proceedings in marriage and in hearings in the 
Council Chamber. For example, with regard to marriage, according to article 52(1) of 
Ordinance No. 81/02, “[n]o marriage may be celebrated if the girl is below the age of 15 
years or the boy below the age of 18 years, except under an exemption granted by the 
President of the Republic for serious reasons.”164 Within this provision, clear legal 
derogations from mainstream treaties (CRC and ACRWC) ratified by Cameroon are 
glaring. Not only does it discriminate against the girl child in terms of her marriage age, 
it also puts her in a difficult situation where, if married earlier, it is the President of the 
Republic who decides and not the girl child whether the marriage takes place or not.165 
Thus, despite its recognition of children’s right to participation, it is limited in some 
instances. Surely, the involvement of the President or any other individual for that 
matter to make such a critical decision on a child’s behalf as to enter into marriage is a 
                                                            
158  No. 522/MSAP/DAS/BDI of 27 June 1974. 
159  No. 81/0018/LC/MINAS/SPFI of 18 September 1981. 
160  Committee on the CRC, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under article 44 of the 
Convention – Cameroon (n 145 above). 
161  See Tarh v Tarh (n 178 below). 
162  On the organisation of the civil register arts; 52(1) and 64(1). 
163  See generally, art. 238. 
164  See also, art. 488 of the Civil Code. 
165  Probably not surprising that this is the case, especially considering the fact both legislations were 
applicable in Cameroon before the CRC and the ACRWC were adopted. 
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violation of children’s right to autonomy and participation. Also, it contradicts 
Cameroon’s commitment to the ACRWC, which prohibits child marriage166 and the very 
reasoning of the Committee on the CRC in its General Comment No. 18, which provides 
that:  
As a matter of respecting the child’s evolving capacities and autonomy in making decisions 
that affect her or his life, in exceptional circumstances a marriage of a mature, capable child 
below the age of 18 may be allowed provided that the child is at least 16 years old and that such 
decisions are made by a judge based on legitimate exceptional grounds defined by law and on 
the evidence of maturity without deference to cultures and traditions.167 
Although the Committee on the CRC expresses a lenient view in terms of the age of 
marriage as per the ACRWC, as elaborated below, article 52(1) of Ordinance No. 81/02 
in Cameroon still violates such a requirement by expecting a girl of 15 to enter into a 
marriage without her consent but with that of another. This practice is still prevalent in 
Cameroon because despite the ratification of the CRC and the ACRWC, the provisions 
of these instruments (though not uniform) have not been infiltrated into the national 
legal system.  
In 1990, the State promulgated two laws related to ensuring children’s right to 
participation: The Act on freedom of social communication,168 and the Act on freedom 
of association.169 Although not directly intended to protect children, both Acts protect 
some aspects of children’s right to participation through guaranteeing their freedom of 
association and social communication (the link between these rights and children’s right 
to participation has been analysed in chapter three).   
Sadly, two other pieces of legislation which could perhaps be identified as central 
to protecting children’s right to participation and possibly clear the inconsistencies in 
the age of marriage and other related issues – because they do so much better than the 
laws mentioned above and are contemporary or recent developments – are still in draft 
stages. These laws (the Persons and Family Code and the Child Protection Code), which 
when adopted will be the main domestic instruments on children’s rights in Cameroon, 
extensively address a number of issues ranging from the best interests of the child to the 
protection of the family environment.170 It is hopeful that once promulgated these pieces 
                                                            
166  Art. 21. 
167  CEDAW and Committee on the CRC, Joint general recommendation/general comment No. 31 of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women and No 18 of the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child on harmful practices CEDAW/C/GC/31-CRC/C/GC/18 (2014) para 19.  
168  No. 90/53 of 19 December 1990. 
169  No. 90/53 of December 1990. 
170  See for example, secs 5, 18 & 42 of the draft Child Protection Code. 
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of legislation would clarify several derogatory clauses within the Cameroon child 
protection system.  
Even though national laws have not really protected children’s right to 
participation in Cameroon, in practice, children’s right to participation has been 
ensured sporadically and, regrettably, much so from a tokenistic approach.171 In fact, the 
plurality of laws (both general and outdated – highlighted as protecting children’s right 
to participation extant in Cameroon) have not helped to ensure factual children’s rights 
in general and their right to participation in particular in Cameroon. Equally, it has not 
really helped to clarify Cameroon’s legal system enigma of conflicts of laws. Worth 
noting, though, the State has for a long time made some attempts to unify its laws and 
ensure the protection of children’s rights.172 It is probably common knowledge that a 
unitary codification or, at the minimum, a comprehensive piece of contemporary child 
law enacted in Cameroon will bring benefits to the entire child justice system. It will 
enable easy accessibility and propel proper development of its provisions and children’s 
rights in general. It will also, from a Cameroonian perspective, undoubtedly establish a 
spring board from which the contextual normative expansion of critical children’s 
right(s) – such as their right to participation – is developed and provide a better 
protection to children.  
The State is, of course, aware of such benefits of a unified173 child protection law 
and has promised to ensure this happens.174 However, the process is painfully slow and 
this is due to the lack of proper coordination of the justice system pertaining to 
                                                            
171  “Tokenism is the final rung of non-participation under Hart’s Ladder, where children are prima facie given 
a voice but in reality, are given very little or no input into what the subject should be or the manner in 
which it is communicated”. For details on this approach, see A Parkes Children and international human 
rights law: The Right of the child to be heard (2013) 17; R Hart ‘Children’s participation: From tokenism 
to citizenship’ 1992 (4) UNICEF Innocenti Essays 5; R Hart ‘Children’s right to participate: Some tools to 
stimulate discussion on the issue in different cultures’ in Verhellen E (ed) Understanding children's rights: 
Collected papers presented at the second international interdisciplinary course on children's rights (1997); 
SR Arnstein ‘A ladder of citizen participation’ (1969)35(4) Journal of the American Institute of Planners 
216-224. 
172  See generally, Fombad (n 133 above) and CM Fombad International encycopaedia of laws, Constitutional 
law: Cameroon (2011).  
173  Cameroon has, for example, unified its Criminal Procedure Code 2006 – this process is not new to the 
state. 
174  See, Committee on the CRC, Written replies by the Government of Cameroon to the list of issues prepared 
by the Committee on the Rights of the Child in connection with the consideration of the second periodic 
report of Cameroon (n 130 above) paras 5–9.   
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children.175 Most, if not all, of the laws intended to unify child law in Cameroon are still 
in their draft stages and stuck in the shelves at the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry 
of Social Affairs.176  
As already mentioned, children’s right to participation is to some extent (on paper) 
protected at the national level in Cameroon – this is all thanks to the ratification and 
incorporation of the CRC and ACRWC in the national legal system. The test 
undoubtedly is in the practical aspects or implementation of the right.177 Instances where 
children’s views have been heard have mostly been in custody cases. For example, on 
appeal in Tarh v Tarh178 the Bamenda Court of Appeal set aside an earlier decision 
granting custody of the children of a failed marriage to their mother because the trial 
judge failed to consider the views of the children involved. In doing so, Ndoping J held 
that it is imperative for the opinion of children to a failed marriage to be heard in 
determining which of the parents should be given custody.179 The impression at this stage 
is that this is the furthest the courts in Cameroon have gone in protecting children’s 
right to participation in the context of custody.180 The participation of children in all 
matters that concern them within the family is farfetched, because the family is still a 
closed environment and private. Resultantly, any introduction of such “powers” to 
children to participate in all matters concerning them will be foreign and might be 
rejected at first mention. In fact, precisely how this is going to develop at the level of 
practice and procedure remains a matter of speculation. 
                                                            
175  The only substantive attempts so far made by the State to unify its laws is through the Labour Code, the 
Penal Code, the Highway Code, the General Tax Code and the Criminal Procedure Code (CPC) of 2007. 
For example, prior to 2007, when the CPC came into effect, criminal procedure in Anglophone Cameroon 
was based on the Nigerian common law. Likewise, criminal procedure in Francophone Cameroon was 
based on French Civil Law. See also, EN Njungwe ‘International standards on juvenile justice: 
Implications of the New Criminal Procedure Code on the Administration of Juvenile Justice in Cameroon’ 
(2008) 2 Cameroon Journal on Democracy and Human Rights 59 & 67. See also, A Akonumbo ‘Excursion 
into the best interests of the child principle’ in family law and child-related laws and policies in Cameroon’ 
(2010) The International Survey of Family Law 63-94. 
176  A Akonumbo ‘Implementation framework for children’s rights and welfare standards: Profiling the 
harmonisation status of child law’ (ACPF report) (2008) 24.  
177  In fact, the State has alluded to the fact that attempts to ensure children’s right to participation are likely 
to face obstacles due to the gerontocratic nature of traditions in Cameroon in which children are only 
regarded as human beings in the making until they reach maturity. See, Committee on the CRC, 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the Convention – Cameroon (n 
145 above) para 53. 
178  Tarh v Tarh appeal No. BCA/19/87 (unreported). 
179  As above.  
180  Noteworthy and credit to the learned Judge, this was before the ratification and adoption of the CRC and 
the ACRWC. 
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Institutional development in Cameroon 
Unfortunately, at the time of writing this thesis, Cameroon did not have a host of state 
funded institutions who act like human rights violations watch-dogs at the national 
level, as does South Africa.181 However, in 1990, the State established the National 
Commission on Human Rights and Freedoms (NCHRF) and at the national level this is 
the main state funded organisation with the mandate of a human rights watch-dog.182 At 
least on paper, it is an independent institution that can advise, observe, evaluate, discuss, 
debate, promote and protect issues of human rights and freedoms in Cameroon.183  
As the leading national human rights commission in Cameroon, the NCHRF is a 
central institution in protecting children’s rights in Cameroon and enjoys national 
coverage with regional offices in six of Cameroon’s 10 regions.184 To facilitate its work 
on promoting children’s rights, the NCHRF has established a sub-working group to 
promote the rights of vulnerable groups (including children) in Cameroon.185 In its 2013 
activity report, the NCHRF reported on conducting educational activities in schools on 
the rights of the child.186 It also conducts hearing sessions on issues such as child support 
in cases where the parents are divorced. Indeed, during such hearings the NCHRF takes 
the child’s views into consideration and makes decisions that are generally in the best 
interests of the child.187 Besides these functional reports on the NCHRF generally found 
on its webpage, the NCHRF unfortunately does not (but for its 2013 activity report) 
publish reports of its inquiries or interventions to protect human rights, thus making it 
difficult to evaluate the extent to which it has promoted and protected children’s rights 
in general or in particular their right to participation in Cameroon.  
                                                            
181  This is typical of most African countries and especially those classified on the same or a lower rank of 
human rights protection in Africa by the statistics of the ACPF (n 122 above). 
182  The NCHRF was established through Act No. 2004/016 of 22 July 2004, amended in 2010. 
183  International Human Rights Instruments, Common core document forming part of the reports of States 
parties – Cameroon UN/doc/HRI/CORE/CMR/2013 para 86. 
184  See generally, http://www.cndhl.cm/index.php/organisation-de-la-cndhl [accessed 7 May 2015]. 
185  For details on this working group, see, http://www.cndhl.cm/index.php/les-sous-commissions/sous-
commission-n-3 [accessed 5 May 2015]. 
186  NCHRF’s 2013 activity report, available at http://www.cndhl.cm/index.php/rapports-edh-et-rapports-d-
activites, and http://www.cndhl.cm/index.php/protection-et-promotion-des-droits-des-enfants 
[accessed 5 May 2015]. 
187  In a telephone conversation with an official at the Commission, on Monday 4th May 2015, he attested to 
the fact that the Commission has conducted several of such hearings and made decisions that compel the 
father, especially, of children from a divorced marriage to provide financial support to their child(ren). 
However, he also admitted that the process has not been completely smooth, especially in cases where a 
parent fails to make such a contribution and the other refuses to act on the Commission’s 
recommendation to approach the courts for financial reasons.  
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Elsewhere, in 2009, the State reported to the Committee on the CRC that a 
National Commission to Protect Children at Risk, Juvenile Delinquents and Abandoned 
Children188 had been created189 in the department of the Ministry of Social Affairs with 
the mandate to draw and oversee monitoring and implementation strategies of the 
national children’s policy.190 However, in the same report, the State is quick to highlight 
the difficulties it faces in ensuring the smooth running of this Commission specifying in 
the process lack of funds and personnel.191 Institutionally, the non-functioning of this 
Commission, worsened by the fragile impact of the NCHRF on the protection and 
promotion children’s rights, puts children in Cameroon in a thin situation regarding the 
fulfilment of their rights.  
At the level of the judiciary, unfortunately, there is no court specifically assigned 
to hear matters that concern children. Resultantly, depending on the matter, and 
especially in issues related to custody, children in Cameroon are generally heard in the 
chambers of the Courts of First Instance, High Court or Court of Appeal, and in rare 
cases at the Supreme Court of Appeal.192  
However, one other institution that has made some progressive thesis in the 
promotion of children’s right to participation is the National Assembly (Parliament). 
Since 1998, the State instituted children between the ages of 9 and 18 in parliament 
sessions. This is intended to be a platform for dialogue between children and decision 
makers and contribute to the effective implementation of their right to participation.193 
                                                            
188  The Commission serves as an umbrella entity to enhance the interaction between the various stakeholders 
in the interest of improved coherence, efficiency and impact of the National Children’s Policy. 
189  Pursuant to Degree No. 90/524 of 23 March 1990. 
190  Although reported in 2009, a similar Commission had been promulgated by law Decree No. 90/524 of 23 
March 1990 establishing the National Commission to Protect Children at Risk, Juvenile Delinquents and 
Abandoned Children. Several other institutions have also been created, including the National Committee 
to Combat Drug Abuse; the National Committee for the Social and Economic Rehabilitation and 
Reintegration of Disabled Persons; the National Commission on Health and Safety at Work; the National 
Prison Administration Commission; and the Technical Committee to monitor the implementation of 
International Human Rights Instruments. 
191  Committee on the CRC, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the 
Convention – Cameroon (n 145 above) para 41. 
192  For details on the jurisdiction of these courts, see, the Justice and Peace Commission  
Archdiocese of Bamenda Report on The Judicial System in Cameroon available at 
http://www.justiceandpeacebamenda.org/attachments/article/24/The+Judicial+System+in+Cameroon.pdf 
[accessed 5 May 2015], see also the webpage of the Ministry of Social Affairs [www. minas.gov.cm] resume 
on Children in Conflict with the Law available at http://www.minas.gov.cm/index.php?view= 
article&id=167%3Aenfant-en-conflit-avec-la-loi&format=pdf&option=com_content&Itemid=189&lang=en 
[accessed 7 May 2015]. 
193  Details on the Rules for Selection of Junior Parliamentarians, visit, http://www.minas.gov.cm/ 
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=154&Itemid=180&lang=en [accessed 7 May 2015]. 
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These sessions have been progressive and consistent since the inception in 1998 and are 
generally held every June 16.194 Usually, during such sessions ministers195 also present 
their plans and projects to young parliamentarians (children) and they pose questions 
to the minister.196  
This process has indeed been practiced in Cameroon for over a decade now. 
However, the impact of this parliamentary process is far from having any meaningful 
and/or direct thesis to the lives of children, as in most cases the discussion is formalistic 
in nature and mainly theoretical with no real target within a reasonable time.197 The 
process (sessions) has been helpful as, to some extent, it has instilled a sense of child-
centred initiative at the national level, such as the national plan of action for children’s 
rights and awareness in some general ministerial planning and budgeting.198 It has also 
registered some sporadic success stories in Cameroon; for example, child 
parliamentarians are reported to have strongly advocated for the eradication of 
compulsory fees for primary education and a raise of salary for government employees 
(including teachers).199  
In the State’s initial report submitted to the Committee on the CRC, the State 
indicated instances where it fulfilled children’s participation in parliament. One such 
instance is when children presented the CRC to parliamentarians during an ordinary 
session of the national assembly in 1991 requesting for its ratification and two years later 
(in 1993) the State ratified the CRC.200 This is theatrical and, in many ways, does not 
necessarily constitute children’s participation. As mentioned earlier in chapter two, 
children’s right to participation transcends beyond a mere request and entails 
meaningful engagement and dialogue on all matters that concern children. Perhaps a 
debate or discussion on the content of the treaty would have strengthened the State’s 
claim for children’s participation in the ratification of the CRC. Irrespective, the process 
                                                            
194  This is also the day of the African Child.  
195  The last session was held on 16 June 2012 under the theme “Rights of children with disabilities: Duty to 
protect, respect, promote and fulfil”, during which the Ministers of Social Affairs, Public Health, 
Secondary Education and Women’s Empowerment and the Family equally presented their plans related 
to their effort in protecting disabled children. 
196  Committee on the CRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the 
Convention – (n 137 above) para 52. 
197  See generally, S Kamga ‘Forgotten or included? Disabled children’s access to primary education in 
Cameroon’ (2013) 1 African Disability Rights Yearbook 27 – 48. 
198  As above. 
199  ACPF’s report (prepared by A Bequele et al) The African Report on Child Wellbeing 2013 Towards greater 
accountability to Africa’s children (n 57 above) 26.  
200  Committee on the CRC, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the 
Convention – Cameroon (n 145 above) para 51. 
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in itself is laudable but the impact of the process on the children (including other 
children in Cameroon) who submitted the treaty in parliament and made the request is 
questionable.  
Although it could be argued that Cameroon’s weak institutional protection of 
children’s rights is as a result of the lack of personnel and funding as the State alluded to 
in its 2009 report to the Committee on the CRC, one other possible reason which might 
have contributed to the ineffectiveness of institutions in Cameroon is the legal rifts 
discussed earlier in this chapter extant in Cameroon (due to its mixed-jurisdiction). 
Indeed, the State did not mention this in its report to the Committee on the CRC as one 
of the reasons why institutions such as those indicated in the earlier paragraphs face 
operational challenges. However, this is not far from the truth. Indeed, such institutional 
challenges have not helped and to some extent contributed in creating tension in 
Cameroon’s children’s rights protection schemes and any further attempts in protecting, 
sanctioning, analysing and harmonising child law in Cameroon. Also, if fully functional, 
these institutions would probably, through their education and training programmes, 
clarify the difference in the definition of a child and ensure a better protection of 
children’s rights at grassroots level in particular. The mere existence of these different 
laws and their conflicting definition of a child (though addressed through a 
consideration of international law, taking into consideration article 45 of Constitution) 
has a potential to pose a problem in the protection of children’s right to participation as 
any attempt to identify, select or admit children to participate in decision-making 
processes both within the private and public space could lead to unnecessary confusion, 
especially because most court decisions in Cameroon make little or no reference to 
international law, although they are required to do so, especially in cases of conflict of 
the laws extant in Cameroon.  
4. Conclusion 
Generally, it is encouraging to note that most African states have domesticated 
provisions of these instruments (specifically children’s right to participation) in their 
national constitutions and others through acts of parliament. However, the majority of 
African states have been reluctant to develop effective mechanisms to make this right a 
reality especially in the family environment. Worth noting is the acceptable concept 
adopted in most children’s rights acts enacted by African states with no express 
limitation on where and how such rights can and should be enjoyed by children. In fact, 
as seen above, some have expressly encouraged the enjoyment of such rights within the 
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family. The adoption of a consolidated children’s rights statute at national level depicts 
a valuable opportunity for these states to incorporate and protect children’s right to 
participation. The problem is hardly at the level of the enactment of laws or creation of 
institutions but at the level of implementation. Implementation is key because it gives 
meaning to the laws enacted, provides a measuring rod in the general evaluation of the 
institutions created, and is the final determinant in the general protection of rights, as it 
ensures that the rights protected are delivered to its rightful legatee. However, 
Goonesekere acknowledges that in some developing countries, legislative reforms may 
be viewed with cynicism as, in practice, law enforcement is generally weak, public 
awareness of the rights enshrined in such treaties and to some extent national laws, is 
low or worse, non-existent. She goes on to add that “… legal procedures are either 
inaccessible or ineffective to give relief and remedies from injustice and abuse of power” 
in most developing countries.201 
Respect for children’s views in all matters affecting them is one of the most difficult 
principles to comply with, especially in family settings. This is not only because of the 
resistance to adhere demonstrated by most parents in Africa, as seen in the preceding 
chapters, but also because of the challenges of knowing how to go about it.202 It is also 
because of the high walls surrounding families built by traditions, culture, religion and 
even the law, as discussed further in the next chapters. In instances where children are 
allowed to enjoy their right to participation, their views are not always received with the 
degree of serious consideration they deserve and require. Most children in Africa (just like 
in most communities in the world) grow up in communities were adults are perceived as 
being always wise and children as immature and sometimes foolish.203 Such perceptions 
are major challenges to the general implementation of their right to participation.  
In the chapters that follow, this thesis will attempt an analysis of the implementation 
of children’s right to participate in family decision-making processes. In the process, this 
thesis will also, amongst others, provide insights into the span of parental directives and 
guidance and state interference in family matters. The rationale is to substantively analyse 
the extent to which the right to participation as it applies to children is practiced in family 
decision-making processes, and the relationship between the roles played by the state, 
parents and children before, during and after such processes. 
                                                            
201  S Goonesekere Children, law and justice: A South Asian perspective (1998) 355. Though she writes in Asian 
context, the logic is equally true and applicable in the African context. 
202  P Parkinson & J Cashmore The voice of a child in family law disputes (2012) 87-88. 
203  AB Nsamenang ‘Dilemmas of right-based approaches to child well-being in an African cultural context’ 
(2013) in D Johnson et al. (eds) Vulnerable children: Global challenges in education, health, well-being, 
and child rights 18-21. 
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Chapter Five 
THE FAMILY, THE STATE AND 
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN’S RIGHT 
TO PARTICIPATION 
1. Introduction 
The significance of the provisions protecting children’s right to participation in both the 
CRC and the ACRWC analysed in the earlier chapters will definitely serve no purpose if 
they are not implemented. In fact, the institutions analysed in chapter four will have no 
real impact if they are not utilised for the purposes for which they were set up, in this 
case as institutions with a certain mandate to redress and facilitate children’s right to 
participation in general and specifically their right to participate in family decision-
making processes. Traditionally, implementation trails ratification, it gives life to legal 
provisions and the case of children’s right to participation is no exception. Indeed, the 
rule of treaty law prescribes that upon ratification, a state party accepts the obligation to 
give effect to that treaty’s provision at the domestic level.1 Specifically, article 29 of the 
Vienna Convention mandates that unless a different intention appears from the treaty 
or is otherwise established,2 a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire 
territory.3 The territorial coverage of a ratified treaty is crucial in ensuring that the rights 
protected are delivered to everyone within a given territory – the state. In the case of 
international children’s rights law, such rights are delivered to every child within a state 
party’s territory irrespective of whether he or she is a citizen of that particular state or 
not.4 Also, the Committee on the CRC has stressed that a satisfying implementation of 
children’s rights must be seen by state parties as fulfilling their legal obligations to each 
                                                            
1  See generally, art. 14 (Consent to be bound by a treaty expressed by ratification, acceptance or approval) 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). See also, chapter two of this thesis. See also, 
Committee on CESCR, GC No 3 on the Nature of States Parties Obligations UN doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 14 
(2003) para 4; Human Rights Committee, GC No 3 para 4.  
2  Which is not the case with the mainstream children’s rights treaties under scrutiny in this thesis. 
3  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969). 
4  See generally, Committee on the CRC, GC No 5 paras 12 & 30 - the obligation of States to respect and 
ensure the rights set forth in the Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination 
of any kind. 
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and every child within the state.5 In so doing, state parties must ensure that their effort 
is guided by the four general principles of children’s rights – one of which is children’s 
right to participation.6  
Children’s right to participation has been, rightly so, identified as one of the most 
critical children’s rights, yet challenging and least implemented7 especially within the 
family. Many reasons account for such challenges and have been identified and analysed 
below. However, the family remains the first and probably the most important and 
appropriate environment that provides all children with the platform to start learning 
how to express their views on matters that concern them. As acknowledged by the 
Committee on the CRC, “[a] family where children can freely express views and be taken 
seriously from the earliest ages provides an important model, and is a preparation for 
the child to exercise the right to be heard in the wider society”.8  
The Committee on the CRC’s assertion above is crucial, since most children in 
Africa are nurtured into adulthood chiefly within the margins of the family 
environment, and by extension, assisted by other social institutions such as schools and 
religious institutions.9 Legally, the importance attached to the family is also strengthened 
in the preambles of both the CRC and the ACRWC. For example, the CRC declares that 
the family is a fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth 
and well-being of all its members and particularly children.10 Thus, for the full and 
harmonious development of a child, he or she should grow up in a family environment, 
in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding.11 Despite this strong 
recognition given to the family, as the natural unit and fundamental group of society in 
which a child should grow, both the CRC and the ACRWC – and the case is equally true 
with other international and national laws in Africa12 – fail to provide any concise 
definition of what exactly a family is. Rather, such laws have dwelled on the different 
                                                            
5  Committee on the CRC, GC 5 paras 11-12. 
6  As above. 
7  MS Pais ‘The Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (1997) United Nations Manual Human Rights 
Reporting under Six Major International Human Rights Instruments 427. 
8  Committee on the CRC, GC 12 para 90. 
9  B Rwezaura ‘Law, culture and children’s rights in Eastern and Southern Africa’ in W Ncube (ed) Law, 
culture, tradition and children’s rights in Eastern and Southern Africa (1998) 289. 
10  See, the preamble of the CRC para 5. 
11  See generally, the preamble of the CRC para 6 and of the ACRWC para 6. 
12  See for example; art. 58 of the 2002 (amended) Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of 
Algeria, art. 17 of the 2001 Constitution of Senegal, art. 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Cote 
d’Ivoire, art. XIX of the Constitution of Uganda and art. 20 of the 1998 Constitution of the Republic of 
Madagascar.   
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family structures arising from various cultural patterns and emerging family 
relationships.  
The UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) has indeed confirmed that the concept 
of family is complex as it asserts that “the concept of family may differ in some respects 
from State to State, and even from region to region within a State, and that it is therefore 
not possible to give the concept a standard definition”.13 Indeed, other international 
human rights mechanisms have expressed similar opinions.14 For example, the 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Committee on the CESCR) has 
affirmed that the concept of family must be understood “in a wide sense” in harmony 
with appropriate local context.15    
Surely, it is common knowledge that in contemporary Africa, a family is a term 
which in everyday use means different things and in many instances the understanding 
and usage (of the term family) defies strong determinants such as marriage,16 
consanguinity and adoption. This understanding is telling and true in the 
conceptualisation of the family in both the CRC and ACRWC. According to these 
treaties, the family includes extended family members, the community and applies in 
situations of nuclear family, separated or divorced parents, single parent family, 
common law family and adoptive family.17 The rationale supporting this concept has 
been well captured by Nukunya in 2003, where he refers to the situation in Ghana by 
proclaiming that “procreation of children is the responsibility of parents, but the 
training of the children is not exclusively theirs … in an extended family the parents’ 
roles are shared by others”.18 
The length and breadth of such scope in the conceptualisation of family, makes it 
difficult at any point in time to think that a child could be without a family. Indeed, 
unless something extremely unthinkable or unimaginable happens to the parents and 
                                                            
13  UN Human Rights Committee (Committee on the CCPR) GC No 19: Art. 23 (The Family) Protection of 
the Family, the Right to Marriage and Equality of the Spouses para 2. 
14  See for example, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, (Committee on 
the CEDAW) GR No 21 equality in marriage and family relations, CEDAW/A/49/38 paras. 13 and 18, and 
GR No. 29 Economic consequences of marriage, family relations and their dissolution, CEDAW/C/GC/29 
para 24. 
15  Committee on CESCR, GC No 4 The Right to Adequate Housing CESCR/E/1992/23 para 6; GC No. 5 
Persons with Disabilities CESCR/ E/1995/22 para 30. 
16  See for example, Okpeitcha v Okpeitcha (2002) AHRLR 33 (BnCC 2001) in which the learned judge 
described his wife and children as his family. 
17  See for example, the Committee on the CRC, Outline to the Day of General Discussion The Role of the 
Family in the Promotion of the Rights of the Child UN Doc CRC/C/24 27 – 28. 
18  GK Nukunya Tradition and change in Ghana: An introduction to sociology (2003) 51. Even though the 
author made his study in the Ghanaian context, it is equally true in the rest of the African continent. 
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extended family members of a child, the initial phase of a child’s life is principally spent 
in the family. The family is not only the first point of social exposure for a child,19 it is 
also an ideal platform for a child to learn to express himself or herself freely and to do 
so at all times in all decision-making processes on matters that concern him or her. 
Significantly, it is not only these treaties that recognise the role of the family in Africa; 
the ACHPR echoes the fact that the family is the natural unit of society and calls on state 
parties to protect it, because it is “the custodian [of] moral and traditional values 
recognized by the community”.20 Further, the state has a duty to assist the family in 
preserving such moral and traditional values.21 
1.1. The family 
From the brief analysis of the concept and role of family indicated above, the question 
still remains – what is a family? As there is no prescribed definition of the ‘term’ or 
‘concept’ family under international human rights law, this chapter will not attempt any 
definition or analysis of the composition of family structures.22 The Committee on the 
CCPR holds that the challenge in providing a systematic definition of the family is 
because “the concept of family may differ in some respects from State to State, and even 
from region to region within a State, and that is therefore not possible to give the concept 
a standard definition”.23 The Committee on the CESCR however advises that the concept 
of family should be understood “in a wide sense”24 and “in accordance with appropriate 
local usage”,25 thus locating its definition in local context and acceptability of what it 
refers to, or consists of, within a State or community.  
In relation to children, the family is a unit that must ensure they are protected. It 
may include a variety of arrangements that could provide children with the appropriate 
                                                            
19  As above para 2.2. 
20  See, art. 18(2) of the ACHPR. 
21  As above. 
22  For details on forms of families, family forms based on era, household forms and marriage forms extant 
in Africa, see generally, E Okon ‘Towards defining the ‘right to a family’ for the African child’ (2012) 12 
African Human Rights Law Journal 376 - 383. 
23  Committee on the CCPR, GC No 19; art 23 (The Family) Protection of the Family, the Right to Marriage 
and Equality of the Spouses, 27 July 1990 para 2. 
24  Committee on the CESCR, GC No 4 The right to adequate housing (Art. 11 (1) of the CESCR), 13 
December 1991, E/1992/23 para 6. 
25  Committee on the CESCR, GC No 5 Persons with disabilities, 9 December 1994, E/1995/22 para 30. See 
also Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (Committee on CEDAW), GR No 
21, paras 13 and 18, and GR No 29, para 24; Committee on the CRC, GC No 7, para 15; See also, Human 
Rights Council’s Report of the Working Group on the issue of discrimination against women in law and in 
practice A/HRC/29/40, paras 23-24. 
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care and development prescribed by international children’s rights law. As indicated 
below, it could be in any form, but not limited to, the nuclear family, the extended family, 
and other traditional and modern community-based arrangements, provided these are 
consistent with the rights and the best interests of children.26 It must be child-centered, 
friendly and acceptable. Equally, the notion of “family environment” is also given a 
wider perspective in the CRC27 and the ACRWC.28 Elsewhere, according to articles 4 and 
44(2) of the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of all Migrant Workers and 
Members of their Families the family is any group, under applicable law that “produces 
effects equivalent to marriage”.  
Therefore, it can be concluded that the composition of the family is not as important 
as the result expected from it. From a children’s rights perspective, the result must be 
aimed at ensuring that the best interest of the child is the paramount consideration at all 
times and in all matters concerning the child. The recognition of all these different types 
of families is indeed more accurate in Africa than probably elsewhere in the world.29 
According to Oheneba-Sakyi and Taky, different family structures have existed in Africa 
from time immemorial and are still extant despite various 21st century challenges such as 
economic crises.30 Irrespective of its composition, in Africa the family (including extended 
relatives) has a responsibility to nurture its children.31  
Legally, the responsibility of family members to care for a child has been codified 
in some countries in Africa. For example, the South African Children’s Act allocates a 
role to the extended family in the protection of children’s rights by its definition of a 
child’s family members.32 Such extended responsibility inevitably generates another 
intersection with a number of rights of the child protected by international children’s 
rights law, particularly, the right to parental care, the scope of such care, when the 
extended family is required to care, the right for a child to grow up with parents, the best 
interests and welfare principles and the right of the child to participation. The extension 
of parenthood beyond biological and adoptive lineage, from a children’s rights 
perspective, also warrants that any such analysis of children’s rights protection within 
                                                            
26  Committee on the CRC, GC No 7, para 15. 
27  Committee on the CRC, GC No 14, para 66. 
28  See, art. 18 of the ACRWC. 
29  See generally, Y Oheneba-Sakyi & BK Taky (eds) African families at the turn of the 21st Century (2006). 
30  Y Oheneba-Sakyi & BK Taky ‘Introduction of the study of African families: A framework for analysis’ in 
Y Oheneba-Sakyi & BK Taky (ed) African Families at the Turn of the 21st Century (2006) 1–18. 
31  I, for example, spent most of my childhood with my paternal grandparents, then with my maternal uncle 
and with my paternal uncle before I moved to living alone in my final year in high school. Throughout my 
stay with these relatives, they took care of me; they taught me life lessons and many other necessary things. 
32  Children’s Act 30 of 2005 art. 1(1). 
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the family in Africa must take all these questions into consideration. Although Kaime 
acknowledges that there could be obstacles in ensuring that children’s rights in general 
are protected within African families, he also sees flashes of hope in this respect, as he 
affirms that “[p]arents no longer see children’s rights discourse as a conspiracy drawn 
up by misguided government types intended to spirit away their authority over 
children”.33 
2. The African common position on children’s right to participate 
in family decision-making processes 
A typical African family is planned largely around the lives of its children. In most 
cultures around the continent, just as the case may be elsewhere,34 children represent 
continuity and the future. As such, several cultural practices in Africa are embodied with 
rituals, traditional and contemporary institutions designed to ensure children’s survival 
and affluence in a manner commensurate with the beliefs of the family and society. In 
return, children are viewed as crucial players to family survival – with responsibilities 
towards their families and societies to respect their parents and elders, to preserve and 
strengthen African cultural values in their relation with other members of their 
communities, and to work for the unity of the family and to assist [their parents] in time 
of need.35 The aspect of providing assistance to the family is noted here as a reciprocation 
of the responsibility parents bear when providing care to a child.36  
                                                            
33  T Kaime ‘Vernacularising’ the Convention on the Rights of the Child: Rights and cultures as analytic tools’ 
(2010) 18 International Journal of Children’s Rights 650. See also, T Kaime The African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child: A socio-legal perspective (2009) 183. This was based on his fieldwork, 
assessing the awareness of children’s rights in the Magombo and Ndalama villages in Malawi. 
34  See for example, R Bosisio ‘Children’s rights to be heard: What children think’ (2012) 20(1) International 
Journal of Children’s Rights 147 in which he indicated that, in Italy, children are regarded as “fragile and 
vulnerable subjects who require protection from themselves and the world”.  
35  See, art. 29(1) and 31 of the ACRWC and art. 29(1) of the ACHPR. For a detailed analysis of this duty of 
African children, see, J Sloth-Nielsen & BD Mezmur ‘A dutiful child: The implications of Article 31 of the 
African Children's Charter’ (2008) 52(2) Journal of African Law 159–189. 
36  See for example, T Mangena & S Ndlovu ‘Reflections on how selected Shona and Ndebele proverbs 
highlight a worldview that promotes a respect and/or a violation of children’s rights’ (2014) 22(3) 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 667, in which they reveal that traditionally within the Shona and 
Ndebele communities in Zimbabwe and also true across the Continent, “parents are motivated to give 
good care to their children because they know that, in Shona ‘Chirere chigokurerawo’ (bring it well, 
tomorrow it will look after you too), and in Ndebele, ‘Ukuzala yikuzimbela/ukuzala yikuzelul’amdolo’ (to 
bear children is to extend one’s knees)”. 
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To a large extent, the African cultural and legal system makes an attempt through 
such provisions in the ACRWC to strike a balance between respect, responsibility, 
benefiting from care and providing care. The mutual respect in the duties and 
responsibilities between parents and child in an African family is further apparent in 
article 20 of the ACRWC, which enjoins parents to ensure that a child’s best interests is 
central in their childrearing endeavour. Such mutuality has positive consequences in 
that it elevates a child beyond an object upon whom protection and welfare is bestowed 
to a subject on whose shoulders lies the responsibility to ensure the overall well-being of 
the family.37 Uniquely, this responsibility does not vanish as the child grows into 
adulthood, as the ACHPR38 exposes similar responsibilities and enjoins African 
‘children’ to continue caring and assisting the family in time of need. 
Also, the duty of children to respect their parents and to assist them in time of need 
embodies some aspects of children’s right to participation, in this case, collaborative 
participation, as it embodies aspects that would encourage a child’s involvement in family 
decision-making processes. However, the strength of such involvement depends to a large 
extent on the real level of recognition they [children] are given within the family 
environment. As per article 9 of the Cultural Charter for Africa39 which is in tandem with 
the ACRWC, such recognition should consist of children’s active participation in African 
cultural life. This provision highlights what could be referred to as the initiation phase of 
nurturing children in Africa, as it could be read to highlight the fact that children in Africa 
have a right to be involved in the cultural life of their family and from that involvement, 
learn about key tenets of African cultural life and to ensure continuity of the same.  
Remarkably, it is worth noting that children are not generally thrown into 
participating in these cultural matters mainly as ‘children’. Indeed, they are involved 
because based on the legal provisions stated above, they have a right to be involved and 
more so, because they are crucial members of the family especially in terms of ensuring 
continuity. The prospect of continuity is a very influential and crucial aspect in parenting 
in Africa. For example, letting their child/ren participate in such cultural life could be 
considered as shaping future custodians of certain family practices and beliefs. Indeed, the 
mere recognition of their right to participate in African cultural life and their actual 
                                                            
37  R Intudi ‘The application of the International Convention on the Rights of the Child in Africa: When the 
law is tested by reality’ (2007) in A Alen et al. (eds) The UN Children’s Rights Convention: theory meets 
practice 23. 
38  See, art 29(1). 
39  Resolution CM/Res.371 (XXIII) adopted by the Twenty-third Ordinary Session of the Council of Ministers 
and by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU (June 1974, Mogadiscio), available at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/CULTURAL_CHARTER_AFRICA.pdf [accessed 8 April 2015]. 
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participation led Kaime, writing in 2010, and concurring with Armstrong, to affirm that 
“the African conception of human rights has manifested itself in the recognition that 
children are a valuable part of the society”.40 Nsamenang relates to this assertion and adds 
that such recognition is fortified by typical traditional African family participative 
pedagogies designed in a manner that rapidly and systematically transforms children into 
“cultural agents of [their] own developmental learning from an early age”.41 
Surely, from the above it can be denoted that children are not completely lost in 
the translation and interpretation of the family and human rights in Africa. Children 
play a critical role in guaranteeing the continuity of the family, its beliefs and practices. 
In many ways, such recognition justifies the typical African perception of children which 
proclaim and uphold children as “the leaders of tomorrow”42 and the “future of 
tomorrow”.43 Naturally, such proclamations are correct because at some stage in their 
lives children will become adults and take on key positions of responsibility in society. 
However, the traditional context in which these assertions are applied in some traditions 
in Africa emasculates children’s capacity and competence to have an opinion in a matter 
that concerns them.44 Crucially, children’s right to participation is not intended to only 
prepare children for the future, as it jointly requires parents to journey along into a 
child’s future by letting him or her participate in all decisions-making processes on all 
matters of concern to him or her. From this perception, such proclamation could be 
regarded as limited, not necessarily in their expression but, more so in their practice. 
Indeed, they could be seen as drawbacks in the general enhancement of children’s right 
to participation, especially if applied jointly with yet another common African ideology 
which regards its children as “irrational beings”.45 In fact, unlike the earlier ideologies, 
the reference to children as “irrational beings” holds the single ability to hinder children 
                                                            
40  Kaime (n 33 above) 39. 
41  AB Nsamenang, ‘Dilemmas of right-based approaches to child well-being in an African cultural context’ 
(2013) in D Johnson et al (eds) Vulnerable children: Global challenges in education, health, well-being, and 
child rights 15. 
42  In Swahili, it simply translates as, Watoto ni taifa la kesho… the translation of such phrasing into African 
languages goes a long way to show how it is recognised and practiced. 
43  For example, the Swazi proclaim that bantfwana bangulimba loya embili; the Nyanja declare ana ndiwo 
tsogolo lathu; the aBanya’rwanda insist abana nibo Rwanda rwejo. Literally translated, all of these 
expressions mean that “children are the future” and they convey the notion that children must be well 
protected and nurtured otherwise without them, society will die. See Kaime (n 33 above).  
44  This is very common among the Grass field clans in the North-West region of Cameroon. See also, 
Nsamenang (n 41 above) for a general perspective.  
45  AP Ndofirepi & A Shumba ‘Conceptions of “Child” among traditional Africans: A philosophical purview’ 
(2014) 45(3) Journal of Human Ecology 233-242. 
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from participating in, for example, family decision-making processes on matters that 
concern them on the basis that they are presumed to be irrational in their thoughts.  
The contrast that exists within these ideologies is telling, and to some extent extant 
in the contextual normative meaning of children and their competence to participate in 
decision-making processes on issues that concern them in the family. As the future, it 
would be logical that children are included in decision-making processes, especially on 
matters that concern them. In the context of children’s rights in general and their right 
to participation in particular, such inclusion has an unquestionable significance in 
shaping responsible citizens who will be able to ensure the continuity of the family, as 
required by the ACRWC. Contrarily, the ideology referring to children as irrational 
beings should not have a place in contemporary society, especially because the ability to 
be rational is not and should not be defined by age only, but jointly with the environment 
and the exposure a child gets.46  
Woodhead has argued that three prominent elements influence children’s ability 
to be rational: the environment (physical and social) the customs (including traditions) 
and childrearing practices (including values of the parents).47 Woodhead’s argument 
could also be understood to mean that the human ability and level of rationality can be 
better understood as a product of these factors, rather than strength triggered and 
perfected by age. This reasoning is further justified by the fact that adults also possess 
the ability to be irrational. For example, an adult who, for some reasons not medically 
linked, rejects a medically recommended blood transfusion in a life-threatening health-
related situation, could not be said to be rational and the same goes for an adult who 
rapes a child.48 Worth noting, the underlying logic in affording children the right to 
participation lies in the dominant construction of the fact that children are human 
beings with rights and the ability to participate in all matters that concern them. Their 
ability to participate is irrespective of their rational logic based on age, culture or race. 
Generally, they have a right to participate in a decision-making process on a matter that 
concerns them first before anything else and including their age. 
                                                            
46  J Gardner ‘The mark of responsibility’ (2003) 23(2) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 157-171. 
47  M Woodhead ‘Reconstructing developmental child psychology. Some first steps’ (1999) 13 Children and 
Society 3-19.  
48  See for example, the Kenyan case of George Hezron Mwakio v Republic [2010] eKLR. In this case, an adult 
man dragged a child (a 15-year-old girl) through a sisal plantation near the Kenyan-Tanzanian border 
before raping her – the act was classified as ‘aggravated’ and he was sentenced to serve 30 years of 
imprisonment.  
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2.1. Legal balancing 
From a legal perspective, the right to participation for every human being is a key right 
that affords every person the platform to have an opinion in a matter that concerns him 
or her.49 Indeed, as leaders of tomorrow or the future of tomorrow, it is plausible to grant 
a child the opportunity to interact, corporate, be consulted and/or participate in 
decision-making processes on matters that concern him or her now rather than later. 
Naturally, it is in so doing that the child will develop crucial leadership skills, such as the 
ability to make decisions and listen to others. This is a position which African states have 
recognised through their ratification of both the CRC and ACRWC, without any 
reservation to children’s right to participation.50  
Also, the vast domestication of children’s rights in general in Africa, as seen earlier 
in chapter four, to some extent minimises any fears that African State parties have no 
true interest in protecting such rights. Rather, such vast domestication should be seen as 
a validation of the rationale of the legal provisions protecting these rights and the 
intention of African State parties to ensure that children’s right to participation, for 
example, is protected within its territory and in the family in particular. Such guarantees 
should also be extended to the programs (highlighted sporadically throughout this 
thesis) that State parties have developed at national level as efforts to ensure that children 
participate in family decision-making processes.  
Cantwell,51 speaking in 2014,52 declared that the rationale for the protection of 
children’s right to participation is to elevate a child to the same level as adults to 
participate in proceedings on matters that concern him or her now rather than later. In 
view of the reasoning of some of the African ideologies and concepts regarding 
childhood highlighted earlier in chapter two and this section, this rationale is disputable. 
The reason for this is the fact that, although they recognise children as key members of 
the family with rights,53 typical African traditional practices and ideologies bear no 
underlying intention or gritty ambition of equating children with adults or even 
                                                            
49  See generally, Committee on the CRC, GC 12. 
50  See for example, CRC Status of ratification available at https://treaties.un.org/Pages/HistoricalInfo.aspx 
[accessed 8 April 2015].  
51  N Cantwell was the coordinator and general spokesperson for the NGO Ad Hoc Group throughout the 
drafting of the CRC. See also, N Cantwell ‘Words that speak volumes: A short history of the drafting of 
the CRC’ in 18 Candles the Convention on the Rights of the Child Reaches Majority 21, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/crc18.pdf [accessed 13 March 2015]. 
52  During an armchair session at a children’s rights conference commemorating the 25th anniversary of the 
CRC in Leiden, (the Netherlands). Details of this conference can be seen here: 
http://law.leiden.edu/organisation/private-law/child-law/25yearscrc/ [accessed 26 March 2015].  
53  Kaime (n 33 above). 
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considering them as adults during decision-making processes within the family, if they 
are involved.54  
This is generally because, in African societies, parents in particular regard 
childhood as a training phase for growing into adulthood and the challenges thereof.55 
Although progressive in the sense that parents could be held responsible (which of 
course they should) for providing such training to children by involving them in 
decision-making processes on matters that concern them, it should be noted that such 
‘training’ is mainly instructive56 rather than collaborative,57 thus espousing the strength 
of parental authority and control.58 For example, a study conducted by Save the Children 
in Ethiopia in 2003 revealed that parents in the North of Vollo usually talk to their 
children about domestic issues but mainly in the sense of making their children listen 
and follow what they (parents) do rather than requesting their opinion on the activity 
concerned.59 Practically, collaborative participation to ensure family continuity is a form 
of participation which parents do not hesitate to implement, especially because it bears 
with it the aspect of strengthening family beliefs and practices, and African parents are 
generally interested. Although it is probably common knowledge that parental authority 
                                                            
54  The Swazi proverb mentioned (at n 42 above) is a key practice in the siSwati culture which is telling and 
refers to children as the future of tomorrow who need protection at present and nothing more. 
55  P Alston (ed) The best interests of child: Reconciling culture and human rights (1994) 90. 
56  It should be noted that the issue of competence with regards to children’s ability to participate in decision-
making processes on matters that concern them is not supposed to be in an instructive form. Interestingly, 
this is not uniquely African as several other scholars from other parts of the globe have highlighted the 
same practice elsewhere. For example, the Irish experience in I Coyne et al. (2006) Giving children a voice, 
investigation of children’s experiences of participation in consultation and decision-making in Irish hospitals 
9-17. See also, Save the Children’s report on Children’s Rights in Ethiopia: A Situation Analysis (2003) 1. 
57  Collaborative participation is one of the generally recommended methods of ensuring children’s right to 
participation – see for example G Lansdown Promoting children’s participation in democratic decision-
making (2001) 15 in which she remarked that “[d]eveloping structures for discussion, and the 
development of collaborative solutions with children are important parts of the process of participation 
and democracy”. 
58  “A good illustration of the effectiveness of culturally appropriate procedures and arguments is provided 
by the manner in which some communities in the south of Malawi have attempted to deal with the practice 
of fisi (hyena) during girls’ initiation ceremonies. The practice entails that, at the end of formal instruction 
during the initiation period, the fisi goes into the compound where the initiates are ensconced to ‘examine’ 
whether they are able to practise the concepts and theories which they have been taught regarding sex and 
sexuality.” T Kaime ‘The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the cultural legitimacy of children's 
rights in Africa: Some reflections’ (2005) 5(2) African Human Rights Law Journal 221–238. 
59  Save the Children’s report on Children’s Rights in Ethiopia: A Situation Analysis (2003) 19. Available at 
http://resourcecentre.savethechildren.se/sites/default/files/documents/childrens_rights_in_ethiopia_a_s
ituation_analysis.pdf [accessed 21 July 2016]. 
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and control gradually drops as a child matures,60 in the context of traditional African 
ideologies a child is always a child.61 Thus, to some extent a ‘child’ is continuously in this 
training phase even after the age of 18. After childhood, such parental control could also 
be based on the fact that a particular ‘child’ lacks enough capacity or knowledge of a 
particular practice.  
However, the allocation and acceptance of this right to children in mainstream and 
domestic children’s rights instruments in Africa and the programs that state parties have 
developed in terms of these instruments are a strong signal that perceptions might 
change some day and they are changing already to grant children full access in decision-
making processes as human beings with the  capacity to make valuable contributions as 
rational beings, based on their maturity and ability to form and communicate their 
opinion freely in the family.62 The Committee on the CRC calls on state parties to 
encourage families to ensure “the promotion of positive, non-violent and participatory 
forms of child-rearing”, which gives due weight to the views of children according to 
their maturity on matters that concern them.63 While this could be noted as a strong and 
positive call from the Committee, it is easier said than done because for such values to 
be practiced acceptably in the family environment, it would require a massive shift of 
perceptions. It would require a shift from the traditional views that regard childhood as 
a passive stage, and children as irrational and incompetent, to accepting and recognising 
them as human beings worth making substantive contributions in all decisions on 
matters that concern them. Indeed, the maintenance and inclusive involvement of 
children in family decision-making processes in Africa should start with educational 
approaches designed to bring children’s rights into the family not as an opposing 
concept to already existing parental duties but as a compliment to such parental duties 
with the intention to enhance family unity and continuity.  
                                                            
60  See for example, MEC for Education, Kwazulu-Natal v Pillay 2008 1 SA 474, where Langa CJ remarked 
that “[t]he need for a child’s voice to be heard is perhaps even more acute when it concerns children [in 
the later part of childhood] who should be increasingly taking responsibilities for their own actions and 
beliefs” (para 56). 
61  TC Nhenga-Chakarisa ‘Who does the law seek to protect and from what? The application of international 
law on child labour in an African context’ (2010) 10 African Human Rights Law Journal 175. See also¸ W 
Ncube Law, culture, tradition and children’s rights in Eastern and Southern Africa (1998) 100. 
62  See generally, chapter two of this thesis for details on the conditions. 
63  Committee on the CRC, GC No 8, The right of the child to protection from corporal punishment and other 
cruel or degrading forms of punishment, UN doc CRC/C/GC8 paras 12 & 41. 
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3. Bringing children’s rights into the family 
Based on the section above, it would be preposterous to speculate or conclude at first instance 
that children’s rights are not practiced and respected in the family. In fact, the section above 
demonstrates in the affirmative that they are practiced, although it questions the method and 
intent of which children are generally permitted to participate in African cultural life. 
Irrespective, the family has, is and will always be the first place where children will on the one 
hand enjoy the most protection of their basic rights, such as their right to food, sleep and 
play and, on the other hand, where such rights could be violated without notice.  
Research indicates that over the years, legal scholars have given enormous attention 
to the susceptibility of children to abuse,64 the protection and implementation of their 
rights,65 children’s duty to love and honour their parents, and parental duty to care and 
provide for their children.66 However, little attention has been paid to perhaps the most 
critical child-rearing environment in the general children’s rights discourse, which is 
promoting the effective protection of children’s rights in the family.67 Several reasons could 
account for this limitation and, ranging from parental reluctance or lack of interest to 
approach the courts (thereby giving both the judiciary and legal scholars less to write home 
about) to the established fact that the family is a private entity. Whether such a gap in 
literature is deliberate or simply an omission is irrelevant, because whatever structure or 
legal means is adopted to significantly promote, for example, children’s right to 
participation in family decision-making processes should be aware of the stringent privacy, 
cultural and religious walls that have surrounded most families from time immemorial. It 
                                                            
64  L Duggan et al. ‘The credibility of children as witnesses in a simulated child sex abuse trial’ in J Ceci et al 
(eds) Perspectives on Children’s Testimony (1989) 71-99. 
65  See for example, L Westra Child law: Children’s rights and collective obligations (2014). 
66  See for example, J Fortin Children’s rights and the developing law (2009) 319–363. 
67  This thesis unfortunately is not tailored to provide an in-depth analysis of this aspect either. But others, 
for example, Kaime (n 33 above), Fortin (as above) and C Breen Age discrimination and children’s rights: 
Ensuring equality and acknowledging difference (2006) have all analysed the protection of children rights 
in the family through their research. 
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should also take into consideration the various forms of family structures extant in Africa68 
and the general protection or privacy terms on which most families are structured.69 
Legally, it is perhaps possible that constitution drafting committees in most 
African states considered the possible challenges that may be encountered by legislation 
to penetrate the family environment and requiring certain child-rearing standards from 
parents and relatives.70 Although the factual protection of individuals or vulnerable 
members within the family is challenging, mainstream children’s rights instruments are 
firm in their obligations assigned to state parties, to ensure that rights are protected and 
delivered to their rightful benefactors even in the family. As seen in chapter four, African 
states have encouragingly met their obligations (on paper) and at the very least 
recognised children as rights holders especially in the protection of, for example, their 
right to education and health. However, just like most children’s rights, the protection 
of their rights in the family requires a blend between theory and practice. Theoretically, 
such rights are available but the practical aspect of ensuring that children as rights 
holders, especially within the ambits of their right to participate in family decision-
making processes within the family, is limited.  
Indeed, numerous aspects frustrate the implementation of this right in the family 
and the most central of them have also been codified in legal text which protects the family 
as a private entity in some constitutions.71 For example, the Constitutions of Cameroon 
(the preamble), the Federal Republic of Nigeria (article 10) and Egypt (article 10) all 
protect the family as a private entity which should be void of any interference. Such 
                                                            
68  In Zimbabwe, for example, there are two dominant family structures, namely the nuclear family and the 
traditional (extended) family. The others are the single parent family, child-headed families and elderly-headed 
families. For more on these family structures, see Committee on the CRC, Consideration of reports submitted 
by states parties under article 44 of the convention: Zimbabwe UN doc CRC/C/ZWE/2 para 215 – 217. 
69  See for example, [at the global level] art 12 of the Universal Declaration which provides that “[n]o one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to 
attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks”. At the national level, art 22(1) of the Constitution of the Federation of Nigeria, 
which provides that “(1) [e]very person shall be entitled to respect for his private and family life, his home 
and his correspondence”; art 10 of the 2014 Constitution of Egypt which provides that “[f]amily is the 
basis of society and is based on religion, morality, and patriotism. The state protects its cohesion and 
stability, and the consolidation of its values”. 
70  R Chisholm Softening the blow changing the custody to residence (1998) 4, available at 
file:///C:/Users/efokala/Downloads/chisholm2001.pdf [accessed 4 November 2015] in which he said it is 
helpful to note that it is as difficult to those making legal decisions to listen to children as the case with 
parents because in both instances it is crucial to understand what is happening before making any decision 
on the lives of children. 
71  See generally, the Constitution of Cameroon (preamble), the Constitution of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (art 10) and the Constitution of Egypt (art. 10).  
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declarations are very strong and have been very influential both in the way parents 
perceive their authority within the family and the way the state could intervene to protect 
abused family members, including children. Worse, children’s right to participation is not 
protected in these Constitutions and these countries practice constitutional democracy 
which makes the Constitution superior above all other legal texts. In this regard, 
instituting children’s rights in general in the family, especially in instances where they have 
been abused, would require the state to take stakes beyond legal text. 
However, with the exception of South Africa, for example, where the need to 
protect children’s rights have been expressly extended into the family through 
constitutional provisions72 and expanded in its Children’s Act as parents and members 
of the extended family have been given legally binding roles to ensure children’s rights 
within the family, the implementation is still not smooth.73 Notwithstanding, it is 
certainly a signal that directives are beginning to change and that presumed parental 
roles, protection and enjoyment of children’s rights within the family in most African 
states have started gaining stronger recognition and protection.74  
3.1. Is the family a private space? 
Concepts such as family privacy, family as a private space, and the notion that the state 
cannot or should not intervene in private areas as it could result in invasion of privacy, 
are indeed concepts that are also protected by law.75 Noticeably, there is a huge amount 
of literature and human history challenging the fact that states should not interfere in 
family affairs or in the private relationship between parents and children.76 This could 
conveniently gain justification from the fact that the initial obligation to respect and 
protect children’s rights, generally lies with the state – which is of course transposed 
through national laws to citizens.  
The relationship between the state and its citizens could possibly be grouped under 
two channels. These are the vertical (state and citizens, individuals or groups) and 
                                                            
72  See generally, art. 28 of the Constitution which provides that “every child has the right to family care or 
parental care or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment”. 
73  South African Children’s Act (2005) art. 1(1) & ch 3.  
74  See ch 3 of this thesis. 
75  See for example, Human Rights Council’ reports, Protection of the family: role of the family in supporting 
the protection and promotion of human rights of persons with disabilities (2016) UN Doc A/HRC/32/L.35. 
See also, BB Woodhouse ‘The dark side of family privacy’ 67 The George Washington Law Review 1247–
1999.  
76  See for example, AJ Kleinfeld ‘The balance of power among infants, their parents and the State’ (1970) 
4(4) Family Law Quarterly 63–84. See also, SJ Baskin ‘State intrusion into family affairs: Justifications and 
limitations’ (1974) 26(6) Stanford Law Review 1383-1409. 
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horizontal (citizens and individuals) channels. The vertical legislative responsibility 
bestowed on citizens by states seems workable at least to the extent that it is generally 
acceptable and citizens (individuals or groups) are aware that any breach could lead to 
legal sanctions. The challenge, though, is with the horizontal relationship between 
citizens and/or individuals within groupings (private space - family) or society in 
general. For example, within the family, it could face considerable strain, especially 
regarding the respect of family members’ rights. Generally, parental dominance prevails; 
in some cases, dominance is based on seniority and in some, on gender. Either way, it is 
a complex environment and it is such nuance in the authority, powers and dominance 
within the family space in particular which complicates the proper implementation of 
children’s right to participate in family decision-making processes. However, with an 
established record that considerable levels of human rights violations take place in 
homes, (i.e. in the family environment77), it is logical to hold that a comprehensive 
protection of human rights should include the protection of every human being 
everywhere in society and the family is no exception.  
However, based on the reasons presented in this chapter and sporadically 
throughout this thesis, the comprehensive introduction of children’s rights protection 
within African families is farfetched. The most central one seems to be the stringent 
hierarchical order that dominates most family structures in Africa. Generally, families 
are concerned with guaranteeing stability and this is usually implied to mean preserving 
the very conservative systems of parental authority which have undermined children’s 
ability to participate in decision-making processes over the years. The inclusion of 
children in decision-making processes, parents could argue, would create tension in the 
family environment and destabilise the much-needed stability in the family.  
All the same, the enactment of children’s rights in several international human 
rights treaties (specifically in the CRC and the ACRWC) and the domestication of 
children’s rights in several African states, establish a direct relationship between the state 
and children in areas not limited to protecting a child from abuse and violation of his or 
her rights within the family. This relationship is true, especially in the context that most 
states, have established what is generally referred to as “hotline or emergency numbers” 
which can be used by any member of the family, including children, to report any form 
of abuse happening within the family to a state agency such as the police.78 The legal 
recognition of such a relationship mandates a certain level of collaboration between the 
                                                            
77  See for example, E Egede ‘Bringing human rights home: An examination of the domestication of human 
rights treaties in Nigeria’ (2007) 51(2) Journal of African Law 249-284. 
78  Commonly known in, for example, South Africa as 10111, Angola as 113, and Egypt as 122. 
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family and the state in child-rearing, which to a reasonable extent challenges the 
presumption that parents have complete ownership over their child/ren or that the State 
is not allowed to intervene in family matters.  
To this end, the introduction of children’s rights law and the domestication, 
education and dissemination of children’s rights in Africa have shifted perceptions (to 
some extent even traditional and religious perceptions) and brought awareness of 
children’s rights within the family in some African homes.79 For instance, Lloyd, writing 
in 2002, points to the fact that both the CRC and the ACRWC have “… regards to and 
respect for cultural practices … but prevents cultural practices which may be harmful or 
prejudicial to a child’s health and bans other practices such as child marriage”.80 Legally, 
interference in the family space is allowed to the extent that such interference is not 
unlawful.81 Although it is far from it, a comprehensive protection of children’s rights 
within African families is fast becoming more a reality than a dream and the position of 
African children within their respective families, as seen in the next chapter, is also 
gaining prominence. As a result, parental authority over their children is becoming 
consultative rather than autocratic and the impact of the actions of the state to protect 
children’s rights in the family is gradually been felt.82 
It is, but not absolute 
The shift to the recognition of rights of “vulnerable” individuals within the family did 
not start with children’s rights, but more so with the claiming of women’s rights within 
the family. Historically, the claiming of such rights began because it was necessary to 
protect the rights of abused women within family walls and the private space debate kept 
it out of any authoritative intervention.83 Indeed, state intervention was not resistance 
free and any interference by state authorities to protect an abused woman was classified 
as state intervention into the private family space. Today, interference to protect abused 
                                                            
79  See for example, T Kaime The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child: A socio-legal 
perspective (n 33 above), and T Kaime Convention on the Rights of the Child: A cultural legitimacy critique 
(2011). 
80  A Lloyd ‘Evolution of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and The African 
Committee of Experts: raising the gauntlet’ (2002) 10(2) The International Journal of Children’s Rights 23. 
81  See for example, art. 16(1) of the CRC and art. 10 of the ACRWC. 
82  Kaime (n 40 above). 
83  See for example, F Olsen ‘The myth of the State intervention in the family’ (1985) 18(4) University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform 839–840; O Jonas, ‘Gender equality in Botswana: The case of Mmusi and 
Others v Ramantele and Others’ (2013) 13(1) African Human Rights Law Journal 299–244; F Banda 
‘Building on a global movement: Violence against women in the African context’ (2008) 8(1) African 
Human Rights Law Journal 1–22. 
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women is no longer regarded as state intervention into the private family space, because 
legally women’s rights have been given full recognition in law through their protection 
in CEDAW. Through CEDAW, women are now beneficiaries of an array of rights both 
within the public and private space and the state has a mandate to ensure that such rights 
granted to women are protected and promoted even within the family. At the African 
regional level, just like is the case with children’s rights, women’s rights in Africa has 
been fortified by the adoption of a specific African regional instrument on women’s 
rights - the African Women’s Protocol.  
Through both instruments women have been granted several rights, including the 
right to inheritance, the right to self-determination, and the right to participate in all 
decision-making processes, including family decision-making processes on all matters 
concerning them.84 Although very similar, the contextual application of children’s right to 
participation in family decision-making processes is different because, as demonstrated 
throughout this thesis, children are generally presumed to be incompetent and this could 
last throughout childhood and possibly frustrate their inclusion in family decision-making 
processes, let alone the chance to express their views on matters that concern them.  
However, the competence of women, once questioned, has now (in most parts of 
the continent) been lifted and this is, in most cases, not only due to the recognition of 
their right to meaningfully participate in family decision-making processes but also 
based on the fact that through the enjoyment of their rights, women in Africa are now 
beneficiaries of several privileges, such as financial independence generally ascribed to 
men only. Indeed, based on this thesis, women now fall into the category of parents and 
as parents they have the responsibility to also ensure that children enjoy their right to 
participate in family decision-making processes on all matters that concern them.  
4. Scope of parental directives and guidance and state 
intervention85 
4.1. Parental directives and guidance 
The allocation of parental responsibilities and rights to, amongst others, provide children 
with directives and guidance in, and during the enjoyment of their right to participation 
is protected throughout the CRC and the ACRWC. The award of directives and guidance 
                                                            
84  See for example, para 8 of the preamble of CEDAW and Art. 9 of the African Women’s Protocol. 
85  The terms – intervention, interference and intrusion will be used interchangeably through this chapter.  
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to parents is critical, as it points to and strengthens the fact that a comprehensive 
protection and enjoyment of children’s rights is not void of adult contribution or 
assistance.86 Also, both instruments87 emphasize and recognise the dynamic composition 
which surrounds most families in Africa. Chiefly, article 5 of the CRC is significant in that 
it tacitly recognises the reality that what constitutes a family varies from country to 
country and in some cases from clan to clan, as it overtly refers to the influence of “local 
custom” as a measure for a state party’s obligation to respect the responsibilities, rights 
and duties of parents to ensure that children’s rights are protected in the family.88  
The importance of such recognition is that it leaves no gap for escape or excuse 
that may exist in the case of non-protection of children’s rights in the family. However, 
placed in an ideal world, it must also be noted that article 5 does not seem to have the 
impact expected in terms of being one of the measuring rods which should guide states’ 
assistance to parents according to their local customs. This is true, especially when 
related to the protection of children’s right to participate in family decision-making 
processes. Indeed, many state parties have alluded to cultural and traditional attitudes 
(local customs) as one of the main barriers to the implementation of children’s rights to 
participation, especially in the family.89  
Irrespective, the responsibility of parents to ease children to enjoy their right to 
participate in a family decision-making process in particular, remains unchanged 
under both the CRC and the ACRWC. Traditionally and legally, parents are 
considered to have a natural right to control and nurture their children.90 Although 
parental rights and control of the family has developed strong roots in family law, its 
core intent provides concrete justification for protecting children’s interests91 and in 
                                                            
86  M Freeman ‘The rights to be heard’ (1998/99) 22(4) Adoption and Fostering 56. 
87  Especially the ACRWC. 
88  Art. 5 provides that “States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and duties of parents or, where 
applicable, the members of the extended family or community as provided for by local custom, legal 
guardians or other persons legally responsible for the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the 
evolving capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in the exercise by the child of the 
rights recognized in the present Convention.” See also, A Parkes Children and international human rights 
law: The right of the child to be heard (2013) 73. 
89  For example, see, Committee on the CRC, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under 
Article 44 of the Convention: Cameroon UN doc CRC/C/28/Add.16 para 53; Ghana UN doc 
CRC/C/GHA/3-5 paras 76 – 77; The Gambia UN doc CRC/C/GMB/2-3 para 78. 
90  See for example, art. 20 of the ACRWC which provides that, “Parents or other persons responsible for the 
child shall have the primary responsibility of the upbringing and development the child and shall have the 
duty”: – to ensure the best interest of the child and to secure the child’s development. 
91  Baskin (n 76 above). 
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particular their right to participate in family decision-making processes on matters 
that concern them.  
Modern theories of child welfare, offer persuasive support to children’s rights and 
suggest that legal systems should strengthen the relationship between parents and 
children - in the context that it enhances an environment of shared, positive and 
responsible dialogue.92 Accordingly, the Committee on the CRC admits that  
[t]he Convention recognizes the rights and responsibilities of parents, or other legal 
guardians, to provide appropriate direction and guidance to their children, but 
underlines that this is to enable the child to exercise his or her rights and requires that 
direction and guidance are undertaken in a manner consistent with the evolving 
capacities of the child.93 
The position of the Committee mentioned above is not innovative but firm and highlights 
what should, from a rights protection basis, bind a parent-child relationship. The 
Committee’s obstinacy to generate a link between parental responsibilities and rights and 
children’s right to participate in family decision-making processes consistent with their 
evolving capacities could be viewed as modern. This is especially true because traditional 
African family practices, as indicated earlier in this chapter, are generally not construed to 
give children the chance to participate in family decision-making processes on all matters 
that concern them. Nevertheless, from the Committee’s position above, it is deducible that 
parental responsibility is two- dimensional when respecting children’s right to participate 
in family decision-making processes. First, it is the responsibility of parents to ensure that 
a child freely expresses his or her view on a matter that concerns him or her. Washak holds 
that the full and justified execution of such duty should be based on grounds that a child 
has not been imperiled to external influence and he or she has received all required 
information to facilitate and enhance his or her ability to make an informed 
contribution.94 Secondly, the dimension of responsibility espoused by the Committee’s 
reasoning above is the parental responsibility to give due weight to the views of the child 
expressed during a family decision-making process on a matter concerning the child. Such 
                                                            
92  For instance, see, Committee on the CRC, GC No 12. 
93  Committee on the CRC, GC No 12, para 91. See also art.18 of the CRC.  
94  RA Washak ‘Payoffs and pitfalls of listening to children’ (2003) 52(4) Family Relations 373, 375. 
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weight, Lester and Brazelton warn, should not be based on homogenous reasoning since 
children’s capacities are not homogenously linked to their biological age.95  
Further, articles 20 of the ACRWC and 18 of the CRC are construed to emphasize 
the much-needed role of parents and/or legal guardians in the upbringing and 
development of children and the assistance that must be provided by states to parents 
accordingly. Viewed through the lens of these articles, parents are portrayed here as passive 
beneficiaries of rights in a legal instrument intended for children. Such parental rights are 
engulfed in their responsibility package. According to Eekelaar, the causal cogent of the 
granting of parental responsibility is two-folded as “a factual recognition of the state of 
affairs, and also a normative granting of approval by the state to a given situation”.96  
Reasoning along with Eekelaar, Freeman purports that parental responsibility in 
Eekelaar’s logic “is a status which consists in, and is co-extensive with, practical 
actions”.97 Actions which generally cannot be provided by law, especially because the law 
cannot respond swiftly to a child’s immediate need, such as provide water to a thirsty 
child. However, the legal concept of parental responsibility rests upon a dogma which 
purports such responsibility as the ordering of relationships in the natural world. Truly, 
it is the law that regulates parental duty to respond to a child’s immediate need through 
its recognition of parental responsibilities and rights. Indeed, the legislative perception 
of parental responsibility is telling when analysed in the eyes of the South African 
Children’s Act, which holds that it is the “… responsibilities and rights that a person may 
have in respect of a child, [which includes] the responsibility and the right to care for 
the child; to maintain contact with the child; to act as guardian of the child; and to 
contribute to the maintenance of the child”.98  
Based on such legal codification, parental responsibilities and rights to care for 
their children, cannot reasonably be refuted by the argument that the intricate 
underlying rationale of such responsibilities and rights has something to do with 
protecting parental interests, the interest they have in their children and espousing their 
                                                            
95  BM Lester & TB Brazelton ‘Cross-cultural Assessment of neonatal behaviour’ in DA Wagner and HW Stevenson 
(eds) Cross-cultural perspectives on child development (1982) 20-53; D Frank & S Zeisel ‘Failure to thrive’ (1988) 
6 Paediatric Clinics of North America 1187-1206; and C Landers Early child development summary report, 
(UNICEF, 1989) 6. See also G Lansdown The evolving capacities of the child, (2005). See also P Parkinson & J 
Cashmore, The voice of a child in family law disputes (2012) 81, in which a parent said “I don’t claim to be an 
expert but what I would say is that … all of this has to be tempered on the child, the individual, and so I could 
even say from my three, Daniel, at age 7 is far more aware in many respects than Matthew at age 11 …”. 
96  J Eekelaar ‘Parental responsibility: State of nature or nature of the state?’ (1991) Journal of Social Welfare 
and Family Law 37. 
97  M Freeman ‘Whose life is it anyway?’ (2001) 9 Medical Law Review 271. 
98  Sec 18(2) South African Children’s Act (2005). See generally, sec 18 of same for further details.  
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domination over their children. Archard, writing in 1993, reasoned that if parents do 
have “… a right to rear it is plausible to think that it is derived from and is consequently 
dependent upon the prior duty to give a child the best possible upbringing”.99 The best 
possible upbringing and development of a child must be comprehensive (which includes 
material, mental, physical soundness amongst others) in order to enhance the proper 
development of children. For this to happen, parental domination, especially during 
family decision–making processes on matters that concern a child, must be reduced to 
the minimum and the space given to a child to express his or her opinion on a matter 
that concerns him or her broadened as widely as possible based on the maturity of the 
child. Confidently, this is a perception advocates for children’s right to participate in 
family decision-making processes will agree with.100  
However, to ensure that such balance is struck, parents should heed to the fact that 
“[c]hildren’s levels of understanding are not uniformly linked to their biological age [… 
the level of access to] information, experience, environment, social and cultural 
expectations, and levels of support all contribute to the development of a child’s capacity 
to form a view. For this reason, the views of the child have to be assessed on a case-by-
case examination”.101 The knowledge required in ensuring such case-by-case 
examination is in most cases difficult and indeed probably the reason why it is not 
surprising that both the CRC and the ACRWC introduce the state as a key role player to 
provide assistance to parents where possible.  
4.2. State intervention 
Throughout the CRC and the ACRWC, the state is recognised as the main duty bearer 
with the responsibility to ensure that the rights protected in these instruments are 
delivered to children. Even in instances where parents have been assigned duties, the state 
is still assigned to provide support and assistance to parents to facilitate their childrearing 
duties. It is this link in duty implementation that makes state intervention in the family a 
possibility. State intervention in the family could be classified into positive and negative 
interventions. Positive is that which is generally accepted and would strengthen family 
                                                            
99  D Archard Children: Rights and childhood (1993) 130. 
100  See generally, art. 12 of the CRC and 4(2) of the ACRWC and for an expansive reading see Committee on 
the CRC, GC No 12. 
101  Committee on the CRC, GC No 12 para 29. 
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unity, protect the vulnerable or punish offenders,102 and negative is that which could 
destroy or weaken family unity and bonds. State intervention to ensure children’s right to 
participate in family decision-making processes could be a mixture of both.  
From a family law perspective, the dilemma is whether the state is capable of 
providing sufficient assistance and whether the state should even intervene in family 
matters?103 Generally, the family condones some level of protective intervention by the 
state – this is the case irrespective of the African cultural or religious beliefs they practice. 
It is perhaps irrelevant how resistant or susceptible to state intervention a family could 
be, as international human rights law generally imposes obligations on states first, before 
others, to ensure the respect and protection of human rights within its territory, and the 
family is no exception.104 In contemporary legal literature, most scholars concede that 
there are times when state intervention in the family is absolutely relevant.105 Some such 
instances, most scholars claim, include cases of divorce or legal separation or where the 
human rights of co-family members are perpetually abused.106  
                                                            
102  For instance, a family will be quick to accept or invite the state to intervene to order the non-custodial 
parent to provide pecuniary maintenance for his or her child or children if that would not happen without 
a court order. For example, in the decision of the high court of Lesotho in Seotlo v Seotlo CIV/APN/262/82 
in which the state (through the judiciary) ordered the non-custodial partner to “maintain the … two 
minor children (of a dissolved marriage) in the sum of R75.00 per month and such amount to be paid to 
the office of the Registrar of the High Court” (para 3). Also, even in the case of a dissolved marriage, as 
was the case in the Namibian case of FN v SM (CA 77/2011) [2012] NAHC 226, the court, if satisfied with 
the evidence submitted, can intrude without objection on grounds of domestic violence from the acts of 
one of the partners of a previous marriage to protect the affected parties and in some instances, rescind 
certain rights and privileges it had earlier granted to the abusive party during the divorce hearing. In this 
case, the court rescinded an earlier interim protection order and replaced it with a final protection order 
in terms whereof – amongst others – the respondent was “ordered not to commit any further acts of 
violence against his minor children; and custody of the minor children born between the appellant and 
respondent [was] granted to the appellant for the duration of this order, subject to reasonable access by 
the respondent of alternate weekends and school holidays …”. 
103  See generally, Olsen (n 83 above) 835, BB Woodhouse ‘The dark side of family privacy’ (1999) 67 George 
Washington Law Review. 1247. 
104  See, for example, two Kenyan cases: C.K. (A Child) (through Ripples International as her guardian and 
next friend) and others v Commissioner of Police / Inspector General of the National Police Service and 
others, petition 8 of 2012 [2013] eKLR where, as recognised by the Court, the State has a duty under Articles 
19 and 34 of the CRC to protect children from all forms of abuse. This decision properly found the State 
accountable for its failure to fulfil this duty. See also, Agnes Wanjiru Kiraithe & another v Attorney General 
& 2 others petition no. 536 of 2013 [2014] eKLR, in which the State had to intervene in a community’s 
(family) practice of FGM to protect the children concern.  
105  Parkes (n 88 above) 76-77. See also, Baskin (n 76 above) 1390-1391, in which he argues that two main 
reasons justify such interference - the best interests of the child and the doctrine of parens patriae. The 
latter is a doctrine that grants the inherent power and authority of the state to protect persons who are 
legally unable to act on their own behalf – Black’s law Dictionary (eighth edition) 1144. 
106  For instance, see, Baskin (n 76 above) 1383–1409. 
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However, such intervention is still very difficult in African families as the family 
still enjoys, as it should, some degree of privacy and non-intervention by third parties. 
Families generally prefer to resolve family disputes within the family. On one hand, this 
could be regarded as progressive as it strengthens family unity in the sense that it 
encourages and fortifies family bonds through keeping family matters private and 
shielding “wrongdoers” from “public shame”; on the other hand, such family practices 
disguise and condone human rights violations in the family. Different views have been 
expressed about why the state should or should not intervene in the family. There are, 
of course, several instances where family members hold strong views and the state 
concurs that the state should not intervene.107 For example, in the South African 
Constitutional Court case of DE v RH,108 based on whether the Court should intervene 
and sanction a supposed adulterous partner in a collapsing marriage, the court held that  
… global trend was moving towards the abolition of civil claims based on adultery. Even in 
South Africa, it is clear that attitudes towards the legal sanction of adultery have been softening. 
Marriages are founded on love and respect, which are not legal rules, and are the responsibility 
of the spouses themselves. In the present case, the breakdown of the marriage was as a result 
of a failure by the spouses themselves to sustain their marriage and thus it would be 
inappropriate for the courts to intervene.109 
The decision of the Court in the case above is very interesting and it will send strong 
signals across a continent which still, rightly so, holds marriage values quite high and 
based on legal, religious and customary terms.110 Olsen, however, holds that claims for 
non-intervention in most cases have been qualified by the caveat that the state should 
intervene to correct inequality and abuse in the family (i.e. protective intervention111), 
and in this case there was no abuse, especially as the marriage had irretrievably broken 
down. Reasoning along with Olsen, the decision of the Court is not cast in stone on all 
family matters. Indeed, protective intervention is exactly what most courts in Africa 
have adopted in several cases in their attempt to intervene in family related issues to 
resolve inequality and human rights violations. For example, another interesting and 
                                                            
107  See generally, J Dwyer Misused concepts and misguided questions: Fundamental confusions in family law 
debate (2013) Faculty Publications. Available at http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/1788 [accessed 17 
November 2015]. 
108  DE v RH CCT (2015) 182/14.  
109  DE’s case (as above) paras 37 & 42–47. Extract from the summary of the case available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2015/128.html [accessed 19 November 2015]. 
110  From a customary law angle, this will not cause so much fuss. This is because most customary practices 
across the continent do not rebuke adultery since it condones polygamy – adultery under customary law 
could be quickly defended with intent to marry. See EN Ngwafor Family law in Anglophone Cameroon 
(1993) 108.   
111  Olsen (n 103 above) 835. 
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topical family issue in African traditional and cultural discourse is property inheritance. 
In most cultures, such practice is decided within a family and across masculine lineage.112 
However, the state (through the judiciary) has intervened in the family space on several 
occasions, in many different countries, to correct this inequality or injustice and to 
protect women’s or girl-children’s right to inheritance. For instance, in the Nigerian case 
of Mojekwu v Iwuchukwu,113 the Nigerian Supreme Court held that the Lli-Ekpe custom 
which prohibits women from inheriting property is repugnant to natural justice, equity 
and good conscience. In its reasoning, the court passed a decision contrary to the 
cultural practice in the Lli-Ekpe community and allowed the widow (respondent) the 
right to inherit her late husband’s property.  
Similarly, and equally groundbreaking, is the South African Constitutional Court 
decision in Bhe and Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate and Others114 in which the court 
passed a decision similar to that in Mojekwu v Iwuchukwu, setting aside the cultural 
norm which prohibited the girl-child from inheriting property, and granted her such 
rights. These cases and others in many ways have reshaped the cultural mindset of 
property inheritance along masculine (boy-child) lineage in some part of Africa. 
Intrinsically, the decision on who inherits rests in the family – thus, the intervention of 
the courts to correct any injustice or inequality that exist in the family in this regard is a 
justification of the extent to which the state can intervene in family matters to protect 
the vulnerable (in this case a girl-child) in the private space. However, it would be 
interesting to ascertain whether the state could still intrude in the family even in the 
absence of any form of abuse or inequality.115 
From an international law perspective, several treaties promulgated in the early 
1990s reflect an expanded understanding of state responsibility that include the 
responsibility “to ensure the prevention, investigation, and punishment” of human 
                                                            
112  A very common practice in the Lli-Ekpe custom in Nigeria – see also, E Fokala ‘The relevance of a 
multidisciplinary interpretation of selected aspects related to women’s sexual and reproductive health 
rights in Africa’ (2013) 17 Law, Democracy & Development 186. 
113  Mojekwu v Iwuchukwu 2004 (4) Nigeria SC 1. 
114  Bhe and Others v Khayelitsha Magistrate and Others (CCT 49/03) [2004] ZACC 17; 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC); 
2005 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). 
115  See for example, art. 17(1) of CCPR prohibiting unlawful and arbitrary interferences with family privacy 
and 17(2) which promises everyone the right to protection against such interference; see also arts 16(3) & 
23(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which affirms that “the family is the natural and 
fundamental group of society and is entitled to protection by the state”.  
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rights violations that occurred in private as well as public space.116 Such established state 
responsibilities have many times been confronted with parents who also claim legal 
responsibilities and rights bestowed by the same international treaties. A classic case 
here is the CRC and the ACRWC which both harbour an avalanche of parental 
responsibilities and rights – probably more than any other treaty does. Certainly, 
parental responsibilities and rights are key components to the very existence of 
children’s rights. It would not be wrong, either, to suggest that such responsibilities and 
rights represent one of the underlying and veiled main bargaining chips with which 
these instruments have attracted huge acceptance – as they are also very visible in 
national laws related to children.117  
However, caution should be taken when the state constructs a legal parent-child 
relationship in its systematisation of national laws as “… it confers various rights and 
powers on the persons to whom it gives the legal status of parent”.118 In most cases, such 
legal provisions bequeath on parents considerable autonomy to educate and provide 
directives and guidance to their children as they deem fit.119 In fact, in the South Africa 
case of S v M120 Sachs J in his attempt to define the scope of parental responsibilities and 
rights as protected by section 28 of the South African Constitution, which confers a 
number of rights on children, held that the purpose -  
… is to ensure that parents serve as the most immediate moral exemplars for their offspring. 
Their responsibility is not just to be with their children and look after their daily needs. It is 
certainly not simply to secure money to buy the accoutrements of the consumer society, such 
as cell phones and expensive shoes. It is to show their children how to look problems in the 
eye. It is to provide them with guidance on how to deal with setbacks and make difficult 
decisions. Children have a need and a right to learn from their primary caregivers that 
individuals make moral choices for which they can be held accountable.121 
                                                            
116  For example, international instruments such as the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against 
Women prohibit states from tolerating custom and tradition as a justification for the violation or women’s 
rights. Regional instruments, such as the African Women’s Protocol (2005), also call on states to address 
injustices and the abuse of women’s and girls’ rights in Africa. For example, article 4 of the Protocol provides 
that states must take steps to “adopt … such … legislative, administrative, social and economic measures as 
may be necessary to ensure the prevention, punishment and eradication of all forms of violence”. 
117  See, ch 2 of this thesis. 
118  Dwyer (n 107 above) 243. 
119  For example, in the Republic of Tanzania, sections 8 and 16 of the Law of the Child Act (2009) for 
Mainland and Section 10 of the Zanzibar Children’s Act (2011): parents have a common responsibility to 
take care and protect their children through the provision of food, shelter, clothing, education, medical 
care, liberty and right to play and leisure. Through both laws, every parent or person legally responsible 
for a child bears the duty to ensure that the best interests of the child are his basic concern at all times. 
120  S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC). 
121  As above para 134. 
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In most cases, state intervention is generally overlooked and in some instances rejected 
with absolute resentment. However, once given some thought it becomes apparent that 
there is no such thing as a parent-child relationship in law, without state intervention.122 
The state is the source of regulations and laws, and in most cases such laws create legal 
relationships. The parent-child relationship is no exemption. Obviously, even within the 
creation of such relationship there exists factual limitations – to some extent also created 
by the state (through the law) – which identify the extent to which the state can intrude 
in the family. Elsewhere, in the celebrated United States Supreme Court case of Prince v 
Massachusetts123 Rutledge J, held that “it is cardinal … that custody, care and nurture of 
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include 
preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder”.124 Rutledge J’s 
reasoning is sincere and points to the fact that state intervention is unavoidable, yet it 
also has some factual limitations.125  
Over the years, legal scholars, for example through the writings of Goldstein, Freud 
and Solnit, have argued that - 
[t]he child’s need for security within the confines of the family must be met by the law through 
its recognition of family privacy as the barrier to state intrusion upon parental autonomy. 
These rights – parental autonomy, a child’s entitlement to autonomous parents and privacy – 
are essential ingredients of the family integrity.126 
Family integrity is very significant in children’s rights discourse. Actually, it is a 
fundamental requirement to provide a child with a friendly and happy family 
environment and for the child’s upbringing and development to continuously progress 
on an acceptable trajectory. It is crucial to the point that when or if it is broken or 
weakened by excessive state intervention, it has the possibility of frustrating a child’s needs 
and affecting a child’s developmental progression.127 Indeed, it should be noted that from 
the standpoint of a child’s psychological, emotional and intellectual well-being, parental 
decision making enjoys major advantages over those of an outsider – the state.128  
Much authority of this nature supports the general proposition that, except where 
there is some legislation or authoritative public policy to the contrary in a given society, 
                                                            
122  See for example, Dwyer (n 107 above) 240. 
123  Prince v Massachusetts (1944) 321 U.S. 98.  
124  As above para 166. 
125  In most cases, such limitations are based on the lack of state presence to immediately and probably 
physically provide or protect the child at all times.  
126  Goldstein et al. The best interest of the child (1996) 91. 
127  As above 89. 
128  Baskin (n 76 above) 1385. 
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parental directives and guidance extend to all areas of a child’s life. Examples of such 
traditional parental authority over children extend to naming a child, custody and 
control of religion and education. Surely, the parental duty to provide a favourable 
environment probably grants parents the right to censor the books read and movies 
watched by a child – and in most cases children have no choice and opinion in this 
regard.129 Equally, as acknowledged by Lord Fraser in Gillick v West Norfolk and 
Wisbech,130 parental directives and guidance “exist for the benefit of the child and they 
are justified in so far as they enable the parent to perform his [or her] duties towards the 
child, and towards other children in the family”.131 
Therefore, only in the most extreme cases where there are satisfactory reasons that 
a child’s welfare is not met and the court confirms that the parents have failed in the 
execution of their duty to care for a child will the state be in a position to intervene. 
Generally, non-intervention is the norm, but intervention is allowed in exceptional cases 
especially when it is intended to protect a child.132 In Eritrea, parents are the first duty 
bearers to their children – the place where protection starts – and at the same time the 
child also belongs to the community (the state).133 In South Africa, the Children’s Act 
recognises that parents have shared responsibilities and rights in respect of their child.134  
The responsibilities and rights of unmarried fathers came under review in the case 
of FS v JJ and Another.135 In that case, the court held that biological fathers acquire 
automatic parental responsibilities and rights in the circumstances listed in section 21(1) 
of the South African Children’s Act.136 In terms of the South African Children’s Act, as 
interpreted in FS v JJ and Another, irrespective of their marital status, married or 
unmarried fathers and mothers of a child also bear the responsibility to provide 
appropriate directive and guidance to a child, especially in the context of enhancing their 
right to participation in family decisions-making processes on matters that concern the 
child. The decision in this case also re-enforces the fact that the parent-child relationship 
is a macrocosm of an asymmetry of power which of course also exists as a measure to 
                                                            
129  P Parkinson & J Cashmore, The voice of a child in family law disputes (2012) 89. 
130  Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech A.H.A [1986] AC 112 para 170. 
131  As above para 170. 
132  See for example, art 16(1) of the CRC and art. 10 of the ACRWC.  
133  See generally, Committee on the CRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 
44 of the Convention, Eritrea UN doc CRC/C/ERI/4 147-149. 
134  See generally, ch 3 of the South African Children’s Act which deals with termination, extension, 
suspension or restriction or parental responsibilities and rights for mothers and fathers – married and 
unmarried, and makes provision for parenting plans for co-holders of parental responsibilities and rights, 
in addition to other protection measures in the event of rights violations.   
135  S v J and another 2011 (3) SA 126 (SCA) 8. 
136  As above paras 24–25. 
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ensuring children’s right to participation in decision-making processes in the family in 
Africa.  
5. Methods of state intervention in the family – the state should 
find its way 
In contrast to the shrewdness of bestowing parents with directives and guidance in 
promoting children’s right to participate in family decision-making processes, is the 
undesirability of the alternative, state intervention. In fact, despite benefitting from clear 
legal recognition and the duty bequeathed on state parties to provide assistance to 
parents, in this way giving the state the green light to intervene in the family as 
demonstrated above, it is however interesting that there is no uniform approach 
designed to facilitate such state intervention, especially in their effort to protect 
children’s rights in general and their right to participate in family decision-making 
processes in particular. Indeed, taking into consideration the difficulty international law 
has in specifically defining a family, or the broadness of its attempted definition, or its 
firm classification of the family as a private entity deserving protection from the state, it 
is not surprising that international law does not prescribe any modus operandi for states 
to intervene in the family. Resultantly, gaps still exist in knowledge and practice 
concerning the proper policies and standards that should govern state intervention in 
the family, especially in the context of protecting children’s rights to participation in 
family decision-making processes. 
However, article 4 of the CRC, interpreted in the light of state intervention in the 
family, could be considered as a directive provided by international children’s law to 
state parties on how to intervene in the family, as it could be read to instruct states to 
adopt both legislative and administrative means of intervention. Legally, such means 
should be visible through national laws as anticipatory signs to parents for possible state 
intervention if such children’s right to participate in family decision-making processes 
in all matters that concern them, for example, is violated.137 The Committee on the CRC 
has, however, cautioned states that in adopting such legislative and administrative 
methods of intervening in the family, states should take into consideration the fact that 
in many cases, only children themselves should indicate whether their rights are being 
fully recognised and realised.138  
                                                            
137  See for example, art. 42 of the CRC which places responsibility on governments to make children’s rights 
known to adults and children. 
138  Committee on the CRC, GC 5 para 50. 
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The Committee advises that interviewing children (with appropriate safeguards) 
could be adopted as substantive methods of finding out, for example, to what extent 
their right to participation is respected within the family, especially in decision-making 
processes on matters that concern them.139 Since there is no prescribed method of 
intervention, this approach is critical because it is through such methods that a state’s 
findings could be accurate in order to enable the development of appropriate standards 
to protect children’s rights in a particular family, or a cluster of families with similar 
structures. Surely this approach re-enforces the fact that it is technically up to states to 
devise an approach, specifically on how to provide assistance to parents and encourage 
children’s participation in family decision-making processes on matters that concern 
them. Article 41 of the CRC, however, provides the yardstick to measure the acceptable 
extent to which such legal and administrative procedures could stretch, as it holds that 
they must encourage better protection of children’s rights in general than the CRC does. 
The general rule is therefore that any state intervention resulting from reported 
child abuse must be child-centered, either to reinforce the protection prescribed in 
both the CRC and the ACRWC, or to offer better protection to the child. Indeed, it is 
open-ended and the reason why it is not surprising that several states in Africa have 
tailor-made their own approach on how to intervene in the family space to ensure that 
children are given the space to participate in decision-making processes on matters 
that concern them. One such method is through the design of campaigns and 
educational materials. Eritrea, for example, reporting to the Committee on the CRC in 
2012, indicated that through its Ministry of Labour and Human Welfare and in 
collaboration with a host of other stakeholders such as the police, the Attorney 
General’s Office and civil society organisations, has developed and disseminated 
promotional materials which reflect the [joint provisions of the CRC and the ACRWC] 
on child abuse and proper child upbringing in the family.140 In the same light, the 
United Republic of Tanzania has also developed community-based family manuals for 
training parents and empowering them to give their children the chance to express 
their views in family decision-making processes.141 Probably due to the lack of any 
specific method, any progressive methods, like those adopted by Eritrea and Tanzania, 
are welcomed and will to a certain extent facilitate state intervention to protect 
children’s rights in the family. However, campaigns and educational methods are 
                                                            
139  As above. 
140  Committee on the CRC, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the 
Convention, Eritrea (n 133 above) para 176. 
141  Committee on the CRC, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the 
Convention, United Republic of Tanzania UN doc CRC/C/TZA/3-5 para 56 
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indirect means of intervention and may only affect future children’s rights violations 
in the family, if the parents chose to adhere.  
From a legislative perspective, countries such as Gambia, through its Children’s 
Act, have explicitly placed an obligation on parents to care and provide for their 
children, and have gone further, through its department of social welfare, to develop a 
communication strategy on children’s rights and protection. This strategy is intended to 
raise public awareness and shift perceptions towards children and promote respect for 
their views on matters that concern them.142 Indeed, despite the inclusion of this 
obligation in its Children’s Act, the State admits that it lacks a clear and concise strategy 
to intervene in the family and assist parents and legal guardians to ensure the protection 
of children’s rights in general and their right to participation in family decision-making 
processes in particular.143 This is indeed the reality –whatever suggestion the Committee 
on the CRC may have – most (if not all) states lack a clear and concise strategy to 
intervene in the family in their attempt to protect children’s rights. 
Perhaps it is not unrealistic to expect that administrative and/or legislative 
procedures should enable state intervention in the family that would establish an 
effective and efficient means to protect children’s rights in general. The point is, 
legislative and administrative means will provide the basic guidelines which will shape 
the state’s approach. For example, in cases where there are pre-existing and established 
legislative and administrative methods and check points of state intervention in the 
family – for example in divorce or legal separation cases – it is easier for states to find 
their way into the family to find settlement. However, in cases with no such pre-existing 
methods of intervention, the state might find it difficult to intervene into the family 
space to influence any differences in this regard. An example is the case where a child 
makes a choice, based on contemporary fashion trends, to have a tattoo or a piercing on 
sensitive parts of his or her body. Surely, taking into consideration the meaning of 
‘participation’ and how it has been codified legally, it will be complex to establish 
whether intervention would be possible in such less dramatic family decision-making 
processes. The fact that parental consent is required for such choices to be implemented 
complicates the matter even further. 
However, in another scenario, state intervention in the family could be frustrated 
by certain preconceived perceptions (not necessarily based on lack of legal regulations) 
                                                            
142  Committee on the CRC, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the 
Convention, Gambia UN doc CRC/C/GMB/4 para 76. Several other countries in Africa have also adopted 
such legislative methods. See, for example, South Africa, Nigeria, Cameroon, Mozambique analysed in 
chs 2 and 3 of this thesis.  
143  As above para 105. 
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as to when state intervention is right or wrong. For instance, on the one hand, a state 
charging a parent with child abuse for asking a child to wash dishes as a disciplinary 
measure resulting from the violation of an agreement reached in the family wherein the 
child also participated, could be interpreted as an overstretched state intervention in the 
family. On the other hand, state prosecution of a parent for intentionally stabbing his or 
her child to death, because the child ignored a family decision which included the child, 
will most probably receive universal approval and will likely not be considered as state 
intervention in the family. The rationale here is that dish washing as a punitive measure 
in a home is more intricate and could be educative (a child’s duty to ensure his or her 
environment is clean) than killing a child (in contravention of his or her right to life), 
which internationally has been classified as murder with established methods and 
procedure of state intervention. 
The challenge is basically the fact that there is no pre-existing state designed 
administrative or legislative agreement on family roles. Thus, any form of state 
intervention to resolve such punitive measures as dish washing is complex and will in 
most cases receive resistance from families. However, state intervention would be 
permitted if the punitive measure is excessive and prevents the child from enjoying other 
rights, such as his or her right to education.144 The point is, this situation speaks to the 
fact that a uniform method of state intervention should not be encouraged; rather, states 
should adopt a child-centered case-by-case approach with a minimum effect on family 
unity. Such intervention should be open – if not, it will be weighty to suggest that states 
should devise a specific method that suits all traditional or cultural practices extant 
within its territory in Africa. A case-by-case approach must be within the margins of 
certain standards defined by states which must be concomitant with the general 
principles of children’s rights protection. Olsen holds that the state should adopt an 
approach which adjudicates borderline cases in its attempt to intervene in the family to 
correct or protect children’s rights, because in doing so the state will necessarily 
influence the family145 and in the process, correct any wrongs that may exist in the family 
regarding the protection of a child’s right to participate in decision-making processes on 
matters that concern him or her. 
Surely, absolute control or upbringing of a child is not completely within the 
authority of parents only. It is both within the authority of the state and parents – 
primary authority lies in the hands of parents and secondary authority is with the state. 
                                                            
144  See for example, ID Cherney ‘Mothers’, fathers’ and their children’s perceptions and reasoning about 
nurturance and self-determination rights’ (2010) 18(1) International Journal of Children’s Rights 79–91. 
145  Olsen (n 103 above) 854. 
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A satisfactory upbringing of a child and the protection of his or her right to participation 
in family decision-making processes, for example, would require a great level of 
complementarity between these levels of authority. For example, the state has through 
legislation empowered parents to be the primary keepers and caregivers of their 
children, to name, love and ensure that their children enjoy their rights in general and 
their right to participation in particular in the family. The state comes into the family 
only when such authority bestowed on parents is not observed or abused. 
5.1. Barriers to ensure children’s right to participation in the family146 
Children’s right to participation, despite its firm rootedness as a key children’s right, 
with probably the most potential to elevate children (for example, mentally and 
rationally) to the same level as adults when they participate in family decision-making 
processes on matters that concern them,147 still faces enormous implementation 
challenges and the family seems to be the beehive of such challenges. Most African 
families have for many years been surrounded with barricades hindering children from 
participating in family decision-making processes, built on reasoning such as that 
children’s participation in family decision-making processes will undermine parental 
authority and control, encourage disrespect for parents, expose children to dealing with 
technical issues which could overburden them,148 waste time, and put children at risk, 
amongst other things.149 This thesis will not attempt an analysis of all these barriers on 
the basis that they, and many more, have been discussed and analysed to a great extent 
by several scholars who have attempted to encourage children’s right to participation in 
                                                            
146  It should be noted that none of the barriers highlighted here are particular to Africa – what I attempt here 
is finding an Africa experience to the barriers. 
147  See for example, P Alderson & J Montgomery Health care choices: Making decisions with children (1996); 
C Willow Hear! Hear! Promoting children and young people’s democratic participation in local government 
(1997). 
148  There is unfortunately no study yet, at the African regional level, which supports this assertion – it is based 
on the analysis of African families provided earlier. However, Parkinson and Cashmore have captured 
this succinctly through interviews with parents in Australia. Through the interviews clear instances on 
how parents could and would like to protect their children are highlighted, especially as they argued that 
some information is too heavy and could overburden children. For more on this see Parkinson & 
Cashmore (n 61 above) 62-89. 
149  A Franklin & P Sloper ‘Listening and responding? Children’s participation in health care within England’ 
(2005)13 International Journal of Children’s Rights 21. 
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the family. Most of these barriers are visible within the African setting just as the case is 
with family structures in other continents.150  
However, this thesis is selective and limits the analysis of such barriers to two 
aspects which bare strong unique African characteristics – barriers based on the 
undermining of parental authority and control and barriers based on religious and/or 
cultural beliefs. With regard to religious and/or cultural beliefs, it is probably common 
knowledge that a majority of family structures, practices and directives adopted by 
families on the Continent are either influenced by one of these or both. The importance 
of promoting and strengthening African cultural beliefs and practices is very visible in 
the ACRWC, as it, for example, implores states to ensure that a child’s education 
preserves and strengthens positive African cultural and traditional practices.151 With 
regard to parental authority and control, it is worth mentioning that the respect of elders 
(parents) is also protected in the ACRWC152 and cuts across almost every facet of a child’s 
upbringing – including how you receive something from an elder, how you sit next to 
an elder and how you behave next to elders. 
5.1.1. Undermining parental authority and control 
Parental authority, control of the household, and the level of respect demanded within 
a family in Africa is probably second to none in the world. This is irrespective of whether 
such families are based in the rural or urban areas, or formally educated or not. In fact, 
it goes beyond decision-making processes and is well established even in salutations (the 
way you greet an elderly person).153 This is so entrenched in African parenting that it 
should not, at any point, surprise anyone if African parents are quick to brandish this 
aspect as a reason for not encouraging children’s right to participate in family decision-
making processes on matters that concern them. Children’s right to participation, as 
analysed below in chapter six, does indeed require children to partake and express their 
                                                            
150  For a detailed and comprehensive analysis of these barriers, see for example, G Lansdown Can you hear 
me? The right of young children to participate in decisions affecting them (2005) 17-18. See also, G 
Lansdown ‘The realisation of children’s participation rights’ in A Percy-Smith & N Thomas (eds), (2010) 
A Handbook of children and people’s participation: Perspectives from theory and practice 11; Parkes, (n 84 
above) 74-76; U Kilkelly & M Donnelly Participation in health care setting: Perspectives of children, parents 
and health professionals ch 9, 6. 
151  See generally, art. 11 of the ACRWC. 
152  See art. 31 of the ACRWC, which provides that “Children have responsibilities towards their families and 
societies, to respect their parents, superiors and elders, to preserve and strengthen African cultural values 
in their relation with other members of their communities”. 
153  Just to add that this is not negative but it is the African way and such salutations are not uniform 
across the continent – it varies from country to country and in some cases from community to 
community. 
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views on matters that concern them. However, it does not require them to lead the 
process or to discard any person (parents in particular) from such processes. Such 
commonly held misconceptions are rooted in fear of losing control - in most cases 
African parents (rightfully so) regard staying in control as a natural obligation they have 
to protect and care for their children.  
For example, in an unreported South African case, parents who had very 
conservative beliefs and principles on the manner in which they brought up their 
children faced a massive blow when their daughter, 16 at the time, approached the High 
Court in Cape Town to request to be “freed” from her parents to live a semi-independent 
life from them because she was unhappy with the conservative manner in which her 
parents administered her upbringing. In her submission, she complained that she was 
unhappy because her parents restricted her from speaking to boys, using her cellphone 
to reach out to friends, going out with friends after school, and reading what she likes, 
for example Harry Potter, which her parents found to be inappropriate.154 After the 
hearing, the learned judge in this case granted her request - permission to live semi-
independently with a school friend and her family (host family) until she attains the age 
of 18. Her parents were, however, granted access to her for two to three hours a week at 
a neutral venue and were allowed to phone her between 8:00 and 8:30 pm on a Tuesday 
and Friday.155  
Details of how these parents dealt with the removal of their daughter from their 
care and the subsequent impact of the abrupt limitation of their parental authority is 
not reported. However, psychology would probably dictate that any parent(s) would 
be traumatised for a while, if not until they received their child back under their control 
and care.156 The ability of the court, in this case to hear this child, evaluate her opinion 
and pass judgement based on what was in her best interests should not go unnoticed 
                                                            
154  It should be noted that this case was unreported; however, scholars have referred to and analysed the 
merits of the case in several child law related articles. For example, M Bekink ‘“Child Divorce”: A 
break from parental responsibilities and rights due to the traditional socio-cultural practices and 
beliefs of the parents’ (2012) 15(1) Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal 179. Remarkably, she made 
an attempt (which failed) to obtain copies of the legal arguments presented in court and the order 
given from the learned judge or the attorneys who represented the girl. The reason she could not get 
such information as she reported was based on the sensitivity of the matter and the client’s 
instructions. She however relied on media reports which she obtained through Legal brief, accessed 
through http://www.legalbrief.co.za/ article.php?story=20100610091458403 [accessed 15 June 2010] 
in her analysis.  
155  Further access such as holidays were also granted but alternated with the foster parents. 
156  DC Browne ‘An evaluation of foster parents’ attitudes towards birth parents’ (2002) 3(1) Irish Journal of 
Applied Social Studies 84-95, in which she also adds that it could even get worse if the relationship between 
both parents (foster and birth) is not cordial.  
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as it is laudable, bold and in tandem with children’s right to participation. However, it 
is such decisions, such ‘powers’ given to children through their right to participation 
that scares parents and promotes the fear that such children’s rights undermine 
parental authority and control. In fact, it is possible to also establish such fear in 
parents’ upbringing. It is possible that during their childhood parents were not 
involved in any decision-making processes on matters that concerned them. The 
parents portrayed in this case were possibly brought up in a conservative home and as 
a result they could only offer to their daughter the upbringing they know best. Possibly, 
this unfortunately exposes their inexperience and lack of technical know-how in 
involving their daughter and evaluating her opinion in the decisions they made on 
matters that concerned her.  
Notwithstanding, there are some limitations to parental fears that the promotion 
of children’s right to participate in family decision-making processes could undermine 
parental authority and control. This is very possible especially in a case where a parent 
voluntarily requests the court to appoint other persons as foster parents, thus relieving 
them of their parental authority and control. This was the case in Uganda in the Matter 
of Salem Mukiibi and Ashaf Ssemakula (Minors) and the Matter of an Application by 
Hoffman Edward and Olivia Nakawungu Hoffman, Brother-Law and Sister,157 (the 
Hoffmans) in which the court evaluated the application of a single parent (mother of 
Salem and Ashaf) requesting the Hoffmans (whom she and her children were familiar 
with) to be appointed as foster parents to her two children, because she could not 
afford to maintain them. Before the court made its decision to remove the children, it 
also evaluated the application of the Hoffmans to be foster parents and most 
importantly to listen to the views of the children.158 This is in no way a claim that the 
parent in this case was completely happy that her children were removed from her care 
– because most parents would not be happy – but the point to underscore here is the 
fact that she could not resist her children’s right to participate in such decision-making 
process, because their participation had a stronger probability to compliment her 
reasoning and application which in all fairness was in their best interests. However, it 
is possible that the mother would have resisted state intervention to facilitate this 
                                                            
157  See generally, Re: Salem Mukiibi and Ashaf Ssemakula (Minors); In Re: An Application by Hoffman 
Edward and Olivia Nakawungu Hoffman, Brother-in-law and Sister, Respectively (Family Cause No 061 of 
2005) ((Minors)) [2005] UGHC 30 (21 October 2005); 
158  After gathering all the facts, the Judge made the following order, “In the circumstances, I will grant this 
application and appoint Hoffman Edward and Olina Nakawungu Hoffman legal guardians of Salem 
Mukubi and Ashaf Semakula both minors. The guardians shall have legal custody of the infants and be at 
liberty to take the infants to any part of Uganda or outside Uganda, so long as the infants remain in their 
minority or until further orders issued by this court.” 
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process, if it had not been initiated by her although it was in the best interests of the 
children. 
Indeed, it is through such cases that one can concur with the fact that recent trends 
and developments in child rights jurisprudence, and especially in their right to 
participation have begun shifting perceptions to a child-centered approach which in 
many ways has minimised and in some cases completely discarded any excuse that may 
arise from parents.159 For example, applicable societal and rights-based reasoning that 
no parents shall have a choice, with regard to having their children attain a certain level 
of education, is now enforceable in all African states. If not through national laws, this 
obligation is regulated by the CRC and the ACRWC. Generally, such legislative 
directives and infringement on parental authority and control are without regard to any 
parent’s specific wish, culturally or religiously motivated – it is regarded as reasonable 
and proper both to the family, society and in the furtherance of persuasive state interest 
to educate its future leaders. 
5.1.2. Religious and cultural grounds 
These are perhaps the two most contentious behavioural influencers that design and 
probably direct most families in Africa. Jointly, they have the ability to indoctrinate 
patterns on which most family goals and practices follow.160 In a South African 
Constitutional Court decision in Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay 
Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs, Sachs J stated that religion “… is part of the 
people’s temper and culture, and for many believers a significant part of their way of 
life”.161 Perhaps Sachs J’s strongest position on the impact of religion and culture on 
African families and the way it affects the position of children was made in an earlier 
judgement he delivered in Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education, in 
which he held that  
                                                            
159  A Skelton ‘Parental responsibilities and rights’ in T Boezaart (ed) Child Law in South Africa (2005) 62.  
160  It is common knowledge in Africa and perhaps elsewhere that the natural rights of parents instruct them 
to guide and supervise the child and includes the parental right to implant particular religious and cultural 
values in their child/ren. See, for example, Simleit v Cunliffe 1940 TPD 67; Landmann v Mienie 1944 OPD 
59; Oosthuizen v Rex 1948 (2) PH B65 (W); Wolfson v Wolfson 1962 (1) SA 34 (SR); Engar and Engar v 
Desai 1966 (1) SA 621 (T); W v S 1988 (1) SA 475 (N) at 494–95; Mentz v Simpson 1990 (4) SA 455 (A); 
Stassen v Stassen 1998 (2) SA 105 (W) at 107 and V v V 1998 (4) SA 169 (C) at 176G. See also, JMT 
Labuschagne et al ‘Parental rights to participate in a child’s personality development and its religious and 
moral upbringing and the child’s right to freedom of choice: Observations on the field of tension caused 
by the irrational in a human rights dispensation’ (2004) 25(1) Obiter 41, 48-51.  
161  Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie; Lesbian and Gay Equality Project v Minister of Home Affairs 2006 (1) 
SA 524 (CC); 2006 (3) BCLR 355 (CC) para 90. 
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[t]he right to believe or not to believe, and to act or not to act according to his or her beliefs or 
non-beliefs, is one of the key ingredients of any person’s dignity … For many believers, their 
relationship with God or creation is central to all their activities. It concerns their capacity to 
relate in an intensely meaningful fashion to their sense of themselves, their community and 
their universe. For millions in all walks of life, religion provides support and nurture and a 
framework for individual and social stability and growth. Religious belief has the capacity to 
awake concepts of self-worth and human dignity which form the cornerstone of human rights. 
It affects the believer’s view of society and founds the distinction between right and wrong…162  
What is right or wrong in most instances within most African homes is justified by the 
position of what is believed to be so either through the influence of religion or culture.163 
It hardly needs to be validated that religious and cultural practices are also strong 
promoters of parental rights, control and authority over their children. Although both 
are not necessarily on par in terms of certain practices - for instance female 
circumcision164 - both do promote, to a great extent, the respect of adults and the love 
and care for children. It is basically the height of such recognition and respect for adults 
which is, of course, not literally a problem but for the fact that it has in most instances 
minimised or weakened to some extent the place of a child and his or her involvement 
in family decision-making processes on matters that concern him or her.  
Religious and cultural factors could frustrate state interference, if such intervention 
collides with what parents hold as correct based on their religious or cultural practices – 
a classic case here is the practice of early child marriage. For example, in Gambia, while 
the legal provisions condemning early child marriage - Section 24 of the Gambian 
Children’s Act165 which declares subject to the provision of any applicable personal law 
any marriage entered into by a child shall be voidable and Section 25 which prohibits 
parents and guardians from betrothing children in marriage – look strong at first glance, 
they are constantly violated based on religious and traditional grounds.166 Indeed, “any 
applicable personal law” includes Shari’a law167 and since the majority of Gambians 
                                                            
162  Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) SA 757; 2000 10 BCLR 1051 (CC) para 
36. 
163  See for example, T Kaime Convention on the Rights of the Child: A cultural legitimacy critique (n 79 above). 
This thesis is not taking a stance whether such measures are wrong or correct – it just portrays what is 
African. 
164  It is noteworthy that most religious practices do not condone female circumcision and the reverse is true 
with cultural practices. However, research shows that the practice is rapidly phasing out. 
165  See generally, Children’s Act part IV, s 24 which states that, “Subject to the provisions of any applicable 
personal law, no child is capable of contracting a valid marriage, and a marriage so contracted is voidable”. 
166  See also, the Report of the AU Special Rapporteur on Child marriage in Africa – Report on the Mission 
to Niger 28–29 July 2016 - in which the similar challenges are highlight in Niger. 
167  Shari’a law is generally highly designed on religious practices and permits marriage upon physical 
maturity, which often occurs well before age 18. 
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practice Islam and fall under Shari’a law, child marriage remains a common traditional 
and religious practice and girls are married off well before they are 18 without their 
consent or involvement in such decision-making practices.168  
Further afield, in the cases of Prince v Massachusetts169 and Wisconsin v Yoder,170 
Jehovah’s Witnesses and Amish respectively defended their parental decision-making 
from state interference by arguing that parents’ religious beliefs isolate their childrearing 
practices from state interference. The court, however, rejected this defence related to the 
United States of America’s child labour laws in Prince and accepted it relative to 
compulsory education laws in Wisconsin. One should also take note of the decision of the 
ACERWC in talibé children.171 Although brought against the government of Senegal, the 
reason for referring to this case at this stage of the thesis is not the question whether Senegal 
violated the provisions of the ACRWC or whether the State applied limited protection of 
certain children’s rights as prescribed by the ACRWC, but on the choice of the talibé 
parents based on their religious and cultural beliefs to send their children to Qur’anic 
schools, taught by marabouts. It is therefore critical in the present context that we construe 
the decision of the talibé parents broadly in an attempt to realise their intended purpose. 
First, there is nothing wrong in sending their child to school – educating their children is 
of course part of their parental obligation. Secondly, it should be noted that the choice of 
the school at which a child gains such education is entirely a family decision. However, it 
should be noted that the decision here to send the talibé children to this Qur’anic school 
was most probably influenced by their religion and culture. Based on the facts of the case, 
once in the custody of the marabouts, the talibé children were forced to work on the streets 
as beggars for several hours (6 to 8 hours) a day, leaving them less than 5 hours for their 
Qur’anic studies (which was the reason why they went to the school in the first place), and 
required to meet daily portions of goods acquired from begging. Failure to meet such 
quotas resulted in hidings and punishments at the hands of the marabouts.  
Without a blink, traces of children’s rights violations are clearly visible in this case 
and as one reads through the decision, one cannot help but notice that the State did little 
to intervene to correct this wrong. One reason for such reluctance from the State, one 
would suggest, could be based on the possible tension that exists when intervening in a 
                                                            
168  This is very common in many other states or regions in the Continent where Shari’a law is also applicable. 
See also, ES Nwauche ‘Child marriage in Nigeria: (Il)legal and (un)constitutional’ (2015) 15 African Human 
Rights Law Journal 421-432. See also, M Rajabi-Ardeshiri ‘The rights of the child in the Islamic context: The 
challenges of the local and global’ (2009)17(3) International Journal of Children’s Rights 478–489. 
169  Prince (n 123 above). 
170  Wisconsin v Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 98. 
171  Centre for Human Rights (University of Pretoria) and La Recontre Africaine Pour la defense de Droit de 
L’homme v Senegal Decision: No 003/com/001/2012.  
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family to protect children’s rights from an abuse strongly influenced by a parental 
decision made on religious and cultural grounds. In fact, the State found it difficult to 
probe the parental decision of the talibés to send their children to such a school or even 
to interrupt the existence of the school and exercise arrest of the marabouts, since the 
school has strong traditional and religious bearings on the talibés. 
6. Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted an analysis of the interesting relationship between the family 
and the state in the efforts to protect children’s right to participation. It has also analysed 
the position of African children within the family and society, and possible barriers that 
could frustrate both state intervention and the general protection of children’s rights to 
participate in family decision-making processes in Africa. The issues raised in the chapter 
are not exhaustive as much remains to be done, especially in view of the external 
circumstances surrounding modern African families and the tensions arising therein, be 
they economic, social or cultural. The chapter also questions the privacy of the family 
which over the years has stretched parental rights and conferred on parents the trusted 
ability to make correct and informed judgments with respect to the responsible 
upbringing of children.  
Relatively little academic research has focused on children’s right to participation in 
family decision-making processes. This may be justified by the now outdated concept that 
“private relations” were regarded as sacred in international human rights law. In the case 
of children, this was the case until the adoption of the CRC and the ACRWC, and the 
recent explosive interpretation that children’s right to participation has gained. This right 
was originally considered to concern vertical relations between the state and its citizens, 
rather than horizontal relations between private groupings (family) and individuals.172 As 
Okin correctly observes, the state has the responsibility, not only to grant special rights or 
exemptions and protection to some groups (e.g. cultural and religious groups), but it 
should extend such rights and exemptions within the family and enforce them when need 
arises.173 Indeed, Rawl concurs and warns that “if the private sphere [the family] is alleged 
to be a space exempt from justice, then there is no such thing … as equal rights … and the 
                                                            
172  U Kilkelly & M Donnelly The child’s right to be heard in the health care setting: Perspectives of children, 
parents and health professionals (2006) available at http://www.dcya.gov.ie/documents/research/ 
The_Childs_Right_to_be_Heard_in_the_Health care_Setting.pdf [accessed 13 February 2016].  
173  SM Okin ‘Mistress of their own destiny’ 112 Ethics 229-230. 
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basis of children as future citizens [is] inalienable and protects them wherever they are”.174 
The recognition of the impact that the family has on children’s lives and the 
acknowledgement that the child’s rights are also protected within the family environment 
in these instruments have helped to shift attention on to the protection of children’s rights 
in the private sphere. This is supported by the fact that both articles 12 of the CRC and 
4(2) of the ACRWC make no distinction between private or public space regarding the 
child’s right to participate in decision-making processes in matters that concern him or 
her.175 Unfortunately, challenges still exist to ensure the comprehensive protection and 
enjoyment of children’s right to participation in family decision-making processes. One 
such is the frustration faced by states in finding inroads in the family compounded by 
parental authority and control still extant within the family environment. Some of these 
hypotheses will be tested in the next chapter which appreciates children’s right to health 
and their right to participate in health-related decision-making processes. The chapter will 
attempt to highlight the strength of parental views, the views of medical practitioners and 
children’s views in deciding on his or her health-related treatment. 
 
                                                            
174  J Rawl ‘The idea of public reason revisited’ (1997) 64 University of Chicago law Review 791. 
175  G Lansdown Promoting children’s participation in democratic decision-making, Innocenti Insight, No. 6. 
(2001).  
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Chapter Six 
MEDICAL AND HEALTHCARE-RELATED 
DECISIONS 
1. Introduction 
Bluntly, the right to health, if not addressed properly, is arguably a human right with the 
highest possible resultant to death than any other human right.1 It is not a stand-alone 
right, but it is arguably a right that, if not protected and promoted satisfactorily, could 
be identified as the final check to human existence. For example, poor education, poor 
nutrition, and poor housing conditions will all lead to poor health, and if not remedied, 
the result will be death. In relation to children, this is true especially because children’s 
right to medical treatment, for example, is located mainly within the interrelation 
between their rights to life and health.2 Certainly, it will be preposterous to conceive that 
any human being can claim to be happy or feel comfortable without the knowledge that 
they can access health and medical treatment in time of need. The right to health, as it is 
generally referred to, is a right of assurance and it is not more important to adults than 
it is to children. The significance of good health to all children is well established in 
article 24 of the CRC and article 14 of the ACRWC. 
Through both instruments, children in Africa have a right to enjoy the highest 
attainable standard of physical, mental and spiritual health3 and to access healthcare 
services and facilities.4 A comprehensive interpretation of this provision, to a large 
extent demands the consideration of allied provisions such as article 19 of the CRC,5 
which places state parties under the duty to intervene in the family during medical and 
health-related decision-making processes when the interest of children is at risk. 
                                                            
1  See generally, the 1946 Constitution of the WHO, whose preamble defines health as “a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”. The preamble 
further states that “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental 
rights of every human being....”. 
2  C Breen Age discrimination and children’s rights: Ensuring equality and acknowledging difference (2006) 
48.  
3  See generally, art. 14 ACRWC. 
4  See generally, art. 24 CRC. 
5  See also art. 16 of the ACRWC. 
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Article 3(1)6 of the same instrument requires that such decisions or interventions 
should be in the best interests of the child and article 12’s7 approval of children’s right 
to participate during such decision-making processes especially at the family level.   
Notwithstanding, in practice, African children’s enjoyment of their right to health 
faces huge challenges generally, not only because they are children, but also because 
some health facilities are very expensive, inaccessible, poor in quality8 and understaffed. 
In Africa, for example, the challenges that have marred children’s right to a satisfactory 
health and healthcare vary across the continent and in some cases range from poor 
policies to excessive parental influence which sometimes frustrates a child’s 
participation in medical and healthcare decision-making processes. Further, the 
challenge that children face in ascertaining the right to health is complicated by the 
intimate involvement of health professionals.9 Within African healthcare practices, 
shared decision-making processes are not generally common between a patient who is 
a child, parents and/or health professionals.10 Despite the fact that both international law 
and medical practice encourage patients’ involvement in healthcare decision-making 
processes, patient-doctor confidentiality and patient autonomy, the case of children is 
different as parental and doctors’ opinions in some cases are so strong and in the best 
interests of the child that the opinion of the child is not requested. Through an 
examination of randomly selected court cases that relate to children’s right to health, 
this chapter intends to examine the extent to which children’s right to participate in 
family healthcare decision-making processes has been encouraged or observed in the 
midst of parental or doctors’ opinions.  
                                                            
6  See also art. 4(1) of the ACRWC. 
7  See also arts. 4(2) and 7 of the ACRWC. 
8  U Kilkelly ‘Health and children’s rights’ (2015) in W Vandenhole et al. (ed) Routledge International 
Handbook of Children’s Rights Studies 216. 
9  Kilkelly (as above).  
10  This is generally because children in most African families are regarded as the property of their 
parents. B Thompson ‘Africa’s Charter on Children’s Rights: A normative break with cultural 
traditionalism’ (1992) 41(2) International Comparative Law Quarterly 432; 438-39; KCJM Arts ‘The 
international protection of children’s rights in Africa: The 1990 OAU Charter on the Rights and 
Welfare of the Child’ (1993) 5 African Journal of International and Comparative Law 139, 158: 
observing that ‘[t]he doctrine of parental authority over children is strongly present in contemporary 
Africa and children are often regarded as the property of their parents or legal guardians’ and GS 
Kamchedzera ‘The rights of the child in Malawi: An agenda for research on the impact of the United 
Nations Convention in a poor country’ (1991) 5(3) International Journal of Law, Policy and the 
Family 241. 
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2. Children’s right to health in Africa 
Children’s right to health, as it is protected and promoted in Africa, is well established 
and recognised in all African states. Nevertheless, the resources and the cultural, 
traditional and religious differences within states have increasingly either frustrated the 
realisation of this right or carved different approaches to its realisation. From a legal 
perspective, the modalities governing a successful implementation of this right are 
provided for in the mainstream human rights instruments applicable in Africa and 
ratified by African states. For example, equally relevant to children, other human rights 
instruments such as article 25 of the Universal Declaration, article 12 of CESCR and 
article 16 of the ACHPR contain similar provisions protecting the right to health.  
However, a stronger protection is afforded in the CRC11 and ACRWC, which 
protect some unique health-related aspects and are more elaborate and specific as 
compared to the other instruments. These include: a call for the reduction of infant and 
child mortality; and the provision of necessary medical assistance and healthcare to all 
children, with emphasis on the development of primary healthcare. Indeed, not only 
these provisions are central to children’s right to health. Other provisions, equally 
relevant and related to children’s right to health, include but are not limited to children’s 
right to life protected in articles 6 of the CRC and 5 of the ACRWC, which calls on states 
to protect children’s right to survival and development, articles 3 of the CRC and 4(1) of 
the ACRWC which also require the best interests of the children to be the primary 
consideration to all health-related matters concerning children, and articles 12 of the 
CRC and 4(2) of the ACRWC, which call on children’s opinions to be considered in all 
decision-making processes in healthcare-related matters that concern them. 
Generally, children’s enjoyment of their right to health in Africa, and the decision 
to afford children in Africa this right, is not necessarily straight forward. This is because, 
in many regions across the continent, both traditional and modern means of accessing 
healthcare exist. Indeed, it is probably common knowledge that in Africa there are 
alternative means to access healthcare using modern and traditional scientific 
methods.12 It is equally common knowledge that international law generally does not 
discourage the use of traditional medicine as a form of healthcare, because it regards the 
                                                            
11  Through art. 23 of the CRC, for example, the health of disabled children is also highlighted.  
12  See for example, the Zimbabwean Traditional Medical Practitioners (Professional Conduct) By-laws, 1997 
(No. 245 of 1997) which regulates the professional conduct of traditional healers which also encourages 
and protects traditional practices and beliefs embedded within cultural traditional practices as recognised 
and upheld in the legal system. 
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right to health as containing both freedoms and entitlements.13 However, it discourages 
any form of harmful traditional practice meted on children.14 The presence of alternative 
means of healthcare is a very factual issue in Africa and should be encouraged as part of 
a family healthcare decision-making process, especially in cases where parents hold such 
options in fulfilling a child’s right to health. In most cases, the preference between 
traditional and modern scientific methods of healthcare remains an integral part of most 
family decision-making processes in Africa. Usually, the decision of which healthcare 
method to pick for a sick child is based on what parents suspect to be the child’s illness 
without adequate diagnostics. 
2.1. Implementing children’s rights in medical and healthcare 
As will be seen later, the mere ratification, legislation, and policy domestication of 
children’s right to health, does not reasonably translate into implementation of 
children’s right to health. Indeed, for a satisfactory level of implementation to be met, 
legislative and policy instruments at national level must be accompanied by, amongst 
other things, institutions, health practitioners (including pediatricians), equipped 
hospitals, and children’s consent or involvement in family healthcare decision-making 
processes. This is because the effect of any family health-related decision-making 
process requires the presence of a comprehensive or a minimum standard15  health 
system for the expected result, which generally is healing, to be achieved. As indicated 
above, from a legal perspective the involvement of children in such processes is not 
completely rejected, as several states have demonstrated their willingness to permit such 
involvement by recognising its importance in the general protection of children’s right 
to health.  
Further, as indicated later in this chapter, some states have gone further to institute 
age limits when such involvement is possible and when it is compulsory. As a build-up 
to the age debate and the question when it is necessary for a child to participate in such 
family decision-making processes, this sub-section examines the role of the state in 
providing the basic requirements (for example infrastructure, personnel and 
medication), parental responsibility and children’s participation in health-related 
decision-making processes, missed chances, and the impact of children’s participation. 
                                                            
13  See, Committee on the CESCR, GC 14 para 8. 
14  See, art. 24(3) of the CRC. 
15  In terms of infrastructure, personnel, medication and equipment.   
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2.1.1. The role of the State 
The purpose of the inclusion of this sub-section is to highlight state obligations related 
to children’s right to health and the efforts undertaken by African state parties to meet 
such obligations. Truly, international children’s law imposes huge obligations on 
member states to ensure the implementation of the provisions of children’s rights 
treaties. In health-related matters, such obligations transcend beyond legislation, 
infrastructure, training and employment of staff to obtaining specific results, such as 
reducing or eradicating child mortality.  
As analysed earlier in chapters four and five of this thesis, the obligations ascribed 
to states under the CRC and the ACRWC also extend to the family both in principle and 
in practice. Indeed, state parties to mainstream children’s rights instrument have an 
obligation to provide parents with the necessary support to ensure the healthy 
development of their child. In context and practice, state obligation goes beyond mere 
recognition and protection of a child’s right to health to ensuring that it is actually 
delivered to each and every child, when needed. Generally, a comprehensive 
implementation of children’s right to health is complex. As a result, minimum standards 
have been identified and codified in both the CRC16 and the ACRWC17 and elaborated 
by the Committee on the CRC.18 Further, to assist states in measuring the level of 
acceptable medical and healthcare, the Committee on the CRC has identified four 
crucial guidelines that qualify the role of the state in ensuring children’s right to health. 
These are availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality.19 
Selected national legislation and policies protecting children’s right to health 
It is probably safe to indicate that the adoption of both the CRC and the ACRWC, as 
well as the general call for state parties to domesticate the provisions of these 
instruments, have propelled children’s health rights protection to a fair level. However, 
much still has to be done. In fact, although most state parties in Africa have protected 
children’s health rights in their constitutions and related national legal and policy 
                                                            
16  See, art. 24. 
17  See, art. 14. 
18  See for example, GC No 4 (2003) Adolescent health and development in the context of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child UN doc. CRC/GC/2003/4 and GC No. 15 (2013) On the right of the child to the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health UN doc. CRC/C/GC/15.  
19  For an in-depth analysis of these guidelines and equally appropriate in the context of children, see for 
example, RA Atuguba ‘The right to health care in Ghana: health care, human rights and politics’ (2013) 
in ZA Zuniga et al. (eds) Advancing Human Rights to Health 110. 
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reforms,20 the high rate of child mortality due to poor healthcare has, to be fair, been on 
a decline in the last five years (2010 – 2015) but remains relatively high as compared to 
other regions in the world.21 It is equally worrying to note that the causes of such high 
child mortality rates, for example inadequate drinking water and poor sanitation, are 
preventable.  
That aside, on paper, across the continent, the protection of children’s right to 
health is very encouraging as a plethora of legal and policy text exists which governs 
healthcare in general and children’s health in particular.22 Indeed, according to the 
Committee on the CRC, translating children’s rights into acceptable healthcare practices 
requires the guarantee of legislative, administrative and other measures within available 
resources in domestic law.23 In Zimbabwe, for example, the Public Health Act makes 
provision for healthy attributes and encourages the promotion of good infant nutrition 
and breastfeeding and the setting of standards on the composition and quality of infant 
foods and adequate feeding.24 It also goes further to sanction the prevention and 
suppression of infectious and sexually transmitted diseases.25  
In Kenya, the promulgation of the Constitution in 2010 registered a milestone for 
the right to health, especially because the previous constitution did not protect this right. 
The 2010 Constitution contains a more extensive and progressive Bill of Rights and has 
made the right to health for all children justiciable.26 Also, the Republic of the Gambia’s 
1997 Constitution unequivocally guarantees the right of every child to basic health 
service.27 The State, in its 2007 Health Master Plan,28 promises to also declare maternal 
                                                            
20  Just like any other children’s rights, the protection of this right in national laws provides a fundamental 
legal basis for action and unlocks the potential for litigation and enforcement. 
21  See generally, WHO statistics, which projects that between the years 2010 and 2015 child mortality in 
Africa has been on a decline. For details and a comparative view of the statistics from other regions, see 
http://apps.who.int/gho/data/view.main.CM1300N?lang=en [accessed 20 March 2016]. See also, UNFPA, 
State of the world’s midwifery, 2014 – A Universal Pathway. A woman’s right to health (2014), 
https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/EN_SoWMy2014_complete.pdf [accessed 23 March 
2016]. 
22  For details on the impressive list of all national legislative protection of children’s health rights, see; 
http://www.africanchildforum.org/clr/Legal%20Instruments/African%20Regional%20Instruments.html 
[accessed 26 April 2016]. 
23  Committee on the CRC, GC No 4 para 9. 
24  See generally, the Zimbabwean Public Health Act (Chapter 15:09). 
25  As above. 
26  Sec 53(1)(c), Kenyan 2010 Constitution.  
27  The Constitution of the Second Republic of the Gambia art. 28(2). 
28  See the Gambia’s National Health Policy available at http://www.statehouse.gm/National_ 
Health_Policy_2012-2020_MoHSW-Gambia.pdf [accessed 21 March 2016]. 
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and child healthcare to be free of charge for all Gambians.29 This gesture from the 
government is well received especially on a Continent where a benefit from such social 
welfare systems could be regarded as ‘winning a lottery’.  
Similar trends are traceable in other African countries, as for example Ghana, 
through its Children’s Act promises free medical care to all children and pregnant 
women, pre and up to three months post birth,30 Botswana, through section 15(2) of its 
Children’s Act, promises state assistance to children from poor homes to access health 
care,31 and Tanzania promises free health services to children.32 These state efforts are 
commendable and provide evidence of a good track record across the Continent.    
Such efforts by state parties also demonstrate the seriousness of children’s health 
rights on governments’ agendas in Africa. In fact, all legislative reforms enacted by 
African states have contributed in one way or the other to the translation of children’s 
right to health. Usually, such efforts are built around confirming or expanding 
individual entitlements and parental obligations by adopting regulatory frameworks 
which speak to the realities within a state. 
Selected other measures undertaken by states 
Besides statutory protection of children’s right to health in Africa, it is worth noting that 
most African states have taken encouraging measures, well beyond statute, to ensure 
that statutory provisions are implemented in practice. Such efforts are in most cases 
measured in the form of infrastructure and personnel, equipment and drugs. Indeed, 
one of the main reasons why such efforts by states are important is probably that unlike 
most children’s rights, where state obligations have been generally worded as an 
obligation on states to take all administrative, legislative and other measures in 
                                                            
29  Worth noting, as per the Gambia’s report to the Committee on the CRC in 2011, this symbolic gesture is 
also already being implemented in the Gambia. See generally the Committee on CRC, Consideration of 
reports submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the Convention: Gambia UN doc CRC/C/KEN/3-5 
para 65.  
30  Sec 8(2) of the Ghanaian Children’s Act. Burundi, Botswana, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Zambia also offer free health care to children. However, within each state there exist some limitations. 
Details of these have been listed in the ACPF’s combined reports - In the best interests of the child – 
harmonising laws in Eastern, Southern, West and Central Africa from 2001 – 2007. Available at 
http://www.africanchildforum.org/clr/Harmonisation%20of%20Laws%20in%20Africa/Publications/sup
plementary-acpf-harmonisation-es_en.pdf and http://www.africanchildforum.org/clr/Harmonisation 
%20of%20Laws%20in%20Africa/Publications/supplementary-acpf-harmonisation-wc_en.pdf 
respectively [accessed 25 April 2016]. 
31  Children’s Act 2009. 
32  National Health Policy of 2007, which also includes ‘Free maternal health care to all mothers and pregnant 
women including those who get pregnant at early stage of age 12 to 18 years’. 
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protecting those rights, the provision on children’s right to health in both the ACRWC 
and the CRC permeates states with some specific targeted obligations.33 For example, 
state parties have a duty, amongst others, to reduce or diminish infant and child 
mortality.34 It is, however, in an attempt to ensure that these targets are met that states 
are required to undertake other measures to ensure that children’s health rights are 
delivered to them when required. One such measure, this thesis argues, is that state 
ability to intervene into any family decision-making process (through a state agent – 
doctor) requires the presence, at state level, of a qualified medical doctor to make 
decisions that are medically in the best interest of the child, even if such decisions are 
contrary to parental opinion. 
Elsewhere, in terms of accessibility (measured by walking distance) and visibility 
of healthcare facilities, some progress has also been registered as several African states 
have improved on health infrastructure. Kenya, for example, reporting to the 
Committee on the CRC in 2013, indicated that there had been a significant increase in 
primary healthcare facilities from 4912 to 7111 between the years 2005 and 2010, mostly 
in the rural areas.35 Such progress to facilitate the accessibility and visibility of healthcare 
facilities has also been registered in several countries across the continent.36 The 
availability and accessibility of infrastructure also adds value to family decision-making 
processes, as they might be necessary also to decide where it will be appropriate for a 
child to be treated. Although many scholars and health practitioners have conspicuously 
highlighted the fact that such progress is not commensurate with the increasing demand 
for such services, especially by children, the effort made by states should not go 
unnoticed because it is indeed progress.37 
                                                            
33  See for example, art. 22 CRC on Children seeking refugee status and art. 15(2) ACRWC on Child Labour. 
34  See arts. 24(1)(a) of the CRC and 14(2)(a) of the ACRWC.  
35  Committee on the CRC, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the 
Convention:  Kenya UN doc CRC/C/GMB/2-3 para 150. It is very possible that these facilities have 
increased from 2010 to this day. See Eritrea’s report to the Committee on the CRC, Consideration of 
reports submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the Convention, Eritrea UN doc CRC/C/ERI/4 para 
189 where the state indicates, generally, access to health care facilities has been reduced to approximately 
10 kilometres’ maximum in rural areas. 
36  See, ACPF statistics of progress in budgetary commitment in health care in Africa available in its 2008 
report on the African Report on Child Wellbeing: Towards greater accountability to Africa’s Children 57.  
37  M Pieterse ‘Legislative and executive translation of the right to have access to health care services’ (2010) 
14 Law, Democracy & Development 231-255. 
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3. Parental responsibility and right 
In reality, irrespective of the measures taken by states to protect children’s right to 
health, the recognition of the rights and duties of parents must be appreciated, because 
it is central to ensure that children benefit from and participate in decision-making 
processes on health-related matters that concern them. Indeed, it must be emphasised 
from the onset that children cannot have complete access to and enjoyment of their right 
to health without some kind of parental or guardian influence or authority. A child’s 
health standard occupies a central part of parental duty in children’s rights 
jurisprudence, with the aim that it must ensure the proper development of a child, 
irrespective of their location and/or condition.38  
As demonstrated throughout children’s rights instruments and chapter five of this 
thesis, there are three fundamental commitments designed by law and policy in 
international and African children’s rights jurisprudence that best guide parental 
authority in family health-related decision-making processes: to promote and protect 
the best interests of the child, to ensure a child’s well-being, and to prepare or empower 
a child to take African cultural virtues in the future. Thus, any decision made by parents, 
or any decision-making process which involves children, intended to promote or protect 
children’s right to health, must be in the best interests of the child and ensure the proper 
development of the child.39  
It is based on these fundamental commitments that traditionally, without 
exception to country or community, parents always seize the upper hand in making 
decisions for their children’s medical and health-related issues. Parental authority and 
influence concerning a child’s healthcare decisions is well established in law and 
stronger if the child is young or immature. Reasons for this position in law are plenty 
and, in principle, based on practical necessity. In Uganda, for example, the Children’s 
                                                            
38  The Committee on the CRC has interpreted children’s right to health by addressing its GC No 15 to a 
range of stakeholders working in the field of children’s rights and public health – including parents and 
children themselves. See generally, GC No 15, para 3. 
39  Arts. 3 of the CRC and 4(1) of the ACRWC require African parents, in reaching a decision relating to 
their child to give primary consideration to his or her best interest. This obligation should not be too 
difficult for African parents to accomplish. As demonstrated in chapter two of this thesis, African cultural 
practice obligates parents to care for and support their children since they are the future. 
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Act40 bestows on every parent the responsibility to care for his or her child41 and it is the 
duty of every parent or guardian to ensure a child’s well-being.42 These provisions are 
firm in their recognition and assignment of parental duty and further supported by a 
constitutional provision which provides that “[s]ubject to laws enacted in their best 
interests, children shall have the right to know and be cared for by their parents or those 
entitled to bring them up”.43 In Ethiopia, article 20(3) of the Civil Code alludes to the 
power of the guardian of a minor to submit him or her to an examination or treatment 
beneficial to the health of the minor. Similarly, article 257(1) and (2) of the Revised 
Family Code provides respectively that the guardian shall watch over the health of the 
minor and shall take the necessary measures for the recovery of the minor in case of 
sickness. In other countries, such as Tanzania, parents have a shared responsibility to 
take care and ensure the protection of a child through provision of medical care.44 In 
Egypt, parental consent is recognised especially in cases of organ transplant,45 and in 
Nigeria, parental consent is an integral part of a child’s healthcare.46 
Parental opinion is indeed an integral part of a child’s healthcare. However, it gains 
stronger recognition in instances where a child is severely unwell or incapacitated and 
lacks the necessary capacity to contribute adequately to a medical treatment decision. In 
other words, where the child is able, parental opinion takes second place. For example, 
                                                            
40  Several other pieces of legislation in Uganda grant parents the right to care for and make decisions (health-
related) on their child’s behalf. A plethora of such provisions can be found in the Children’s Act: for 
example, sec 5(2) enjoins parents to care for their children as it provides that “[a]ny person having custody 
of a child shall protect the child from discrimination, violence, abuse and neglect”. Further, sec 5(1)(f) 
guarantees children the right to medical care, and sec 7 requires parents to protect their children from 
social or customary practices that are harmful to their health. Last but not least, according to sec 157 of 
the Penal Code Act, any parent or guardian who fails to care and provide for his or her child ‒ for example 
medical care ‒ commits an offence. 
41  See generally, sec 6(1) of the Children’s Act. 
42  As above, sec 5(1). 
43  See, art. 34(1) of the Constitution of Uganda. 
44  See generally, secs: 8 and 16 of the Law of the Child Act No. 21 of 2009 consolidates all the laws relating 
to children. 
45  Through sec 116 of Child law No 12 of 1996 (amended by law no. 126 of 2008) anyone who fails to 
recognise parental consent, especially in an organ transplant shall be punished by imprisonment. 
46  See generally, sec 39(c)(i) of the Code of Medical Ethics in Nigeria (2004) which provides that “[t]hose 
within the ages of 16 to 18 years have a statutory right of their own to consent to procedures and this takes 
precedence over parental objections, but does not invalidate the right of others to consent on their behalf. 
However, where the child of this age group objects and parental consent is obtained in an emergency 
situation, appropriate treatment or procedure can be given”.  
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in Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority & Another,47 Mrs Gillick’s 
objection to the provision of contraceptives to her daughters without her prior 
knowledge and consent so long as they were below 16 years was overruled by the court, 
as Lord Fraser ruled that: 
It seems to me verging on the absurd to suggest that a girl or boy aged fifteen could not 
effectively consent, for example to have a medical examination of some trivial injury to his [or 
her] body or even to have a broken arm set. Of course, the consent of the parents should 
normally be asked, but they may not be immediately available. Provided the patient, whether 
a boy or girl, is capable of understanding what is proposed, and of expressing his or her own 
wishes, I see no good reason for holding that he or she lacks the capacity to express them validly 
and effectively and to authorize the medical man to make the examination or give the 
treatment which he wishes.48 
This case does not repudiate the parental right and responsibility to have an opinion in 
a child’s healthcare treatment; rather, it confirms the position of mature and able 
children to be involved in their healthcare decision-making processes. It also highlights 
several instances where parental authority which is not readily available should not 
prohibit treatment of a child. It also emphasises that even in instances where parental 
authority is readily available, the well-being of a child should come first.  
Indeed, the situation in some parts of Africa, irrespective of the laws enacted which 
grants children the right to contribute to their healthcare decision-making process, is 
different and parental view still dominates such processes. As will be discussed later in 
Esanubor,49 such domination only becomes an issue if it is not in the best interests of the 
child. Parental responsibility and right, as protected by law, read together with the best 
interests of the child and children’s right to participation, establishes that parents do 
have a responsibility and right to ensure the healthy development of their child and for 
their child to participate in such decision-making processes at the family level. However, 
where parental opinion is not intended to ensure the best interests of the child, it will be 
set aside.50  
Besides, the prevailing underlying spirit of parental decision-making in children’s 
related medical and healthcare decisions is masked under the fact that parents are 
                                                            
47  (1985) 3 All ER 402. This case is also available through http://www.hrcr.org/safrica/childrens_rights/ 
Gillick_WestNorfolk.htm. [accessed 15 July 2016]. For in-depth analysis on this case see M Freeman, 
‘Rethinking Gillick’, (2005)13(1-2) International Journal of Children’s Rights 201–217. 
48  Gillick (n 47 above) 405. 
49  Esanubor v Faweya [2009] All FWLR (Pt 478) 380 (CA). See also Re O (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) 
(1993) 2 FLR 149; Re S (A Minor) (Medical Treatment) (1993) 1 FLR 396. 
50  Kilkelly, (n 9 above) 225. See also, C Bridge ‘Parental beliefs and medical treatment of children’ (1994) 
Butterworth’s Family Law Journal 131.  
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capable to and should act in a child’s best interest.51 Therefore, at the minimum, in the 
absence of a child’s opinion to a health-related decision, parental opinion, if reasonable 
and in the child’s best interests, is encouraged. In fact, in cases of an illness or accident 
at home, such parental responsibility and rights, start within the family (family decision-
making process) and range from noticing or accepting that a child is unwell, deciding to 
take the child for treatment to consenting to treatment. However, it should be noted that 
during a family decision-making process, parental and children’s right to participate is 
elastic in nature, as it can be limited, especially if it is not based on the child’s best 
interest.52 This was established in Esanubor (where parental opinion was discarded) and 
further through the decision in Gillick where Lord Scarman held that “parental right [to 
decide for a child in medical and health care related decisions] must be exercised in 
accordance with the welfare principle and can be challenged, even overridden, if it be 
not”. 53  
Rightly so, it could be argued that the legislative protection and “gift” of parental 
responsibility to act in a child’s best interest across Africa also grants parents the “right” 
to seize such moments and make decisions on the behalf of a child who is ill.54 Indeed, 
the significant number of interventions which are undertaken by parents discussed in 
this chapter is justified by the strong passionate bond between parents and their children 
and strengthened by the legal position of parents as proxy decision-makers or legal 
representatives. In fact, the easy way out and, seemingly, what is commonly practiced in 
Africa right now is that in health-related matters, decisions are likely to be made by 
parents. Only in exceptional cases, usually influenced by the age of the child (discussed 
below), is a child allowed to be involved. 
The strength of parental views in health-related decisions is also justified in article 
18 of the CRC, which ascribes an unconditional duty to parents to be the primary care 
                                                            
51  See for example, Freeman (n 68 above) in which he holds that the importance of parental responsibility 
in respect of their involvement in a child’s health-related decision–making process rests on two facts, first, 
that parents must behave dutifully towards their child and secondly that the responsibility to bring up a 
child belongs to parents. 
52  A host of court cases have justified the centrality of this principle in child law jurisprudence. See for 
example; Kaiser v Chambers (1969) 4 SA 224 (C) at 228G, where the Court made no mistake as it referred 
to the best interests of the child as a ‘golden thread which runs through the whole fabric of our law relating 
to children’. See also Bethell v Bland 1996 (2) SA 194 (W); Krasin v Ogle [1997] 1 All SA 557 (W); Madiehe 
(born Ratilhogo) v Madiehe 1997 (2) All SA 153 (B); Van Pletzen v Van Pletzen 1998 (SA) 95 (O); Meyer v 
Gerber 1999 (3) SA 650 (O); Kirsh v Kirsh [1999] 2 All SA 193 (C); K v K 1999 (4) SA 691 (C); Lubbe v Du 
Plessis 2001 (4) SA 57 (C); Van Rooyen v Van Rooyen [2001] 2 All SA 37 (T) and McCall v McCall 1994 
(3) SA 201 (C). 
53  See, Gillick para 184. See also, Esanubor (n 49 above). 
54  BK Twinomugisha Fundamentals of health Law in Uganda (2015) 208. 
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providers to their children. This provision also recognises the natural position of parents 
and doctors in medical treatment decisions, because parents and doctors always have 
their own opinions. In the case of parents, their presence is justified for two main 
reasons: first, as parents to the child, they share a special bond and secondly, they will be 
indirectly affected by any medical decision and procedure on a child’s health. To some 
extent this parental position also justifies why it is difficult to find instances where such 
processes have been out-rightly challenged in Africa. Briefly, parental knowledge of a 
child and a child’s situation is a key factor that also supports parental dominance in 
healthcare decisions and has been advanced by some scholars as a strong proponent for 
suggesting that parents are appropriate contributors in the decision-making process of 
their child’s healthcare.55  
4. Children’s right to participate in their health-related family 
decisions 
As already highlighted throughout this thesis, international children’s law is clear on the 
importance of children’s involvement in the decision-making processes in all matters – 
in this case, in all health-related matters – that concern them. A child’s healthcare 
decision is perhaps one of the most important decision-making processes that a family 
could hold; it is their child’s healthcare decision, it has very limited room for mistakes 
and it must be right and executed with due diligence. Healthcare generally is a very 
central issue to a child’s proper development and equally central to a child’s right to life, 
survival and development.56 As has been highlighted in this chapter, involving children 
in a health-related decision-making process is indeed complex, because generally 
parents and/or medical practitioners are dominating the process within the scope of 
their rights.  
As will be noticed in this thesis, within Africa, the problem is not the legal 
recognition of a child’s right to be involved in such decision-making processes 
because, as seen in chapter three of this thesis, there is widespread legislative and 
administrative acceptance that children do have such rights. Notwithstanding, the 
level of protection, limitation and caution that states have displayed in the legislative 
                                                            
55  M Paul ‘Decision-making about children’s mental health care: ethical challenges’ (2004) 10 Advances in 
Psychiatric Treatment 301–311. 
56  R Bensted et al. ‘Comparison of health care priorities in childhood and early/late adolescence: Analysis of 
cross-sectional data from eight countries in the council of Europe Child-Friendly Health care survey 
2011’, (2014) 41(1) Child: Care, Health and Development 160–165.  
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conceptualisation of age and maturity and children’s capacity to participate in 
health-related decision-making processes (discussed below) is telling and to some 
extent highlights the sensitive nature of this matter. Studies across the globe show 
that children are constantly marginalised in this process,57 in some cases on the basis 
that they are either young or that health-related issues are too complicated for 
children to understand and that it could be time consuming to explain difficult health 
processes.58 
These factors represent factual challenges a child could face in enjoying his or 
her right to participate in health-related decision-making processes or parents could 
face in respecting their duty to involve a child in his or her healthcare decision-
making process. In reality, healthcare family decision-making processes are complex 
(because, in most cases they involve a third party (health professional or other state 
agency) for the final decision to be arrived at) and sensitive (in the sense that one 
wrong move could lead to a permanent damage or death of a child). However, despite 
its recognition and acceptance in legal texts within African states, children are still 
not given the chance to participate; some examples have been identified below as 
missed chances.  
4.1. Missed chances 
In practice, the limited or lack of respect of children’s right to participate in their 
medical and healthcare decision-making process has resulted in missed chances. In 
this sub-section, this thesis intends to highlight and analyse some instances with the 
help of case law which failed to respect children’s right to participate in their 
healthcare decision-making processes. The complex and sensitive nature of 
children’s right to participate in their healthcare decisions is further confirmed by 
the fact that it is very likely that the opinion of a third party (medical doctor) could 
suppress both parental and a child’s opinion. Especially in cases where such parental 
and/or child’s opinion is unreasonable and not in the best interests of the child. For 
                                                            
57  See for example, research conducted in Ireland, I Coyne et al Giving children a voice; Investigation of 
children’s experiences of participation in consultation and decision-making in Irish hospital (2006) 
available at http://www.dcya.gov.ie/documents/research/Giving_Children_a_Voice.pdf [accessed: 2 May 
2016]. 
58  A Parkes Children and international human rights law: The right of the child to be heard (2013) 79–81. See 
also, Twinomugisha (n 54 above). 
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instance, the Nigerian case of Esanubor59 presents a perfect example where the state, 
through the court, overturned parental opinion which rejected blood transfusion on 
religious grounds, permitted the transfusion on grounds that it was reasonable, in 
the best interests of the child and will save the life of the dying child.60 From a global 
perspective, the decision in this case is not the first of its kind,61 but in the context of 
Nigeria it is the first and it is progressive.62 However, it failed to involve the child 
concerned in the decision leading to his treatment and rather permits doctors to 
proceed without the child’s or parental consent, especially in cases where they are 
against such treatment and if the treatment is in the best interests of the child. Briefly, 
the decision bestows considerable powers on doctors, as they hold the final call 
especially if it is reasonable and not influenced by non-medical reasons, which are 
generally understood to impose on doctors an intrinsic duty to act in the best interest 
of their patients. 
Although, from the facts of the case, the decision to carry out a blood transfusion 
was granted by a State organ (the court), the premise of children’s right to participate in 
                                                            
59  Esanubor (n 49 above). See also a similar situation in the English case of Re R (A Minor) (1993) 2 FLR 
757; (1993) FCR 544. (Blood Transfusion), where the parents of a ten-month girl who was suffering 
from B-cell lymphoblastic leukaemia rejected a medically prescribed blood transfusion on religious 
grounds. However, guided by the welfare and best interests of the child, the court overrode the 
parents’ wishes and directed that the child should receive a blood transfusion as medical advice 
dictated. 
60  Arriving at this decision, the court relied heavily on a decision of the Nigerian Supreme Court in Medical 
and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal v Okonkwo (2002) AHRLR 159 (NgSC 2001) in which the 
court held that: 
The right of freedom of thought, conscience or religion implies a right not to be prevented, without 
lawful justification, from choosing the course of one's life, fashioned on what one believes in, and a 
right not to be coerced into acting contrary to one's religious belief. The limits of these freedoms in all 
cases are where they impinge on the right of others or where they put the welfare of society or public 
health in jeopardy. The sum total of the right to privacy and of the freedom of thought, conscience or 
religion which an individual has, put in a nutshell, is that an individual should be left alone to choose 
a course of life, unless a clear and compelling overriding state interest justifies the contrary if a decision 
to override the decision of a patient not to submit to blood transfusion or medical treatment on 
medical grounds, is to be taken on grounds of public interest or recognised interest of others, such as 
dependent minor children, it is to be taken by the courts. [para 245] 
61  In the same line of parental refusal to blood transfusion to their child based on religious grounds, examples 
date as far back as the 20th century – see for example, Re R (A Minor) [1993] 2 FLR 757 149, Re S (a Minor) 
[1994] 2 FLR 1065. 
62  Especially when juxtaposed to yet another Nigerian case, Medical and Dental Practitioners Disciplinary 
Tribunal v Okonkwo (n 60 above) where the patient, based on religious grounds, refused a blood 
transfusion. The medical doctor respected that refusal and the patient died. In Esanubor, the medical 
doctor discarded (with the help of the court) the religious barrier to blood transfusions and saved the life 
of the patient. 
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health-related decision-making processes was not met, as the child’s direct opinion was 
not obtained before it was overturned on persuasive grounds after due consideration. 
Significantly, from a rights perspective, the standard set and required by international 
law and supported by the general intention and interpretation of mainstream children’s 
rights treaties holds that such decision-making processes, irrespective of whether they 
involve health professionals, or are sensitive and complicated or not, should not be void 
of a child’s active participation which empowers him or her to ask questions.63  
Notwithstanding, in this particular case, it could be presumed, rightly so, that the 
child’s opinion, if obtained, would not have differed from his mother’s. This is because, 
legally, children do not have a right to decide on their religion; rather, parents have the 
responsibility to direct a child’s faith, which generally means children follow their 
parents. In fact, this can be confirmed by taking into consideration the firm rootedness 
of his mother’s resolve – she had no doubts in her decision to reject such blood 
transfusion due to her commitment to her religious beliefs, coupled with the fact the 
child in question automatically practiced the same faith. It could possibly be reasoned 
that his opinion would have been the same as his mother’s and influenced by the same 
faith-based factors which could have masked any family decision-making process. 
Generally, the lack of a child’s right to decide on his or her religious belief or religion, or 
to accept or reject the religion practiced by his or her parents, makes children’s 
participation in such family decision-making processes difficult. 
In fact, at the family level, although not expressly indicated in this case, it could be 
argued that the decision–making process in Esanubor was already corrupted by 
prejudiced faith-based factors, such as “no blood transfusion”, which would have 
impacted negatively on the independent thoughts of the child and the credibility of the 
process. Equally, the fact that the child later applied to the High Court (through his 
mother) to seek a judicial review of the Magistrate Court’s order which overturned his 
mother’s opinion further supports the fact that any family decision-making process that 
may or may not have taken place was bound not to give due consideration to the views 
of the child, especially if it was against his mother’s view and thus not in the child’s best 
interests.64  
Indeed, since the decision-making platform shifted to the State, taking into 
consideration the scope of children’s right to participation, it would have been plausible 
for the court to ascertain that this foundational (family) process took place not only to 
                                                            
63  Committee on the CRC, GC No 12 para 100. 
64  See also, E Nwauche ‘You may not refuse a blood transfusion if you are a Nigerian child: A comment on 
Esanubor v Faweya’ (2010) 10 African Human Rights Law Journal 309–313. 
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promote parental rights and duties but also to encourage the recognition and protection 
of children’s right to participation by granting them the opening to be listened to in the 
family and for their views to be given due consideration. Worse, it is not overtly clear 
whether during the court process the child was given the opportunity to express his 
views or consent to the medical process proposed by the healthcare professional as well.65 
Any attempt to hear the child’s view would have given the court the opportunity to 
meaningfully engage with the child and ascertain whether the child understood the 
implication of refusing a blood transfusion and the court’s decision to turn down such 
views.66 If that had been done, it would have possibly saved the time and resources 
wasted in requesting a judicial review which was all unsuccessful. Again, although this 
decision is plausible, it still remains a missed chance because, before the court was 
approached to intervene, the medical doctor and the mother had some time to seek the 
child’s opinion and involve the child in the decision-making process before the child’s 
health concern became acute.  
Elsewhere, the next cases evaluated in this sub-section represent classic situations 
where children were not in an acute health situation, but they were simply not 
recognised as initial victims in a health decision process which involved several other 
persons. Indeed, although not expressly indicated, one cannot reasonably refute the fact 
that children were among the patients in Purohit and Another v The Gambia (Purohit).67 
The main subject of the case involved the illegal detention of mentally unwell patients 
in Gambia, who were also treated or provided healthcare without their consent. The 
category of patients involved in the case is not sufficiently disclosed. However, the best 
information can be found in paragraph 53 of the African Commission’s decision, which 
                                                            
65  Based on the best interests of the child and the critical nature in which the child was, the State had a duty 
under international law to intervene. See for example, art. 19 of the CRC. 
66  The limitation of the Court process is also contrary to an essential practice required by art. 12 of the CRC 
and 4(2) of the ACRWC. Beyond such limitation is the appreciated attempt taken by the Court to save the 
life of the child based on art. 33(1) of the (1999) Nigerian Constitution which states that “Every person 
has a right to life, and no one shall be deprived intentionally of his life…”. 
67  Purohit and Another v The Gambia (2003) AHRLR 96 (ACHPR 2003), “This case was brought in regard 
to the legal and material conditions of detention in a Gambian mental health institution – ‘The 
Complainants are mental health advocates, submitting the communication on behalf of patients detained 
at Campama, a Psychiatric Unit of the Royal Victoria Hospital, and existing and ‘future’ mental health 
patients detained under the Mental Health Acts of the Republic of The Gambia’ - In its decision, the 
Commission found that requiring indigent people like the patients in this case, without legal assistance, 
to exhaust local remedies in The Gambia before they may approach the Commission is not realistic and 
should not be required. On the merits the Commission explores the prohibition of discrimination on the 
basis of disability and the meaning of the right to health, as provided for under the African Charter”. The 
court found the Government of the Gambia in violation of a string of rights (see generally the last 
paragraph – Decision). 
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suggests that the “… category of persons that would be detained as voluntary or 
involuntary patients under the LDA68 are likely to be people picked up from the streets 
or people from poor backgrounds”.69 This broad categorisation cannot be lacking of 
children. As a result, based on the interpretation of children’s right to participation, read 
together with Principle 1(2) of the UN Principles for the Protection of Persons with 
Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Care,70 their consent is imperative and 
necessary in the healthcare they are provided - based on the fact they are human beings 
irrespective of their mental state and age. 
The decision in Purohit deserves a special mention, because the decision analysed 
in this thesis was not obtained at the State level but by the African Commission, which 
is a higher decision-making platform within the legal strata in Africa and in the context 
of this thesis. However, prior to an appeal to the African Commission, the decision at 
the State level to detain children classified by the LDA as “lunatics and idiots” indicates 
no trace of parental or children’s consent or involvement in the decision to detain them 
or to the healthcare they received.71 In fact, the State admitted to the fact that the 
detainees were not granted the right to express their views72 which culminated in a chain 
of rights violations (including children’s right to participation) by the State.73 The 
families of the children were given neither the space nor the time to engage in any family 
decision-making process with the children involved, as the decision was made at the 
State level and executed without providing or seeking alternative opinions. Collectively, 
the lack of parental consent remains a valid violation of parental rights and duties by the 
State which, in turn, could also be regarded as a breach of the State’s duty to provide 
appropriate assistance to parents, amongst others.74 
Another scenario of a missed chance to accord children the chance to participate 
in healthcare matters is the landmark South African case of Treatment Action Campaign 
                                                            
68  The Lunatics Detention Act.  
69  The African Commission went further to state that “In cases such as this, the African Commission believes 
that the general provisions in law that would permit anybody injured by another person’s act can only be 
available to the wealthy and those that can afford the services of private counsel”. See Purohit’s para 53. 
70  Principle 1(2) requires that “All persons with mental illness, or who are being treated as such persons, 
shall be treated with humanity and respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”. 
71  This was of course strongly backed by the Provision of the LDA which prohibited mentally ill persons 
from exercising inter alia their right to participate. 
72  See, paras 74-75 of Purohit. 
73  See generally, the last paragraph of Purohit. 
74  See for example, arts. 18(2) of the CRC and 20 of the ACRWC. 
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(TAC)75 which dealt with access to treatment to avoid mother-to-child-transmission 
(MTCT) of HIV/AIDS but conspicuously ignored the recognition of pregnant children. 
Although the central issue from a children’s rights perspective in this case was to prevent 
MTCT of HIV/AIDS, the non-recognition of pregnant children in the case remains an 
interesting omission - especially in a country with a high level of teenage pregnancy.76 
Their recognition, this thesis argues, would have given them the opportunity to 
participate directly in the case, understand the importance of the decision of the 
Constitutional Court (which inter alia ordered the State to make niverapine available in 
both private and public health centers to prevent MTCT of HIV/AIDS), and gain more 
insights into how to prevent MTCT. However, unlike the decision in Purohit, children 
where not completely ignored in this case as the Court held, inter alia, that the State has 
an obligation to ensure the protection of children’s rights guaranteed under section 28 
of the South African Constitution, which also includes their right to participate in 
decision-making processes in matters that concern them, especially when the 
implementation of their right to parental or family care is lacking.77 
Indeed, these cases are very different both in context and jurisdiction. However, 
their similarity, which is why they are highlighted in this sub-section, is based on the fact 
that in both cases children (possible victims) were not mentioned. Notwithstanding, the 
credibility of the decisions should not be underestimated, because both Purohit and TAC 
are groundbreaking cases in international law jurisprudence. However, the fact that 
neither the heads of arguments nor the decisions went further to recognise children as 
possible victims of the issues highlighted leaves a gap in child law jurisprudence to 
explore the possibility of children’s right to participate in healthcare-related decisions 
that concern them. This represents a gap in reasoning which in the opinion of this thesis 
is a substantive gap, because it affects not only the general protection of children’s rights 
but also the specific aspects of its key principles, the respect of the views of a child. This 
thesis is not insinuating that the decisions in these cases are incorrect in reasoning, but 
that the recognition of children would have granted children the prospect of future 
consultation especially in family decision-making processes, if such issues re-occur. 
                                                            
75  Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign and Others (No 1) (CCT9/02) [2002] ZACC 
16; 2002 (5) SA 703; 2002 (10) BCLR 1075 (5 July 2002). It should be noted that, to a great extent, the case 
was central in protecting unborn children from contracting HIV/AIDS through Mother-To-Child-
Transmission.  
76  See generally the Report of the Department of Education Teenage pregnancy in South Africa - With a  
specific focus on school - going learners available at http://www.education.gov.za/ 
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=PuNNo1FbrSA%3D&tabid=454&mid=424 [accessed 13 February 2016].  
77  See also, A Skelton ‘South Africa’ (2015) in T Liefaard & JE Doek (ed) Litigating the rights of the child – 
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in domestic and international jurisprudence 24. 
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Also, regrettably, in both cases, children were not recognised as victims and 
consequently the decision-making process at the family level was invisible.  
Parental rights and duties are the strongest at family level and the importance of 
affording the family not only the space to have family decision-making processes but 
also parents and children to exercise their right to have an opinion is well captured in 
the Australian case of Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v J.W.B 
and S.M.B, where McHugh J held that the importance of such a process (family decision-
making process) is strongly based on the “… respect for the family as [a] decision 
making unit … and … possess a moral duty to protect the child and who are, therefore, 
likely to have the child’s best interest in mind”.78  
4.1.1. Impact 
As has been developed throughout this thesis, generally and specifically related to 
children’s right to health, it is not really important who makes the decision or who 
contributes to the decision. What is important is the fact that the decision must be in the 
best interests of the child. However, what international children’s law adds to this 
process is the fact that it is equally crucial that the child concerned should not be kept 
completely in the dark concerning the process, because he or she has a right to know 
and to participate in such decisions, especially in family decision-making processes. 
Indeed, it is no secret that family decision-making processes are run by parents, not only 
because they have the responsibility and right to care for their children under 
international children’s law, but also because, naturally, parents have an instinctive 
attitude to have control over their children. 
However, based on the decisions in Gillick and Esanubor, such dominance has 
limits and parental rights as provided under international children’s law is recognised 
only as long as it is needed to protect the child and does not empower parents to make 
decisions on every aspect of a child’s medical or health care. Several other limits exist 
within a child’s healthcare decision-making process where parental opinion naturally 
comes second, if needed. For example, in the case of a pregnancy-related decision, 
studies have shown that the prime decision maker is the pregnant person – including 
children.79 In fact, in Christian Lawyers Association, Mojapelo J, emphasised that “the 
cornerstone of the regulation of the termination of pregnancy of a girl under the Act 
[CTPA] is the requirement of her informed consent … no female person, regardless of 
                                                            
78  Secretary, Department of Health and Community Services v J.W.B and S.M.B (1992) 175 C.L.R 218 316. 
79  See for example, art. 5(3)(4) CTPA which insists on the fact that termination cannot be denied because 
the child did not consult anyone including parents. 
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her age, may have her pregnancy terminated unless she is capable of giving her informed 
consent to the termination and in fact does so”.80  
The decision arrived at in Christian Lawyers Association touches squarely on 
the basic foundation required by international law in affording children the right to 
be involved in such decisions in a family decision-making process. Indeed, the aspect 
of informed consent is very central, especially in health-related matters and the case 
of children is no exception.81 There is little doubt that through legal instruments, and 
through this case, children are perceived as competent beings able to make such 
pregnancy-related decisions on their own without parental opinion and the medical 
doctor in charge should adhere. The decision arrived at in this case also demonstrates 
that both parent(s), and doctor have no legal right to act against a child’s decision 
and a child is equally entitled to medical confidentiality unless she chooses to inform, 
for instance, her parent(s) before or after terminating her pregnancy.  
However, it should be noted that in exceptional cases, a doctor’s clinical judgement 
is critical as well, especially in medically determining whether a child’s view to a 
particular medical process is in his or her best interests. In doing so, children’s right to 
participation, read together with their evolving capacity as protected under international 
law, warrants the doctor not to only act on the child’s wishes but to give it a fair 
assessment based on the child’s maturity. For example, a child who decides to have her 
pregnancy terminated during the third trimester will no doubt face resistance from a 
doctor, based on medical and legal reasons, and such resistance from a doctor can only 
be overturned of persuasive reasons, such as that the pregnancy is life threatening. 
Runeson et al., warn that although there could be challenges in judging the competence 
of children to understand certain medical procedures, their right to be involved in the 
decision-making processes should be granted first.82 This is a position which this thesis 
concurs with and adds that due consideration should be given to their opinion based on 
context in other to attribute due weight in accordance with the maturity of the child.  
                                                            
80  Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 2004 (10) BCLR 1086 (T) para 19. The Court also 
referred to the content of sec. 12(2)(a) and (b) of the Constitution of South Africa which guarantees the 
right of every woman (girl child inclusive) to determine the fate of her pregnancy. The same 
Constitutional provision grants “everyone” the right to bodily integrity including the right “to make 
decisions concerning reproduction” and “to security in and control over their body” (paras 51-52).  
81  For a comprehensive insight on how this has been tested through case law and further analysis on same 
in South Africa, see, A Moyo Balancing child participation rights, parental responsibility and State 
intervention in medical and reproductive decision-making under South African law [2014] available at 
https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/item/13298/thesis_law_2014_moyo_a.pdf?sequence=1 [accessed 8 
February 2014]. 
82  I Runeson et al. ‘Children’s participation in the decision-making process during hospitalization: an 
observational study’ 9(6) (2002) Nursing Ethics 584. 
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The Committee on the CRC concurs with, and insists on, the involvement of 
children in health-related decision-making processes, as it adds that “children should be 
included in decision-making processes, in a manner consistent with their evolving 
capacities”.83 The credibility and impact of such process is, of course, dependent on the 
sufficiency of the information provided, on the proposed treatment including the effects 
and outcomes to which a child has been granted access.84 In fact, based on the examples 
(practiced in Africa) and cases highlighted in this thesis, the declaration of the 
Committee on the CRC is a classic case of ‘talk is cheap’. The reason for this is that 
striking a balance between parental authority in deciding on their child’s health-related 
matters, and parental obligation to appreciate a child’s evolving capacity in such 
decision-making processes, and to allow the child do so without external pressure of any 
sort can be challenging especially because children’s preferences vary and in the case of 
a particular child, mood swings are very possible.85 This is also true in the context of a 
medical decision made by parents, influenced by religious or cultural beliefs. Usually, in 
reality, children have no right to choose a religious or cultural practice contrary or 
different from their parents under international children’s rights law, and related 
African regional and national laws examined in this thesis. In fact, ascertaining how 
much weight a child’s views should be given in a healthcare-related decision-making 
process is a debatable issue. This is possible especially in Africa as, on the one hand, 
contemporary African child liberationists argue that children possess the same rights as 
adults86 and, on the other hand, typical African cultural practices and beliefs analysed 
                                                            
83  Committee on the CRC, GC No 12 para 100. See also Committee on the CESCR, GC No 14 which states 
that “States parties should provide a safe and supportive environment for adolescents, that ensures the 
opportunity to participate in decisions affecting their health, to build life skills, to acquire appropriate 
information, to receive counselling and to negotiate the health-behaviour choices they make ...”. See also, 
R Hodgkin & P Newell Implementation hand book for the Convention on the Rights of the Child 168 
available at http://www.unicef.org/publications/files/Implementation_Handbook_for_the_Convention_ 
on_the_Rights_of_the_Child_Part_1_of_3.pdf [accessed 31 January 2016. Coyne & Harder share the same 
view as they hold that acting in a child’s best interest in health-related matters should mean encouraging 
his or her view to be heard together with the views of parents and health professionals (I Coyne & M Maria 
‘Children’s participation in decision-making: balancing protection with shared decision-making using a 
situation perspective’ (2011) 15(4) Journal of Child Health care 313). 
84  Committee on the CRC, GC No 12 (as above). 
85  See for example a study conducted in Australia in P Parkinson & J Cashmore The voice of a child in family 
law disputes (2012). 
86  See for example, B Mezmur & J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Listen to us: Arguing the case for child participation in 
NEPAD’ 2009 (17) African Journal of International and Comparative Law 1-28; B Mezmur & J Sloth-
Nielsen ‘Surveying the research landscape to promote children’s legal rights in an African context’ (2007) 
2 African Human Rights Law Journal 330-353 and Frank & L Ehlers ‘Child participation in African context’ 
in J Sloth-Nielsen (ed) Children’s rights in Africa: A legal Perspective (2008) 111–128. 
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earlier in this thesis hold that children’s competence and views are not equal to those of 
their parents and doctors, because childhood is a transitory process.  
Besides, a central question for the purpose of this chapter is: whose life is it anyway? 
Of course, it is that of the child concerned, which makes his or her participation in the 
decision-making process critical, and his or her best interest and not that of anyone else 
paramount. Accordingly, parents and doctors should not exclude children from a 
decision-making process without persuasive reason(s). The reason(s) that support such 
inclusion have been succinctly summarised by McCabe who asserts that there are at least 
five distinct objectives which motivate for children to be consulted: firstly, the ethical 
principle of patient self-determination or autonomy; secondly, children’s involvement 
will improve open communication among physicians, parents, and children; thirdly, 
children’s involvement in goal setting and treatment planning may directly facilitate their 
cooperation with treatment; fourthly, children’s involvement may also promote a sense of 
control which, in turn, may relate to positive adjustment or acceptance; and finally, 
involving children in medical decision-making demonstrates respect for children’s 
capacities, and may provide opportunities for further development.87 While little is known 
about the impact children have made in participating in a decision-making process of 
their own health-related issue in Africa, there is growing evidence further afield that their 
participation will have a positive result88 and increase trust, acceptability, confidence and 
understanding of their illness,89 which could also lead to a speedy recovery.  
                                                            
87  MA McCabe ‘Involving children and adolescents in medical decision making: Developmental and clinical 
considerations’ (1996) 21(4) Journal of Paediatric Psychology 506. 
88  See for example, DB Angst & JA Deatrick ‘Involvement in health care decisions: Parents and children with 
chronic illness’ (1996) 2(2) Journal of Family Nursing 174-194; BA Beresford & P Sloper ‘Chronically ill 
adolescents’ experiences of communicating with doctors: A qualitative study’ (2003) 33(3) Journal of 
Adolescent Health 172–179. 
89  In the case of a lengthy or chronic illness, for example, involving a child in the treatment process will also 
enable the child to manage the illness better by avoiding the don’t dos. See also, H Shier ‘Pathways to 
participation: Openings, opportunities and obligations. A new model for enhancing children’s 
participation in decision-making,’ (2001) 15(2) Children & Society 114, in which he adds that the impact 
could also include “[i]mproving the quality of service provision, increasing children’s sense of ownership 
and belonging, increasing self-esteem, increasing empathy and responsibility, laying the groundwork for 
citizenship and democratic participation, and thus helping to safeguard and strengthen democracy”.  
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5. Challenges in implementing children’s right to participate in 
health-related decision-making processes 
From a legislative and policy perspective, most African states have made tangible strides 
in protecting children’s right to participate in health-related decision-making processes 
in the public and private space (family). In fact, a host of these instruments have been 
identified and highlighted in chapter two and in other instances throughout this thesis. 
However, practical challenges still exist in Africa, especially within the family that have 
marred the process and made children’s enjoyment of this right daunting in several 
quarters. Indeed, with the constantly improving medical technology and technical 
methods of treatment provided or reserved for children for specific health-related issues, 
it remains a challenge both to parents and medical professionals, whether a critically 
unwell child should be subjected to prolonged, complex and sometimes distressing 
explanations in order to observe the child’s right to participation. These are central 
aspects which have no doubt frustrated family decision-making processes, especially 
related to health decisions and to some extent highlighted the vagueness of children’s 
right to participate in health-related treatment decisions. 
Outside the family environment, several factors also act as deterrents to such 
progress and, as indicated in the introductory paragraph of this chapter and sporadically 
in other sub-sections, such progress or effort at the state level is not without blemish. 
Lack of resources is and is not a challenge indeed, in cases where it is, it has been reported 
to be due to lack of prioritisation from state parties to invest in children’s health90 and in 
cases where it is not, embezzlement has stifled the limited resources injected into the 
health sector.91 Nnamuchi, writing in 2008 and in 2012 on the justiciability of the right 
to healthcare in Nigeria, holds that kleptomania by officials is also one of the major 
challenges that continue to frustrate the effective protection and enjoyment of the right 
to healthcare in Nigeria and Africa alike.92 Equally, the shortage of qualified medical 
                                                            
90  See for example, the ACPF’s report The African report on the child’s wellbeing (2013) 53. It should also be 
noted that the limited financial injection is not necessarily related to the lack of financial resources but in 
most cases based of limited prioritisation within states.  
91  See for example, WHO Regional Committee for Africa - The African public health emergency fund: 
Stocktaking – 2015. See also, WHO, Report of the regional committees to the Executive Board (2016) para 
9 WHO doc EB138/4 available at http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB138/B138_4-en.pdf [accessed 
23 March 2016].  
92  O Nnamuchi ‘Kleptocracy and its many faces: The challenges of justiciability of the right to health care in 
Nigeria’ (2008) 52(1) Journal of African Law 1–42.  See also, O Nnamuchi & S Ortuanya ‘The human right 
to health in Africa and its challenges: A critical analysis of Millennium Development Goal 8’ (2012) 12(1) 
African Human Rights Law Journal 178–198. 
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practioners is also amongst the list of acute problems.93 Practically, this shortage is 
caused by a number of reasons, such as the limited number of trained paediatricians and 
the “brain drain”.94 Available resources would lead to the training of qualified medical 
staff with the competence and the ability to both involve children in decision-making 
processes on their health matters and assess their evolving capacity and give due weight 
to their opinion. 
The selected challenges mentioned in the paragraph above are fundamental and 
have been researched and discussed in great detail by other scholars and they are also 
common across the Continent.95 However, what is really critical in the context of this 
thesis is the aspect of age.96 Indeed, it became increasingly critical after the adoption of 
both the CRC and the ACRWC. The protection of children’s right to participate in all 
aspects that concern them remains one of the pillars of ensuring the comprehensive 
understanding and implementation of children’s rights. Dilemmas on whether a child 
should be allowed to participate in health-related decision-making processes and if they 
should, whether age should be the barometer on which their competence for admission 
is measured, remains very central in the general debate, analysis and implementation of 
this particular right. In fact, in most cases, the age issue analysed further below is not 
necessarily African specific because studies conducted in other countries, such as 
Ireland97 and Australia,98 depict trends of similar age factors and challenges related to 
children’s competence compounded by poor communication skills among medical 
professionals and parental lack of patience. 
                                                            
93  See for example, AS Muula ‘Shortage of health workers in the Malawian public health services system: 
how do parliamentarians perceive the problem?’ (2006) 13(1-2) Journal of Health Sciences 124–130 and C 
Uneke et al ‘The Nigeria health sector and human resource challenges’ (2007) 8(1) The Internet Journal 
of Health 1-5. Available at http://print.ispub.com/api/0/ispub-article/6444 [accessed 6 June 2016]. 
94  See for example, G Odongo ‘Caught between progress, stagnation and a reversal of some gains: Reflections 
on Kenya’s record in implementing children’s rights norms’ (2012) 12(1) African Human Rights Law 
Journal 135-136. See also, Committee on the CRC, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties 
under Article 44 of the Convention: Zimbabwe UN doc CRC/C/ZWE/2 para 280. See also, I Schierenbeck 
et al. ‘Barriers to accessing and receiving mental health care in Eastern Cape, South Africa’ (2013) 15(2) 
Health and Human Rights 110-123. 
95  For example, see, O Nnamuchi & SU Ortuanya (n 92 above); Odongo (n 94 above); AF Cooper et al. 
Africa's health challenges: Sovereignty, mobility of people and healthcare (2013); and E Durojaye Litigating 
the right to health in Africa challenges and prospects (2015). 
96  The aspect of age could be worst if it is discriminatory in Christian Lawyers Association the Court held 
that age-based discrimination offends the right to equality and that the party perpetrating it bears the 
burden to prove that the discrimination is fair. 
97  See for example, Coyne et al. (n 57 above). 
98  See for example, Parkinson & Cashmore (n 85 above). 
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5.1. No age limit encouraged? 
Although the concept of children has now generally been accepted as any person below 
the age of 18, as prescribed under international children’s rights law and more strongly 
within the African system, it is worth noting that the aspect of age remains one of the 
wobbliest aspects under children’s rights discourse. Indeed, even within the context of 
this generally accepted age limit, maturity could be attained earlier.99 In criminal matters, 
different age check points exist for which a child could be criminally liable.100 In the 
context of children’s right to participation in health-related matters, it could be argued 
that ‘age limit’ is two-faced, as on the one hand, age limitation is discouraged101 and, on 
the other hand, it is welcomed.102 On the one hand, age could be a barrier for a child to 
participate in health-related matters and, on the other hand, the reason why he or she 
should participate. Notwithstanding, in terms of the phraseology of both article 12 of 
the CRC and 4(2) of the ACRWC, both instruments tend to extend an open invitation 
to states to determine boundaries and modalities on which children’s views are given 
due consideration in accordance with their age and maturity and to determine whether 
a child has the capacity to make decisions about his or her health or participate in such 
decision-making processes. The veracity of this argument is of course limited in context, 
but in areas related to children’s rights to health and medical treatment, which broadly 
entail protection and autonomy, international law (including the African human rights 
system) is silent on whether there should be an age limit at which a child should 
participate in health-related decision-making processes.  
Indeed, it could be argued that children’s right to participation, as protected under 
international children’s rights law, does not substantively provide sufficient guidance on 
how and when to apply the rationale of children’s involvement in medical and health-
related decisions. Instead, the Committee on the CRC delegates much power to the states 
in their promulgation of national laws and policy structures to define such age 
boundaries based on local practice the Committee actually encourages state parties to 
give consideration to the introduction of such legislation.103 However, through article 5 
                                                            
99  Art. 1 of the CRC in some countries maturity is attained with marriage, military service or economic 
independence. 
100  See for example, art. 40 CRC, T Liefaard ‘Juvenile justice from an international children’s rights 
perspective’ (2015) in W Vandenhole et al. (ed) Routledge International Handbook of Children’s Rights 
Studies 234-256. 
101  See, GC No 12, para 21.  
102  GC No 12 para 102. 
103  GC No 12 (as above). 
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of the CRC, for example, the Committee endorses a flexible approach which recognises 
children’s evolving capacities and rejects arbitrary age restrictions.104  
Significantly, in this context, the Committee is simply applying some caution on 
the application of such age restrictions, as a child’s evolving capacities must always be 
considered irrespective of the age limit identified in such national laws. Thus, where a 
younger child (based on age of consent set by such national laws or policy) demonstrates 
the capacity to express an informed view on his or her health-related treatment, due 
weight should be given to such views regardless of the child’s age. Indeed, understanding 
the protection and recognition of children’s evolving capacities simply indicates that 
although it is up to states to identify such age limits, such powers have also been limited 
with a transparent cord which, at first, seems to grant states the free hand to determine 
such age limits while they (states) are also prevented to make such age limits on absolute 
grounds to determine competence without evaluating a child’s evolving capacities. In 
fact, neither the CRC and the ACRWC nor the Committee on the CRC’s GC No 12 in 
its interpretation of children’s right to participation indicates what an acceptable 
minimum age for children to participate in health-related decisions is. 
Indeed, the gap created by such lacuna is not surprising and could be regarded as 
resulting from the fact that health and medical-related decision-making processes are 
sensitive, emotional and in some instances coupled with a wide variety of consensual 
ages across the Continent and the complex nature in which families could react to such 
limitation. However, Child Rights International Network (CRIN) reasons that a 
minimum age should nevertheless be set above which everyone has the right to 
participate in health and medical decision-making processes regardless of capacity.105 
According to CRIN, such an introduction will go a long way to ensure that, in practice, 
children’s right to participate in health-related decision-making processes is not 
suspended until they reach adulthood simply because they do not have the capacity.  
5.1.1. Age limit 
From a general human rights perspective, children do not only have the right to 
participate in all health-related decision-making processes that concern them because 
they are human beings but also because they are bearers of judicial competencies, 
subjective rights and legal obligations not limited by age.106 In fact, healthcare issues are 
                                                            
104  This is traceable throughout the Committee on the CRC GC No 12. 
105  CRIN, Age is Arbitrary: Setting minimum ages, 21 available at https://www.crin.org/en/library/ 
publications/age-arbitrary-discussion-paper-setting-minimum-ages [accessed 8 April 2016]. 
106  See for example, art. 31 of the ACRWC. 
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very central in every aspect of human competence, which makes it not surprising that 
the international community avoids setting any umbrella specific age limit as a criterion 
for when children should participate in health and medical decision-making 
processes.107 Although such lacuna has not helped in discouraging the introduction of 
age limits as state parties have heeded to the Committee on the CRC’s ‘call’ to institute 
such age limits as they deem fit within practical context, age limits have indeed been 
introduced in several African countries as to when a child could be involved in health-
related decision-making processes. 
The South African Children’s Act for example, confers on children over the age of 
12 the right to participate in decision-making processes concerning their medical 
treatment and surgical operations.108 However, a child younger than 12 can participate 
in health-related medical decision-making processes if the child is of sufficient maturity 
and has the mental capacity to understand the benefits, risks, social and other 
implications of the treatment required.109 Further, as probably expected, the legislation 
introduces parents and/or medical practioners as alternatives in the case where a child 
is under or above 12 and incompetent.110  
Parental responsibility, in this context, is worth noting, as it is only fully activated 
when a child does not display sufficient understanding of the health-related matter that 
concerns him or her. Also, the introduction of an age limit in the South African 
legislation is interesting, as the evolving capacities of the child still takes precedence over 
any age limit that may or may not have been protected by law. Yet, another South 
African provision related to children’s capacity to participate in health-related matters 
discussed earlier in chapter four of this thesis is found in section 5(1) read with section 
1 of the CTPA, which grants every child (irrespective of age) the right to consent to an 
abortion required he or she has the capacity to do so. Under this legislation every child 
is competent and has the capacity to make such decisions without parental involvement.  
Elsewhere, the Constitution of Malawi simply holds that every child has the right 
to know111 - thus, indicating that every child should be involved and informed of any 
decision-making process on any matter affecting him/her. Interestingly, the 
Constitution does not stipulate any age limit as a determinant of competence for a child 
                                                            
107  It should be noted that the lack of any specific age limit at the international level is not only in the case of 
children’s rights to participation, but seems to be a common in most children’s rights aspects, for example 
juvenile justice. 
108  See generally, ch 129(2)(a) of the Children’s Act. 
109  Children’s Act ch 129(2)(b). 
110  Children’s Act 129(4)(a)(b). 
111  See generally, the Constitution of the Republic of Malawi (1994) sec 23(3). 
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to participate in health-related decision-making processes, although in practice children 
aged 12 are allowed to participate in health-related decisions.112 The age limit of 12 is 
also recognised in Mauritania, but not as an absolute determinant to competence. The 
limitation in Mauritania is influenced by the Malekite Muslim Law, which regards 
children under the age of 12 as absolutely incapable, whereas children between the ages 
of 12 and 18 are only granted limited capacity.113 The case of Mauritania is contrastable 
with South Africa in the fact that while in South Africa children below 12 have limited 
capacity justified by their evolving capacities, in Mauritania the evolving capacities of a 
child below 12 does not repudiate the age barrier. The difference between the two 
countries is even clearer with the recognition in the rights of children above 12 to 
participate in health-related decisions; in South Africa, a child above 12 has full capacity 
to participate unless proven otherwise, whereas in Mauritania at the same age, a child 
has limited capacity to participate. 
In fact, one would expect that on the basis that Mauritania is dominantly a Muslim 
state, other dominantly Muslim states would have similar trends of child recognition. 
However, in Tunisia, another dominantly Muslim state, the age at which a child’s 
opinion is heard in matters concerning the child is set at 13 in the Code for the 
Protection of the Child.114 These conflicting ideologies illustrate the intricacies involved 
in age and maturity and children’s ability to participate in all matters that concern them. 
In fact, the consideration and recognition of a child’s ability to participate in health-
related matters is no better in Namibia, where the age limit to participate in health-
                                                            
112  Committee on the CRC, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the 
Convention: Malawi UN doc CRC/C/8/Add.43 para 55. It should also be noted that Under a later Report 
to the Committee on CRC, UN doc CRC/C/MWI/2 the State is silent on this aspect, which could mean 
that it has not been codified yet. 
113  Committee on the CRC, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the 
Convention: Mauritania UN doc CRC/C/8/Add.42 para 19. This provision is supplemented by art. 164 of 
the Personal Status Code which provides that “A person who reaches the age of discernment before 
reaching the age of majority does not enjoy full legal capacity”. 
114  See generally, art. 42, which states that “Le délégué à la protection de l’enfance peut poursuivre 
l’application de la mesure urgente après le délai de vingt quatre heures et jusqu’au jour suivant s’il 
correspond à un dimanche ou à un jour de fête officielle et si l’interruption de la mesure est de nature à 
cause un préjudice considérable à l’enfant.” 
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related matters is set at 16, in Ethiopia where it is set at 18,115 and worst in Swaziland 
where children are not considered competent at all and the age of consent is 21.116  
Notwithstanding, the trend displayed above to some extent displays some level of 
consistency within the selected legal instruments that protect children in Africa and 
depicts the fact that age is very central in ascertaining a child’s ability to reasonably 
participate in a health-related matter. However, the question remains whether age is or 
should be a key determinant of a child’s competence to participate in health-related 
decisions. As indicated earlier, international children’s law is not clear on this point. 
However, in practice the reality is that a child can effectively participate in health-related 
decision-making processes only to the extent to which his or her parents or legal 
guardians are willing to involve him or her irrespective of age and/or maturity.  
Generally, parental ability to know when to involve a child in a decision-making 
process is a kind of authority which, in the context of this thesis, affects the basic tenets 
of children’s rights to participate in health-related decision-making processes. Indeed, 
its presence in practice should spur states to adopt legislative and policy measures that 
would set the record clear and encourage parents to involve their children in such key 
decision-making practices irrespective of their personal judgement of the child’s ability 
based on his or her age. Unfortunately, some African states are silent on this issue. Such 
silence could either be a result of keeping in line with the general view of the CRC and 
the ACRWC or the complex nature of instituting age limits, which could affect a state’s 
societal beliefs and practices especially within the family. In Uganda, for example, there 
is no age limit for children to access information on matters that concern them or to 
participate in health-related issues. The Constitution, just like in Malawi, simply holds 
that every child has the right to know117 and the Children’s Act expands on this, as it 
declares that a child of sufficient age and understanding shall be consulted on issues 
relating to the child’s welfare.118  
It probably goes without saying that in the absence of any age limit, a child’s 
evolving capacities should be taken into consideration and due weight should be given 
to the views of a child. However, who appreciates a child’s evolving capacities, especially 
                                                            
115  See generally, the Family Code art 257(1), which provides that “[t]he guardian shall watch over the health 
of the minor”, and art. 257(2), which provides that “[i]n case of sickness of the minor, the guardian shall 
take the necessary measures for his recovery”. Available at http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4c0ccc052.pdf 
[accessed 18 April 2016]. See also, Committee on the CRC, Consideration of reports submitted by States 
Parties under Article 44 of the Convention: Ethiopia UN doc CRC/C/129/Add.8 para 60. 
116  Committee on the CRC, Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the 
Convention: Swaziland UN doc CRC/C/SWZ/1 para 77. 
117  See, arts. 34 and 41 of the Constitution of Uganda. 
118  Art. 20(4) Children’s Act.  
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in the family? Parents, of course. As a result, to achieve this, parents should at all times 
keep an eye on the activities and evolution of their children and the way they react to 
situations or issues in order to better evaluate their evolving capacities. This is because 
every child is different. Indeed, Herbots and Put add that “[i]nternal and external 
characteristics make every child unique [resultantly] special attention should be given 
to vulnerable groups of children, such as children with disabilities, children with a 
mental and/or physical illness, the girl child, etc.”119 Besides, it could reasonably be 
argued that age limits should not be completely discarded as, at the minimum, it places 
children’s capacity on level grounds. A child’s ability to espouse reasonable or 
convincing judgement in a matter that concerns him or her should be the standpoint on 
which such consideration swings parental perceptions and the added value to the 
justification of the medical decision made, irrespective of the child’s age.  
The aspect of “age” is more crucial in the apt implementation of children’s rights 
to participate in health and medical decision-making processes than it is in any other 
decision-making process. This is possibly because health-related decisions are very 
personal and any wrong decision could lead to some form of bodily harm or, at worst, 
death. To get this right, the Committee on the CRC has reaffirmed the importance of a 
comprehensive understanding of the context of children’s right to participate in health-
related decisions by stating that before parents give their consent, children of sufficient 
maturity should be given a chance to express their views freely and their views should 
be given due weight.120 
6. Exceptions 
It should be noted that the exceptions highlighted here are not necessarily exhaustive. 
However, other scholars too have highlighted some exceptions which could also apply 
in the context of family health-related decision-making processes.121 Sporadically, this 
thesis has also mentioned other exceptions in which it would not be in best interests of 
the child to wait for his or her opinion on any matter that concerns him or her. That 
said, it is worth highlighting that the barriers or challenges discussed above live 
                                                            
119  K Herbots & J Put ‘The participation disc: A concept analyses of (a) child (’s right to) participation’ (2015) 
23 International Journal of Children’s Rights 167. See also, L Cattrijsse & I Delens-Ravier ‘Reflections on 
the concept of participation’ (2006) in F Ang et al. (eds) Participation Rights of Children 27 – 38. 
120  Committee on the CRC, GC No 4 Adolescent health and development in the context of the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child UN doc CRC/GC/2003/4 para 32. 
121  See for example, J Fortin Children’s rights and the developing law (2009) 146. 
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alongside a far more promising children’s right to be involved in all family decision-
making processes on health-related matters that concern them. Generally, the practice 
in the last decade has demonstrated that great progress is possible in involving children 
in such decision-making processes.  
However, regrettably, in the context of this thesis such progress has so far been 
registered out of Africa.122 The slow progress on the continent is not a matter of lack of 
legislation, but a result of insurmountable cultural, religious and childhood conceptual 
issues discussed throughout this thesis which are hindering the furtherance and 
implementation of this right. One can hardly disagree with this thesis that there are real 
instances where such rights accorded to children have no chance of being realised, not 
because they are children, but because of the critical health condition in which they 
might find themselves. Indeed, common sense and key undertones of children’s right to 
participate in healthcare-related decisions dictate that where the child has no wishes 
because he or she is either too young or too unwell to participate, doctors and parents 
should decide on what is best for the child. Such instances constitute the exceptions not 
influenced by societal barriers only.   
For this reason, it might not be completely tragic that the child’s opinion in 
Esanubor, for example, was not heard because although required and well established, 
neither international law nor the African children’s rights system where children have 
been granted specific duties123 credits children with an obligation to participate in such 
processes. Plus, in Esanubor, it was a case of life or death.124 As a result, the requirement 
under international children’s law that in all matters concerning a child, his or her views 
                                                            
122  See for example, P Parkinson & J Cashmore (n 85 above); I Coyne et al. Giving Children a voice; 
Investigation of children’s experiences of participation in consultation and decision-making in Irish hospital 
(2006) and D Horgan et al. Children and young people’s experiences of participation in decision-making at 
home, in schools and in their communities (2015) available at http://www.dcya.gov.ie/documents/ 
playandrec/20150617ExperienceParticipation.pdf [accessed 10 May 2016]. 
123  See generally, art. 31 of the ACRWC. See also, J Sloth-Nielsen & BD Mezmur ‘A dutiful child: The 
implications of Article 31 of the African Children’s Charter’ (2008) 52(2) Journal of African Law 159–189. 
124  The severity of deciding between life and death was not discussed at length in the Esanubor case even 
though it was a decision based on whether to let the child concern die or live. But, the issue of life and 
death was analysed in the South African case of Department of Health v Sepeng, [an unreported judgment 
delivered by Seriti J in the Transvaal Provincial Division of the High Court of South Africa on 4 November 
2005], in which the court held that “ … the parents’ right to religion is not unfettered, that the right to life 
is an inviolable right and to the extent that the parents’ right potentially violates the child’s right to life, it 
is in the best interest of the child that the child’s right to life is protected. The content of the child’s right 
to life includes the right to receive medical treatment, especially where such treatment would preserve the 
child’s life”. See also, Life Healthcare Group (Pty) Ltd and Another v JMS (as parent and guardian of the 
infant child MT) and Another (34758/2014) [2014] ZAGPJHC 299 (20 October 2014). All these cases are 
related to blood transfusions denied by parents on religious grounds and later granted by the courts.  
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should be sought first and those views should be given due consideration, is questionable 
and this case justifies this position as it is different and points to a reverse direction 
which holds that the gravity of the situation and the emergency of the treatment required 
have to be given due weight, as well. In cases where, based on the doctor’s analysis, 
treatment must be administered quickly and it is a matter of life or death if the child 
cannot be reached and parental opinion is adverse to medical opinion and not in the 
best interests of the child, court interdicts must be immediate and based on the child’s 
best interests which in most cases would be to save the child’s life first.125  
In fact, both as a principle and as a right accorded to children, involving children 
in health-related family decision-making processes has real exceptions which have been 
discussed broadly through the writings of other scholars.126 This is further strengthened 
by the fact that although children’s right to participation requires a careful balance of a 
child’s evolving capacities, a child’s age is crucial and the parental obligation to care and 
protect a child is a rational argument in children’s rights jurisprudence, which also 
points to the fact that involving a child in a health-related decision-making process 
contains elements which are beyond a child’s reasoning and legal scripts. Also, crucial 
theoretical underpinnings of positive law suggest that for legal principles to be effective 
in the society which they intend to govern they should be practical. In fact, the meeting 
point between what has been legally protected and what would be commonly practiced, 
is a critical interface which needs not be perfect but has to be realistic.   
A child’s right to participate in all family health-related decision-making processes 
that concern him or her is partly unfeasible because in instances such as critical health 
cases where a child is unable to give consent, in cases of emergencies especially where 
there is need for immediate reaction to stabilise the child and in cases of new born babies, 
common sense dictates that the best interests of the child prevails and that is generally 
without his or her opinion.127 It is equally crucial to recognise that these exceptional 
                                                            
125  The court in Esanubor strengthened the powers of the medical doctors to protect the child first and to 
avoid what happened in an earlier case. See Okonkwo (n 58 above), which dealt with the professional 
negligence of a medical doctor who had respected the wishes of a Jehovah’s Witness to refuse a blood 
transfusion and the patient had died thereafter. The Supreme Court of Nigeria held in this case that the 
medical doctor was not guilty of professional misconduct because in respecting the wishes of the patient, 
the doctor was acting in furtherance of patients’ rights to freedom of religion and privacy guaranteed by 
the (then applicable) 1979 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.  
126  See for example, Parkes (n 58 above), G Lansdown The evolving capacities of the child (2005), D Horgan 
et al. (n 123 above). 
127 G Birchley ‘Deciding together? Best interest and shared decision-making in paediatric intensive care’ 
(2014) 22 Health Care Anal 203–222, in which he adds that “it appears that a focus on the shared nature 
of a decision does not cohere with the principle that the best interests of the child should remain 
paramount”. 
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situations are very significant and extend to areas such as drug abuse, alcohol abuse or 
piercing. Unlike sickness which in most cases is natural, drug abuse, alcohol abuse or 
piercings are generally choices made by individuals which generally have health effects 
but not as dramatic as an acute health situation which, as analysed in this sub-section, 
does not require a child’s opinion for treatment. For example, in the case of piercing, 
probably because it is not a common African practice if not imposed by culture,128 it has 
not been directly protected or regulated by law. However, due to fashion and current 
‘contemporary’ choices, some children would opt for piercing either as a personal choice 
or as a choice influenced by their admiration of a celebrity. What complicates this choice 
is that, generally, children do not have a right in Africa to do as they wish with their 
bodies and if it involves a third party (artist), parental consent is paramount. In a nut 
shell, these are real instances where exceptions are likely to occur and legal provisions 
should not turn a blind eye but take them into consideration vis a vis the best interests 
of the child where the child’s right to be involved in family health decision-making 
processes has been or could be ignored or suspended in the child’s best interest.129 
7. Conclusion 
Despite all the challenges raised above, one aspect that stands strong in the general 
protection and implementation of children’s right to health in Africa is the role parents 
and the state play in assisting children to attain this right. Actually, these challenges are 
factual and to some extent expose the general implementation of children’s right to 
participate in family healthcare decision-making processes as not completely possible. 
No state has given its children a free passage to such decision-making processes. This 
makes the unfettered right to participation granted to children a frivolous act of 
generosity which will only come to fruition after a child attains a particular level of 
competence. 
Until such time, and again only in certain cases, and if parents and/or medical 
practitioners allow, would a child freely participate in family healthcare decision-making 
processes on matters that concern them. The position of parents and the state is fortified 
by the fact that both ‘institutions’ are expected to have before them the best interest of 
the child in all actions concerning a child and both have prescribed obligations – in the 
                                                            
128  See for example, EM Doh, Stereotyping Africa: Surprising answers to surprising questions (2009) 98. 
129  See for example, In MS v M, where Sachs J held: ‘Thus, in Fitzpatrick this Court held that “it is necessary 
that the standard should be flexible as circumstances will determine which factors secure the best interests 
of the child”’ para 18.   
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CRC and the ACRWC in this regard. As discussed in chapter five of this thesis, the role 
between parents and the state at times could face some tension and in some instances, 
they could be complimentary. Tension is likely to occur when both disagree on, for 
example, the best medical procedure that should be given to a child.130 The rationale of 
this chapter was not to discuss the scope of children’s right to health but to analyse their 
contribution in the decision-making process which leads to them attaining their health 
rights, especially at the family level. Worth noting, although crucial in this context, 
especially in Africa where it is commonly practiced, this chapter did not analyse the 
aspect of home-based medical or health care given to children. One reason for such 
exemption is the astute empirical methodology this might require, which in return 
might have led this chapter and possibly this thesis out of its flow.  
                                                            
130  This was the case in the Esanubor (n 49 above) and Life Healthcare Group (Pty) Ltd and Another (n 125 
above).  
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Chapter Seven 
NOT UNDERSTOOD AND NOT 
IMPLEMENTED: REMARKS AND 
CONCLUSIONS 
1. Introduction 
There is probably a good and persuasive reason for admiring and appreciating the 
protection of children’s right to participation both in the CRC and the ACRWC and its 
further domestication in the cluster of domestic laws analysed above in this thesis. 
Indeed, the recognition and protection of this right moves children from being passive 
rights bearers or recipients to actual rights bearers with the power to have an opinion on 
all matters which affect them, even in family decision-making processes. In fact, 
Krappmann, writing in 2010, asserts that children’s right to participation definitely 
contradicts the presumption that children are incomplete human beings with no 
capacity to make valuable contributions to decision-making processes on matters which 
concern them.1 Surely, one gathers from such assumptions and the arguments raised 
earlier in this thesis that it is arguably one of the most influential children’s rights and, 
not surprising, it is also one of the guiding principles of children’s rights. It precedes 
both the CRC and the ACRWC. Indeed, what makes this right a fitting guiding principle, 
as demonstrated in chapter two of this thesis and sporadically in other chapters, is down 
to its ‘presence’ in every other right allocated to children.2  
As demonstrated earlier, the right to participation as protected for children has an 
elastic scope; it is not absolute and not specific in terms of location or style of 
implementation. Simply, it applies to all matters that concern a child everywhere and 
anytime. This thesis has focused on its implementation and recognition in family 
decision-making processes on, for example, healthcare matters that affect a child and 
the role played by or the interrelation of the authority between the state and parents in 
ensuring that children enjoy this right at the family level.  
                                                            
1  L Krappmann ‘The weight of the child’s view (Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child)’ 
(2010) 18 International Journal of Children’s Rights 502. 
2  P Alderson ‘UN Convention of the Rights of the Child: Some common criticism and suggested responses’ 
(2000) 9 Child Abuse Review 440. 
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Based on the issues raised in the previous chapters this chapter, seeks to analyse 
whether the conceptualisation of children’s right to participation in both the CRC and 
the ACRWC successfully meets its intended motive. According to the provisions of 
article 12 of the CRC and article 4(2) of the ACRWC, and further scrutiny by Cantwell, 
the primary motive of children’s right to participation is to equate children - at the same 
level of competence in decision-making processes - to adults to have an opinion on all 
matters that concern them.3 Also, drawing from some aspects highlighted in previous 
chapters, this chapter argues that the protection of children’s right to participation is, in 
some respects, encouraging a model of an inclusive decision-making process within the 
family, which has not been entirely successful throughout the over 25-year existence of 
both treaties and not comprehensively possible in the foreseeable future in Africa. 
Indeed, children’s rights monitoring committees (Committee on the CRC and the 
African Committee of Experts), who are ideally placed to clarify the intention of the 
provisions of the CRC and the ACRWC respectively and specifically in this context, their 
implementation within the family, have unfortunately not done so sufficiently. The 
Committee on the CRC’s analyses to date, for instance, have been marked by a “striking 
parental and state party friendly” tone which unfortunately does not convincingly 
attribute an absolute right to participation to children as claimed in the CRC.4 At the 
African regional level, it is perhaps apt to hold that both the AU and the ACERWC have 
extended and strengthened the need to ensure that the provisions of the CRC and 
particularly the ACRWC regulating children’s right to participation are respected, as 
they have set firm targets through long and short term agendas intended to respond to 
any gaps in implementation that may exist over a period of time. 
2. African regional considerations, responses and agendas 
The “uncertainties” which surround the comprehensive implementation of children’s 
right to participation, especially within the family environment, highlighted in previous 
chapters, have not prevented the domestication of such provisions in legal and policy 
                                                            
3  N Cantwell was the Coordinator and general spokesperson for the NGO Ad Hoc Group throughout the 
drafting of the CRC. See also, N Cantwell ‘Words that speak volumes: A short history of the drafting of 
the CRC’ in 18 Candles the Convention on the Rights of the Child reaches majority 21, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/crc18.pdf [accessed 13 March 2015]. See also, N Cantwell 
‘The origins, development and significance of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child’ 
in S Detrick (ed.) The United Nations convention on the rights of the child: a guide to the travaux 
préparatoires, (1992) 19–30. 
4  See generally, Committee on the CRC, GC No 12. 
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texts at the national level in Africa. Rightly so, at the national level, discussions around 
children’s rights issues have transcended beyond legal and policy recognition to 
ensuring effective interpretation and implementation of existing laws. Worth noting, 
though, national challenges have not hampered the spirit of the AU and its organs, for 
example the ACERWC, in developing agendas that would respond to such challenges 
overtime.  
Recently, the AU has spent considerable time on developing agendas and setting 
goals, in its currently known Agenda 2063 for the Africa ‘we want’.5 Succinctly, the 
agenda lists the following “aspirations” for Africa: a prosperous Africa based on inclusive 
growth and sustainable development; an integrated continent, politically united, based 
on the ideals of Pan-Africanism and the vision of Africa’s Renaissance; an Africa of good 
governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law; a peaceful 
and secure Africa; an Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values 
and ethics; an Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of 
African people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children and an Africa 
as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner.6  
In paragraph 53 of Agenda 2063, the AU acknowledges the fact that “African 
children shall be empowered through the full implementation of the African Charter on 
the Rights of the Child”. These aspirations inspired the ACERWC to draw a similar, but 
very child-focused, agenda for children on fostering an Africa fit for children by 2040.7 
In its agenda, the ACERWC takes stock and prioritises future actions related to shaping 
an Africa fit for children on the following ten key aspects: The African Children’s 
Charter, as supervised by the African Children’s Committee, provides an effective 
continental framework for advancing children’s rights; an effective child-friendly 
national legislative, policy and institutional framework is in place in all member States; 
every child’s birth and other vital statistics are registered; every child is born alive and 
survives infancy; every child grows up well-nourished and with access to the basic 
necessities of life; every child benefits fully from quality education; every child is 
protected against violence, exploitation, neglect and abuse; children benefit from a child-
sensitive criminal justice system; every child is free from the impact of armed conflicts 
and other disasters or emergency situations and African children’s views matter. 
                                                            
5  For a comprehensive overview, see, Framework Document, Agenda 2063, the Africa we want available at 
http://agenda2063.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Framework%20Document%20Book.pdf [accessed 30 
September 2016]. 
6  As above, 29. 
7  See generally, http://www.acerwc.org/download/africas-agenda-for-children-rights-2040-english_version/ 
?wpdmdl=9752 [accessed 28 September 2016] 
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Interestingly, and very critical to the much-needed improvement to children’s rights 
protection and fulfilment in Africa, the ACERWC’s agenda is further divided into two 
parts: the understanding and implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of the 
agenda. 
Although these aspirations are necessarily interrelated, what is of specific interest 
to this thesis, is aspiration No 10 which, based on the context provided by paragraph 
47 of Agenda 2063, lays emphasis on the fact that “[i]n pursuit of a people-centred 
continent, all the citizens of Africa will be actively involved in decision making in all 
aspects”. This sets a target that all African children’s views will matter by 2040. 
Currently, this aspiration is a dream but it will be crucial that state parties to the 
ACRWC see to it that it becomes a reality by domesticating such targets in their 
respective national plans for children. This particular target is further simplified by 
eight goals which accentuate the short (states’ responsibility by 2020)8 and long terms 
(children’s right to participation is protected by 2040).9 Interestingly, all the goals 
expressly aspire to an inclusive protection of children’s right to participation within 
the public sphere of society, such as a dedicated and permanent forum of a child 
parliament, with the exception of point 6 under the long-term goals, which aspires that 
by 2040 “[c]hildren have the right to be consulted and heard in proceedings involving 
or affecting them”. This could be interpreted broadly to also include the protection of 
children’s right to participation, for example, in the private space (within the family 
environment),  
The limitation in this agenda in taking a firm stance on the importance of ensuring 
children’s rights and especially their right to participation in, for example, family 
decision-making processes is a probable lacuna in the comprehensive protection of this 
key right, as has been argued throughout this thesis. It should also be noted that, during 
                                                            
8  By 2020: States should have adopted national legislation to institutionalise and formalise a process to 
involve children in parliamentary processes and in the operation of child-specific institutions and should 
have considered the views of children and young people in the monitoring and accountability of all laws, 
policies and programmes affecting children. 
9  By 2040: Child participation, based on the principles of representation, inclusion and accountability, is 
cultivated at all levels; Children participate meaningfully in law making and policy adoption in matters 
affecting their interests, and are involved in the oversight of their implementation; Dedicated processes 
for children’s participation are in place, such as a permanent and dedicated forum in the form of a child 
parliament, or ad hoc forum in the form of a child caucus aimed at bringing forward the voices of 
children in these processes; At school level, child participation and leadership are cultivated by 
involving children in school management, for example in advisory student/learner councils; Legal 
protection is in place affirming children’s rights to assemble, organise and access information and to 
express themselves freely and Children have the right to be consulted and heard in proceedings 
involving or affecting them. 
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the 28th session of the ACERWC, the author suggested verbally and in writing to the 
ACERWC to consider including a specific target on children’s rights to participate in all 
family decision-making processes on all matters concerning them. This suggestion was 
received, considered and included in the latest version of the agenda now adopted by 
heads of states. However, the fact that over the years much has been concentrated on 
strengthening children’s right to participation within the public space, as has been 
argued in this thesis, is probably a justification why the ACERWC found limited 
justification and/or research supporting its implementation in the private space.10 This 
is yet another reason why this thesis is necessary, as it might assist future expansive 
interpretation and implementation of this right into the private space (family). The 
argument between the public and private divide on the implementation of children’s 
right to participation, and the importance attached to both spheres is a debate worth 
debating, especially because the comprehensive upbringing and development of a child 
demands a strong “partnership” between both divides.11 
3. Models designed to facilitate the understanding and 
implementation of children’s right to participation 
Children’s right to participation is one of the rights protected in both the CRC and the 
ACRWC that have benefited from proper or insightful designed models of 
                                                            
10  It should be highlighted here that this agenda was informed by and built upon the inspiration derived 
from numerous existing legal and policy frameworks which in many ways have also promoted the scope 
of children’s right to participation more within public space than the private space. These include: the 
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; the AU Commission (Department of Political 
Affairs) Human Rights Strategy for Africa; the African Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare 
of the Child Strategic Plan (2015-2019); the Abuja Declaration and Plan of Action on HIV/AIDS, 
Tuberculosis and Other Related Infectious Diseases (2001); the Africa Fit for Children Declaration and 
Plan of Action (2001); the Call for Accelerated Action on the Implementation of the Plan of Action 
towards an Africa Fit for Children (2008-2012); the Monitoring and Evaluation Framework to Assess 
Progress towards Africa Fit for Children (Department of Social Affairs); the African Union’s Social Policy 
Framework for Africa (2008); Concluding Observations of the African Children’s Rights Committee; 
General Comments of the African Children’s Committee; Millennium Development Goals (MDGs); 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); the African Child Policy Forum; The Africa Report on Children’s 
Wellbeing (2013); and UNICEF State of the World’s Children (2015). 
11  See for example, B Milne Rights of the child. 25 years after the adoption of the UN Convention (2015) 87–
90; P Parkinson & J Cashmore The voice of a child in family law disputes (2012) 89, 120–122 and J Sloth-
Nielsen ‘Seen and heard? New frontiers in child participation in family law proceedings in South Africa’ 
(2009) 2 Speculum Juris 1–19. 
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implementation from several scholars.12 However, similar to the diction applied by the 
Committee on the CRC, these models of implementation have been designed to enable 
children to participate better in decision-making processes in the public sphere and very 
little attention has been paid to decision-making processes in the private space (family). 
There are four commonly known of these models. The first one is Hart’s ladder of 
participation,13 which consists of eight rungs divided into two halves: the three lowest 
rungs are considered as “non-participation” and the upper rungs as “degree of 
participation”. Briefly, Hart supports a hierarchical model of participation. The second 
one is Treseder’s circles, which is adapted from Hart’s model with the exclusion of the 
last three rungs.14 Just like Hart, Treseder’s model of implementing and understanding 
children’s right to participation is designed to assist professionals, in guiding children to 
participate in decisions on matters which affect them as individuals and as a group. The 
third one is Shier’s pathway to participation15 which, similar to Treseder’s, identifies five 
levels of participation. These are: Children are listened to; Children are supported in 
expressing their views; Children’s views are taken into account; Children are involved 
in decision-making processes and Children share power and responsibility for decision-
making.16 However, Shier’s approach is different mainly because it is specifically based 
on the content of article 12 of the CRC, recognises that there could be challenges in 
involving children, and that adults may have differing stages of commitments. These 
are: openings, opportunities and obligations.17 The fourth model is Kirby et al’s model 
of participation, in which they hold that meaningful children’s participation is a process 
                                                            
12  See for example, R Hart ‘Children’s participation: From tokenism to citizenship’ 1992 (4) UNICEF 
Innocenti Essays 5; G Lansdown Promoting children’s participation in Democratic decision-making (2001); 
J Miller Never too young: How young people can take responsibility and make decisions (2003); L Lundy 
‘‘Voice’ is not enough: Conceptualising Article 12 of the United National Convention on the rights of the 
child’ 2007 (33) 6 British Educational Research Journal 933, and K Herbots & J Put ‘The participation disc: 
A concept analyses of (a) Child (’s Right to) participation’ (2015) 23 International Journal of Children’s 
Rights 167; and an expanded version of Lundy’s Model in Department of Children and Youth Affairs (2015) 
National Strategy on Children and Young People’s Participation in Decision-making, 2015–2020 (2015)  
22. Available at http://dcya.gov.ie/documents/playandrec/20150617NatStratParticipationReport.pdf 
[accessed 30 July 2016]. 
13  Hart (as above). Hart’s view was adapted from Arnstien’s 1969 model on adult participation. 
14  P Treseder Empowering children & young people training manual: promoting involvement in decision 
making (1997). 
15  H Shier ‘Pathways to participation: Openings, opportunities and obligations: A new model for enhancing 
children’s participation in decision-making’ (2001) 15(2) Children & Society 107–117. 
16  As above 110. 
17  As above. 
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and ‘not simply the application of isolated cases of participation activities or events’.18 
Their model, just like Shier’s, is based on article 12 of the CRC and is against a 
hierarchical model of participation. They maintain that children should be listened to in 
all matters that concern them, because it is only in so doing that their involvement is 
meaningful. 
Interestingly, during the progression of the last century or so, other models have 
emerged. The most prominent of them are Lundy’s model of participation19 and Herbots 
and Put’s participation disc.20 Between these models, Lundy’s model is currently the best 
known and this could well be because it precedes Herbots and Puts’. Although ‘recent’, 
traces of Shier’s model can be identified in Lundy’s model,21 as it also embraces a non-
hierarchical model of participation and is based on the content of article 12 of the CRC. 
Lundy advocates a rights-based approach that is non-hierarchical. She maintains that it 
is plausible and should be adopted in order to understand the content and context of 
children’s right to participation, not only because it is flexible but also because it 
highlights the importance of the impact and outcomes of participation. Because it is 
progressive and outlines a set of core principles of participation, the model has been 
expanded with a carefully drafted checklist adopted in the government of Ireland’s 2015-
2020 national strategy on children’s participation in decision-making. 
The similarity of Lundy’s model to Shier’s is stronger when juxtaposing Shier’s five 
levels of participation with Lundy’s voice model checklist. Both advocate a systemic 
understanding and implementation of children’s participation which is child-centred 
and purposeful. However, Lundy’s checklist is expansive and spans beyond the 
participation of children to include young people between 18 and 24 years of age. 
Indeed, just like the other methods, Lundy’s checklist is also structured to ensure that 
children are given the space to express their views; that their voice is enabled; that they 
have an audience to express their views to; and that their views will have an influence in 
the public sphere.22  
The most recent of the methods that have been suggested to assist in the 
understanding and implementation of children’s right to participation is Herbots and 
                                                            
18  P Kirby et al. Building a culture of participation involving children and young people in policy, service 
planning, delivery and evaluation (2003). Also available at http://www.gyerekesely.hu/childpoverty/docs/ 
involving_children_report.pdf [accessed 3 July 2016]. 
19  Lundy (n 5 above) 933. 
20  Herbots & Put (n 5 above). 
21  Lundy (n 12 above). 
22  See generally, Department of Children and Youth Affair’s national strategy (n 5 above) 22, which states 
that “This checklist aims to help organisations, working with and for children and young people, to 
comply with Article 12 of the UNCRC …”. 
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Put’s participation disc. According to Herbots and Put, to understand and properly 
implement children’s right to participation, it has to be analysed and approached from 
the following interrelated four main components: The purpose, the context, the relevant 
stakeholders and the mode of participation.23 They maintain and concur with Kirby et 
al’s model of participation that participation is a process rather than a static, once-off 
event. In arriving at their suggested model, they dissected the content of article 12 of the 
CRC, and extended their interpretation, rightfully so, beyond article 12 to include 
children’s rights related to their right to participation – such as their right to freedom of 
expression (article 13).  
However, unlike the other models of participation analysed in this chapter which 
are specific in terms of the purpose and whom the models are directed to, Herbots and 
Put’s model is purely an in-depth analysis and examination of children’s right to 
participate in all matters that concern them, through the lens of several disciplines and 
in the context of a cluster of rights rather than a stand-alone right. This is appreciated 
and very welcome in contemporary children’s rights discourse. However, in a nutshell, 
their disc is a tool intended to ease the interpretation and understanding of children’s 
right to participation and not a tool intended to ease factual implementation.   
Regrettably, the models discussed above fall short in the specific context of 
children’s participation in family decision-making processes, which this thesis attempts 
to highlight, as their structures and context are generally intended to enable children’s 
participation in the public sphere. The lack of a family decision-making dimension 
leaves these models one-sided, because a comprehensive understanding and resultant 
implementation of this right requires a satisfactory implementation both in the private 
and public spheres of society. The lack of this minor but necessary recognition is a sure 
                                                            
23  Herbots & Put (n 5 above) 167. 
 
Figure 1: Lundy’s Voice Model checklist for participation as included in Ireland’s National Strategy on 
Children and Young People’s Participation in Decision-making 2015-2020 
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missing link in the general interpretation and understanding of this right as it is 
protected for children. Indeed, the interpretation of children’s right to participation 
afforded by the Committee on the CRC considers family decision-making processes 
(private sphere) as given fora in which children must exercise and enjoy this right in all 
matters that concern them.24  
4. Children’s right to participation is like new wine poured into 
an old bottle 
There is a factual challenge in establishing a comprehensive model (which would include 
both the private and the public divide) of child participation. This may be even truer in 
the family environment and is likely based on the fact that the human right to 
participation, as is generally known, was legally first established in the CCPR.25 Indeed, 
over the years, article 25 of the CCPR has benefitted from thorough analytical scrutiny, 
interpretation and models of understanding by the Committee on the CCPR intended 
to address the needs of adult participation and not specifically that of children.26 
Historically, it is an old right, older than both the CRC and the ACRWC.27 It is a right 
that was first intended for adults and through the CRC and the ACRWC children are 
the “new” recipients.  
Neither provision in the CRC nor the ACRWC are copy-pasted from the CCPR; 
however, they have been tailor-made for children with “far too much expectations” to 
participate in all matters that concern them and parents and the state as guarantors. 
Despite this assurance, a culture of selective participation, weak participation or non-
participation28 is still widespread in family decision-making processes which is possibly 
due to the fact that parents do not understand why children should have this right, when 
it should be granted and how it should be granted, coupled with the fact that parents 
know that they have a cultural and legal obligation under the African human rights 
                                                            
24  See generally, Committee on the CRC, GC No 12. See also, Herbots and Puts (n 5 above) 159. As they 
admit that, “The scope of participation can be divided into, on the one hand, the private sphere of a child’s 
life, such as the nuclear family or relations between individuals and, on the other hand, the public sphere 
of a child’s life, such as school, (youth) associations and public services”. See also, Kirby et al. (n 11 above). 
25  See for example art. 25 of the CCPR. 
26  See generally, Committee on the CCPR GC No 25 adopted by the human rights committee under art. 40, 
para 4, of the CCPR. 
27  See for example CCPR (n 18 above) adopted in 1966. 
28  See for example, H Matthews ‘Children and regeneration: Setting an agenda for community participation 
and integration’ (2003) 17(4) Children and society 264–276. 
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system to direct and care for their children.29 To enable a relatively smooth 
implementation of both parental responsibility and the right of the child to participate 
in family decision-making processes, some scholars have advocated a child-centred 
approach to be adopted at the family level to assist parents in understanding30 this right 
and to enable children involved to have a say in all matters that concern them.31 A child-
centred approach is in tandem with the famous UN slogan “Nothing about Us, Without 
Us” adopted by the UN to promote the rights of persons with disabilities, which as per 
article 7 of the CRPD which protects the right to participation of children with disability, 
also includes children with disabilities.32 
However, having children involved in contributing to identifying possible 
solutions to all matters that concern them is only one part of the child-centred approach. 
The other part is to act on the issues discussed. Generally, children are easily 
disenchanted, if they do not see their suggestions acted upon without reason(s).33 This is 
the reason why Lundy’s insistence on the fourth stage influence is very crucial even in 
the family and should be understood so that children’s right to participation does not 
grant children an absolute right to make decisions, especially because such an opinion 
still has to be processed by an adult/parent “with power to effect change”.34  
This is precisely where the crack is glaring between this right as originally ascribed 
to adults and how it has been adapted for children. Generally, adults (presumed 
competent) exercise their right to participation with the intent to effect change, or have 
a say in the decision that will be arrived at; however, a child (presumed incompetent), in 
exercising his or her right to participation will have to “wait” for an adult to give his or 
her opinion due weight based on the child’s age and maturity before hoping that his or 
                                                            
29  See generally, Africa’s agenda for children 2040: Fostering an Africa fit for children, available at 
http://www.acerwc.org/download/africas-agenda-for-children-rights-2040-
english_version/?wpdmdl=9752 [accessed 22 September 2016]. 
30  Herbots & Put (n 5 above) 166–168, 170–180.  
31  See for example, N Thomas ‘Towards a theory of children’s participation’ (2007) 15(2) International 
Journal of Children’s Rights 199–218, U Kilkelly ‘Health and children’s rights’ (2015) in W Vandenhole et 
al (ed) Routledge International Handbook of Children’s Rights Studies 216–233, J Sloth-Nielsen (n 10 
above), Shier (n 9 above), Lundy (n 12 above).  
32  For details on this UN position, see http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/enable/iddp2004.htm [accessed 30 
September 2016]. This slogan was first intended to encourage the “… active involvement of persons with 
disabilities in the planning of strategies and policies that affect their lives. The motto “Nothing About Us 
Without Us” relies on this principle of participation, and it has been used by Disabled Peoples 
Organizations throughout the years as part of the global movement to achieve the full participation and 
equalization of opportunities for, by and with persons with disabilities”. 
33   Parkinson & Cashmore (n 10 above). 
34  Lundy (n 12 above) and Ireland’s Department of Children and Youth Affairs national strategy (n 5 above) 
23. 
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her opinion will be taken seriously in the final decision on a matter that concerns him 
or her. This classification (competency) is not prescribed by law (it is merely 
psychological and in some cases historically based on the perception of childhood, 
culturally linked to a child as an object to whom welfare is due, commonly practiced 
within the family), because at the core of children’s right to participation under 
international law, a child is perceived as able with a certain amount of power. At the 
family level, the law fails to clearly identify the limits or the extent to which a child’s 
views should influence a family (adult) decision-making process on matters that concern 
the child.35 It is this limitation that has made the search process for a dissemination 
pathway, especially in family decision-making processes, crucial.  
4.1. Children’s right to participation in the family 
Although most of the rights-based models analysed above have been focused on the 
context of the CRC and not inclusive or in consideration of the ACRWC, their 
tendencies could permeate a spill over into the African context. Historically, as has been 
demonstrated sporadically in this thesis, children in African societies are seen more as 
property to their parents who require support and care at all times, rather than persons 
with an opinion on every matter that concerns them. Granting children the right to 
participate in all matters that concern them and its further domestication in national 
laws has not changed much family-based classification of a child’s position in family 
decision-making processes.  
Indeed, the situation is further exacerbated by the lack of a clear approach or model 
of implementation of children’s right to participate in family decision-making processes. 
At the family level, such an approach should not be geared towards a complete 
eradication of traditional practices that work, but towards complimenting them. At the 
minimum, to ensure that there is a mentality shift in contemporary parental attitudes, 
behaviours, customs, skills and ways of parenting, it will require a baseline point of 
departure, which this thesis holds very strongly should begin with some form of 
education for parents to know how, when and why it is necessary to involve their 
children; to know how to grant children the opportunity to ask questions; and to know 
how and why to appreciate their opinions appropriately.  
It is also worth noting that the lack of focus on the private sector – family – in the 
models analysed above is not deplorable or hopeless at the moment, as might have been 
                                                            
35  According to Stern, the combination of ‘children’ and ‘power’ is problematic in a family setting because 
it would upset the social order especially because children by definition are subordinate to their parent(s). 
R Stern The child’s right to participation – Reality or rhetoric? (2006) 129. 
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painted above, because although it is true that the models analysed are deeply 
concentrated on facilitating children’s participation in the public sphere,36 they could 
also be adapted to suit the specific context of children’s participation in the private 
sphere – the family. For example, Shier’s five levels of participation jointly with his three 
stages of commitment could be adapted to train/educate parents in how to involve and 
give due consideration to a child’s opinion expressed in a family decision-making 
process based on their maturity. Also, it could be used by states as a checklist to check 
whether such steps were followed by parents in case of a default or when the state is 
asked to intervene. These are, in fact, credible possible ways of either redirecting or 
reshaping Shier’s model to fit a family setting. Unfortunately, however, such redirection 
might not be effective because Shier’s approach holds some rigid elements such as 
“children share power and responsibility for decision-making” which may not be 
completely accepted within the family, nor give much room for family dynamics. For 
example, at the African level, taking into consideration the example given in chapter five 
of this thesis of a child who makes a choice to have a piercing without the knowledge 
and permission of his or her parents, it would be challenging for the state to correct 
irregularities in such decisions, especially because most African states have no specific 
laws in this regard. In fact, it will be equally difficult to involve the child in a decision he 
or she has already made – probably based on his or her right to self-determination, or to 
fairly talk the child out of his or her decision, and equally challenging for parents to take 
such views into consideration at the expense of their obligation to be primary caregivers 
to their child.37 
In the context of this thesis, although it might have similar traces of a stereotyped 
process, Lundy’s model and checklist (figure 1 above) might also assist parents. 
However, just like Shier’s model, it might face some challenges at the point of influence. 
Indeed, ‘influence’, in any decision on a matter that concerns a child is crucial, because 
it completes the process and ensures the practicality of the right. It probably goes 
without saying that without having an influence, or having one’s view given due weight, 
any contribution from a child in any matter that concerns him or her has no value. 
Certainly, it is not completely impossible for a child’s opinion to have an influence in a 
                                                            
36  For further reading on what constitutes children’s participation in the public space, see for example, A 
Partridge ‘Children and young people’s inclusion in public decision-making’ (2005) 20(4) Support for 
Learning 181–189. See also, the submission from the CRIN to the Forum on Human Rights, Democracy 
and the Rule of law, Widening the democratic space: the role of youth in public decision-making (2016) 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Democracy/Forum2016/CRIN.pdf [accessed 8 
August 2016]. 
37  See for example, art. 19 of the ACRWC. 
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family decision-making process and this can be demonstrated by two examples. On one 
hand, a child’s view will have an influence and possibly be the deciding opinion, if such 
opinion is beneficial to parent(s). A fitting example is the case of custody.38 Indeed, with 
the exception of countries that practice the Shari’a law (for example in Algeria where the 
opinion of the child from a dissolved marriage is not required,39 but the decision must 
be in the best interests of the child),40 this is one area of the law and family decision-
making processes where children in common and civil law jurisdictions on the 
Continent best enjoy this right. This is because, although the law also considers other 
aspects such as the custodial parent’s well-being and ability to care for the child, it is the 
child’s opinion and the child’s best interest that the courts rely on first before making a 
decision.41  
However, the influence of a child’s opinion would have no bearing; in fact, if 
received, it could be discarded instantly, if parents think it is not founded on the family 
values they have indoctrinated.42 These are factual and practical fluctuations in a child’s 
influence and one of the reasons why a child’s right to participation remains an aspect 
of new wine in an old bottle – the acceptance and recognition that children have the 
                                                            
38  This is not an African problem, it is a global issue and a perfect example of selective implementation of 
children’s right to participation in family decision-making processes – see for example, N Taylor et al. 
‘Respecting children’s participation in family law proceedings’ (2007) 15(1) International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 61, 72; N Taylor et al. ‘International models of child participation in family law 
proceedings following parental separation / divorce’ (2012) 20(4) International Journal of Children’s 
Rights 645–673. See also, P Parkinson et al. ‘Parents and children’s views on talking to judges in parenting 
disputes in Australia’ (2007) 21(1) International Journal on Law, Policy and the Family 84–107, in which 
they hold that hearing a child’s view, for example, through the medium of trained experts is an accepted 
practice in common-law jurisdictions. 
39  K Filali ‘Experience in Algeria with the use of the CRC in legal proceedings’ (2015) in T Liefaard & JE 
Doek (ed) Litigating the rights of the child: The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in domestic and 
international jurisprudence 171. 
40  See, art. 64 of the Algerian Family Code 2005. 
41  Warshak holds that the two fundamental reasons for permitting children's participation in custody 
matters are ‘enlightenment and empowerment’. See RA Warshak ‘Payoffs and pitfalls of listening to 
children’ (2003) 52(4) Family Relations, 373-384. See also, Re: Salem Mukiibi and Ashaf Ssemakula 
(Minors); In Re: An Application by Hoffman Edward and Olivia Nakawungu Hoffman, Brother-in-law and 
Sister, respectively (Family Cause No 061 of 2005) ((Minors)) [2005] UGHC 30. Discussed in detail in 
chapter 4 of this thesis in which the opinion of the children concerned had much influence in the decision 
to give them away to foster parents - most likely because it correlated with their mother’s view. 
42  See for example, Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority & Another (1985) 3 All ER 
402; Esanubor v Faweya [2009] All FWLR (Pt 478) 380 (CA). For further reading on similar instances, see 
for example, C Bridge ‘Parental beliefs and medical treatment of children’ (1994) Butterworth’s Family 
Law Journal 131 and M Bekink ‘"Child Divorce": A Break from parental responsibilities and rights due to 
the traditional socio-cultural practices and beliefs of the parents’ (2012) 15(1) Potchefstroom Electronic 
Law Journal 179.  
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capacity to participate is not mature enough and would not be, in a great rush especially 
in the family decision-making process. However, the bottle (children’s right to 
participate) is old and deceptive. According to Sloth-Nielsen, it is something of a fashion 
item on the children’s rights agenda.43 Indeed, it is not the same, as has been interpreted 
and practiced over the years, as an adult’s right to participation. In the case of an adult’s 
right to participation, the aspect of “influence”, resultant from an adult’s involvement in 
a matter that concerns him or her, is crucial. In the case of children, the fluctuation on 
whose opinion directs or influences the stronger part of the decision arrived at in any 
family decision-making process, has been weakened by the low standard generally 
ascribed to a child’s capacity to make a substantive contribution during such processes. 
Generally, none of the models analysed above comprehensively permeate a change 
of perception at the family level; rather, they are structured to enhance the ability of 
public officials to give due consideration to a child’s opinion on public matters that 
concern a child or children as a collective. For present purposes, however, some scholars 
have submitted some seemingly convincing arguments as they attempt contextual in-
roads into private decision-making related to children’s private lives.44 In the opinion of 
this thesis, the most interesting of these are Thomas’s climbing wall model and 
Dahlstrand’s model. Thomas’s model identifies six aspects as crucial in involving 
children in making important decisions.45 These are: the choice a child has over his or 
her participation; information about the situation and his or her rights; control over the 
decision-making process; voice in any discussion; support in speaking up; and degree of 
autonomy. Dahlstrand’s model, based on the Swedish context, assigns three roles to a 
child in a decision-making process to facilitate children’s participation in family 
decision-making processes:46 the child as informant, the child as co-actor, and the child 
as actor. Röbäck and Höjer, writing in 2004, allude to the fact that Dahlstrand’s model 
goes a step further, as it allows for a child’s opinion in a matter that concerns him or her 
to be taken into consideration even in instances where the child is absent in person.47  
                                                            
43  Sloth-Nielsen (n 22 above). See also, J Sloth-Nielsen ‘Realising children’s rights to legal representation and 
to be heard in judicial proceedings: an update’ (2008) 24(3) South African Journal on Human Rights 495. 
44  See for example, J Thoburn et al Paternalism of partnership? Family involvement in the child protection 
process (1995) and B Franklin ‘The ladder of participation in matters concerning children’ (1997) in J 
Boyden & J Enew (eds) Children in focus: a manual for participatory research with children. 
45  N Thomas Children, family and the state: decision-making and child participation (2000/2002). For a 
review of this book, see also, E Munro ‘Children, family and the State: Decision-making and child 
participation. Nigel Thomas’ (2015) 29(4) Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare 166–169. 
46  L Dahlstrand Barns deltagande I familjerättsliga processer (2004). [Colleague’s translation]. See also 
similar analyses in, K Röbäck & I Höjer ‘Constructing children’s views in the enforcement of contact 
orders’ (2009) 17(4) International Journal of Children’s Rights 665-667. 
47  Röbäck & Höjer (as above) 665. 
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To summarise, credit must be given to all those scholars who have made reasonable 
attempts to facilitate the understanding and implementation of children’s right to 
participation. They have informed this thesis and enabled the development of a model 
which could work in Africa, and elsewhere, where families are broad, traditions are held 
to the highest level and parents have a responsibility to pass them on to the next 
generation. This thesis argues that a comprehensive acceptance and implementation of 
children’s right to participation in family decision-making processes, especially in 
Africa, should start with the acknowledgement that children are not equal to adults, and 
that families are generally construed on certain norms and beliefs that shape the specific 
identity of a particular family or community. These beliefs in most instances, as have 
been demonstrated in this thesis, are so entrenched that any attempt without recognising 
powers and balancing opinions to suit specific targets such as a child’s best interests 
within the family to usher into the family environment any ‘foreign practice’ would face 
resistance that would either delay children from enjoying this crucial right and being 
included in family decision-making processes or prohibit them partially or completely.  
5. The balance model 
Based on the analyses derived from the models analysed above, this thesis takes the 
debate further and suggests the balance model specifically aimed at targeting children’s 
participation in family decision-making processes. This model is based on a user 
perspective of rights.48 Generally, children’s participation can adopt any style to involve 
children in family decision-making processes. However, based on the context of the 
provisions of both the CRC and the ACRWC, and related national laws, the crucial 
aspect of children’s right to participation is that the result must be in the best interests 
of the child and no one else. In fact, international law pays little attention to who makes 
the final decision but requires the child/ren concerned to be involved in the process 
either directly or through a representative and to be meaningful. A meaningful process 
will allow children to ask questions and demand their views to have an impact on the 
final decision.  
Several scholars have argued that the opportunity to ask questions will, amongst 
others, give children the complete picture of why the decision arrived at was made. Also, 
it will give children and/or parents the opportunity to rethink their opinions if already 
                                                            
48  For more on the user perspective of rights, see M Baumärtel Perspective on the ‘user’: Unpacking a concept 
for human rights research (2014) 8(2) Human Rights and International Legal Discourse 142-159. 
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conclusive or to ameliorate them if still in the course of making a decision.49 This is a 
stance which the balance model analysed below agrees with. However, on the one hand, 
the model discourages a situation where a child would get into any verbal or physical 
confrontation with his or her parent(s) because the parent(s) refused to grant the child 
the opportunity to be listened to and to have their views given due consideration. On 
the other hand, with the assistance of article 5 of the CRC (evolving capacities), it 
encourages a fair and balanced perspective. A balanced approach will hold both parties 
(parent(s) and child/ren) accountable and permeate each party’s ability to give any 
acceptance or objection due consideration to enable a justified decision. This is best 
demonstrated in the form of a participation balance model (figure 2) to enable a child’s 
participation in family decision-making processes.   
 
(Figure 2) The balance model to involve children in family decision-making processes 
5.1. The balance model explained 
Protecting and promoting children’s right to participate in family decision-making 
processes through the balance model recognises the fact that children are not equal to 
their parents; that the traditional and customary superiority of parents as head of the 
family should be acknowledged;50 that children involved in family decision-making 
processes alongside their parents are main (make their own decisions) and co-actors 
(make decisions together with their parents when necessary) depending on the issue 
discussed; and that parents need to fairly assist their children in making decisions. The 
                                                            
49  See for example, N Lynch ‘Restorative justice through a children’s rights lens’ (2010) 18(2) International 
Journal of children’s Rights 171–173; U Kilkelly ‘Health and children’s rights’ in W Vandenhole et al. (eds) 
Routledge International Handbook of Children’s Rights Studies (2015) 226–229. 
50  It could also extend to child-headed homes where the leading child could be granted the status of ‘parent’. 
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model, as discussed further below, recognises the fact that the development of a child’s 
capacity to make constructive decisions is shaped to a significant extent by a child’s own 
effort with increasing maturity and assistance from parents; that parents are duty bearers 
and could make decisions on behalf of their child in the child’s best interests - especially 
in cases where the child cannot express his or her view on a matter concerning him or 
her; and that parents will be willing to allow a change in the balance at different periods 
as a child matures or can contribute substantively, irrespective of the child’s age. 
Crucially, the balance model acknowledges the fact that the state is not allowed to 
intervene in the family environment without persuasive reason and the intention to 
protect. The model, as proposed, encourages the state to aim at intervening especially in 
cases where the child’s views have not been taken into consideration, or where the child 
is being abused and parental opinion is not in the child’s best interests. The balance 
model also portrays (wishes) a state willing to accept a child’s view even when the view 
or decision is different from the state’s, but in the child’s best interests.  
Parties 
As indicated in chapters five and six, children’s right to participation does not grant them 
the right to self-autonomy. Although it grants them the right to have a view in the 
decision-making process of every matter that concerns them, it also suggests that any 
decision arrived at should be given due weight, according to their age and maturity. In the 
case of a family decision-making process, usually the primary responsibility to give due 
weight rests on parents or relatives with the legitimate responsibility to act as parents. The 
secondary responsibility lies with the state as a third force, if the final decision is not in the 
child’s best interests. The role of the state is recognised under international law and 
grounded on the fundamental role that the state has to protect its citizens. As a result, the 
balance model encourages a three-party role system, intertwined at different intervals 
ranging from involving a child in a family decision-making process to giving his or her 
views due consideration based on his or her maturity and not age.51 The model encourages 
respect for parental rights, safeguarded in international law and further domesticated in 
national laws in Africa, as demonstrated in chapters two and three of this thesis.  
                                                            
51  Note: children and parents form the initial stage - during family decision-making processes - the state 
only comes in if there are difficulties at arriving at a decision or the decision arrived at is not in the child’s 
best interests. 
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Components 
It is worth noting that the ‘tools’ highlighted in the model are interrelated, especially 
because each aspect feeds the next. As seen in figure 2, these are space [time], involved, 
audience [attention] and influence [due consideration based on maturity] required to 
facilitate children’s participation in family decision-making processes. The tools have 
been adopted form Lundy’s Model of participation52 with some modifications. The 
modifications made to Lundy’s model are based on the trend developed through this 
thesis to involve children in family decision-making processes on all matters that concern 
them. Further, this thesis argues that at the family level, the aspect of “space” should 
extend beyond providing a child a safe place to include the crucial aspect of ‘time’.53 
Indeed, granting children the space and time to express themselves also gives parents a 
better opportunity to appreciate a child’s views and for an inclusive due weight to the 
views expressed. The second aspect which this thesis builds on is “Involved”, the crux of 
children’s right to participation, which means that they are involved in decision-making 
processes on matters that concern them. Involving children gives them the opportunity 
to express themselves as they best can. Lansdown holds that a child’s expression of his or 
her views could take any form including voice, facial expression and art54 – as a result, a 
child’s involvement in a decision-making process should not be limited to verbal 
communication. The third aspect is “Audience”. It goes without saying that without an 
audience, in this case parents, the views of the child will not be given due consideration. 
As a result, this model insists on the fact that parents must pay undivided attention to a 
child, when he/she is expressing views in a matter that concerns him/her. Based on the 
issue at hand, this is the only way that parents will be able to give a child’s views due weight. 
The last component of the balance model is “Influence”. Just like any decision-making 
process, the decision arrived at is crucial, especially because, based on the decision, one 
could ascertain whether views of all the parties involved were considered and given due 
weight or not. Similarly, the extent of weight given to a child’s opinion in a family 
decision-making process can be measured based on the impact it had or did not have in 
the final decision. The weight of a child’s opinion, articles 12 of the CRC and 4(2) of the 
ACRWC, read jointly with article 5 of the CRC, dictates that it must be based on the child’s 
                                                            
52  Lundy (n 12 above). 
53  The difference with children participating in a public sphere is that such activities are – most of the time 
– planned and executed at a particular place, for example, children in parliament sessions. 
54  G Lansdown The evolving capacities of the child, (2005) 20. 
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maturity first, and not age.55 Indeed, as has been raised previously, a child’s capacity is 
often more a function of intellectual reach than physical years.  
Evolving capacity56 
The balance model gives considerable significance to the evolving capacities of children, 
parent(s) and, by extension, the state as crucial role-player in achieving a meaningful 
participation and to ensure that a child is not only involved in a family decision-making 
process but that his or her views are duly considered. Also, the model regards evolving 
capacity as a tool, not only incumbent for a child to strengthen his or her capacity and 
ability to reason, but also on parents to continuously strengthen their ability to give due 
weight to a child’s view. This perception is strongly rooted in the fact that parental ability 
to give due weight to a child’s view should continuously evolve as a child’s capacity 
evolves. Also, the model portrays the aspect of evolving capacity as the bridge between 
two fundamental divides (family as private space and state intervention) that might 
permeate or prohibit that due consideration is given to a child’s views. In fact, the gap 
between what is legally permissible, such as the state’s obligation to protect and promote 
the rights of its citizens and, what is sometimes customarily and legally prohibited, such 
as a state intervention into the family, remains an aspect of children’s rights 
jurisprudence that should not be air brushed or limited only to very serious violations.  
Legally, what is permissible and what is not permissible, especially in regard to 
parental obligation to listen to a child’s views and to give such views due consideration, 
or state intervention into the family environment, is pacified by the fact that the 
codification of article 5 of the CRC, and the specific inclusion of the word ‘appropriate’ 
does not give African families (parents) a blanket rule to willy-nilly provide whatever 
direction or guidance they hold as suitable. This is especially because what parents might 
hold as suitable in a specific context might not be suitable for the child in that particular 
context – thus the need for an ice-breaker, the state. The introduction of the state as a 
watch-dog – only on call in a family decision-making process, is one of the main aspects 
of the balance model; it encourages an unprejudiced parental view, it discourages pre-
decisions based on parental perception especially based on a child’s age, and it also 
                                                            
55  See also, ID Cherney ‘Mothers’, fathers’, and their children’s perceptions and reasoning about nurturance 
and self-determination’ (2010) 18(4) International Journal of Children’s Rights 88-94. See also, T Mangena 
& S Ndlovu ‘Reflections on how selected Shona and Ndebele proverbs highlights a worldview that 
promotes a respect and/or a violation of children’s rights’ (2014) 22(3) International Journal of Children’s 
Rights 662–664, in which they hold the view that ‘a child is not just a minor but can also be a majority’. 
56  See, chapter 3 of this thesis for the explanation of the aspect of evolving capacity. 
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acknowledges the fact that, at some point, a child’s views gain more strength as he or she 
matures. Most importantly, it helps to answer the following questions: 
The question of capacity and conceptualisation of children’s right under articles 12 of 
the CRC and 4(2) of the ACRWC 
This model argues that the requirement of a child’s capability to communicate his or her 
own views should not be restricted to verbal communication only. This is because 
communication, especially amongst some disabled children, and tiny babies, could take 
several forms, including art, body language, facial expression and action.57 It is this broad 
categorisation of how a child can/should express his or her views, ascribed to this right 
and analysed by several scholars, for instance Lansdown,58 which informs this model to 
approach articles 12 of the CRC and 4(2) of the ACRWC as children’s right to 
participation rather than their right to be heard as the CRC Committee captured in its 
General Comment No 12.  
Also, the model considers the influence of the evolving capacity and portrays the 
specific provisions as children’s right to participation on the ground that the term 
‘participation’, broadly, provides children with better ways of becoming involved in a 
family decision-making process. In fact, without limiting their access to ‘voice’ only, 
evolving capacity gives children of all walks of life, for instance, disabled, vulnerable or 
affected by discrimination or multiple-discrimination, the opportunity to express their 
views how they wish to. Indeed, the burden to enable meaningful participation only 
shifts to parents and/or the state, when required to give due consideration to any views 
expressed by a child based on his or her maturity. 
The question of parental ability to give due consideration/weight to a child’s views  
Currently, and this is not only the case in Africa, the ability and willingness of parents 
to meaningfully involve children in family decision-making processes is still 
questionable. Indeed, this thesis has argued that this is one of the challenges that 
prevent children from appropriately benefitting from the intention of their right to 
participation at the family level. Generally, parents can only give what they have or 
aspects from the training (parental-rearing) they received during their childhood 
which, at the time, had little to do with having a right to express their views in family-
decision making processes in Africa.59 However, because it is progressive and not 
                                                            
57  Lansdown (n 45 as above). 
58  Lansdown (as above). 
59  T Mangena & S Ndlovu (n 46 above) 660–670. 
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limited only to children, especially because it bears the capacity to recognise and 
encourage the evolution of parental skills, evolving capacity can improve parenting 
especially, in providing guidance and direction to a child. Also, it will assist parents, 
and grant them the opportunity to not only assume competence in children, but to 
listen to a child first and, based on the views expressed in a particular matter 
concerning the child, ascertain a child’s competence before giving due weight to such 
views expressed with specific aim at what is in the child’s best interest.   
The question of the child’s best interest 
It is an open secret that the aspect of a child’s best interests under international law 
remains a component in children’s rights jurisprudence which should guide and direct 
any decision made with or without a child for a child. Indeed, it also represents one of the 
strongest justifications under both the international and African children’s rights 
legislative and practical framework why it is necessary and crucial to involve children in a 
family decision-making process.60 This is telling, as some of the most significant and well-
documented African cases relating to or involving children have been decided chiefly on 
what is in the best interests, of the child.61 However, what really constitutes the best 
interests of a child has over the years been one of the most complicated key aspects which 
has, to some extent, made the understanding and implementation of children’s rights as a 
whole, some kind of a double-edged sword. In the case of ensuring that a child enjoys his 
or her right to participation, the evolving capacity of the parties, as portrayed in the 
balance model, grants all parties the opportunity to identify what is in a child’s best interest 
at a given moment. Also, it directs and determines the level of influence each party has in 
a given decision-making process at the family level. Under this model, parents have a 
correlative duty to ensure that a child’s best interest is attained, at all times and the state 
has an interest in protecting what is best for the child if parents fail to do so.  
                                                            
60  BK Twinomugisha Fundamentals of health law in Uganda (2015) 208. 
61  See for example, amongst other cases cited in this thesis, C.K. (a child) (through Ripples International as 
her guardian and next friend) and others v Commissioner of police / Inspector general of the national police 
service and others Petition 8 of 2012 [2013] eKLR, in which it was held amongst others that it was in the 
best interests of the child for the state to conduct a comprehensive and thorough investigation into 
complaints of statutory rape. 
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The question of African ethical, cultural and social family practices 
A considerable part of this question has been investigated and answered by an array of 
reputable empirical research studies conducted by legalists,62 sociologists63 and 
anthropologists64 across the African continent. Some of these contributions have 
informed the arguments and analysis in previous chapters and form the basis on which 
the balance model is structured. Worth noting in this context is the fact that 
fundamental African ethical, cultural and social practices are cognizant of the fact that, 
generally, participation in a decision-making process gives any individual or group the 
opportunity to have an influence on the decision that would be arrived at.65 With the 
assistance of the evolving capacity, the balance model introduces a child who is waiting 
for the opportunity to be involved in family decision-making processes on all matters 
that concern him or her. Also, it introduces a child who knows what he or she wants, a 
child who also knows that what he or she wants might neither be what he or she needs 
nor is in his or her best interest. Furthermore, the model introduces a rational child with 
moments of irrationality, because he or she expects that his or her parents will help to 
know and help to make decisions that are in his or her best interests. Indeed, as Mangena 
holds, “dependency is a defining necessary element of childhood, and children have a 
right to enter into it with trust”.66 It also holds that parents, despite their cultural ethos, 
know that the best interests of the child and not theirs should prevail in any decision on 
a matter regarding a child.  
                                                            
62  T Kaime ‘The Convention on the Rights of the Child and the cultural legitimacy of children's rights in Africa: 
Some reflections’ (2005) 5(2) African Human Rights Law Journal 221-238; T Kaime The African Charter on 
the Rights and Welfare of the Child: A socio-legal perspective (2009); T Kaime ‘Vernacularising’ the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child: Rights and cultures as analytic tools’ (2010) 18(4) International 
Journal of Children’s Rights 637–653; T Kaime The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child: A 
socio-legal perspective (2009); AA An-na’im ‘The interdependence of religion, secularism, and human rights: 
Prospects for Islamic Societies’ (2005) 11(1) Common Knowledge Winter 56–80. 
63  GK Nukunya Tradition and change in Ghana: An introduction to sociology (2003); A Twum-Danso 
‘Reciprocity, respect and responsibility: The 3Rs Underlying parent-child relationships in Ghana and the 
Implications for Children’s Rights’ (2009) 17(3) International Journal of Children’s Rights 415–43. See 
other but similar examples further afield; R Richter & U Zartler ‘Children participating in family decisions’ 
(2011) 32 Revista de Cercetare si Interventie Sociala 7–24. 
64  See for example, RK Hitchcock ‘Indigenous children’s rights and well-being: Perspectives from Central 
and Southern Africa’ in DJ Johnson et al (eds)Vulnerable Children: Global Challenges in Education, 
Health, Well-being, and Child Rights (2013) 219-223 and 225-232; RK Ame ‘Traditional religion, social 
structure, and children’s rights in Ghana: The making of a trokosi child’ in DJ Johnson et al. 
(eds)Vulnerable children: Global challenges in education, health, well-being, and child rights (2013) 240–
252. 
65  Kaime (n 53 above). 
66  T Mangena ‘Suffer little children: Zimbabwean childhood literacy representations in the context of crisis’ 
(2011) 19(2) International Journal of Children’s Rights 207. 
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The question of the state’s intervention into the family environment 
Although African states are parties to the CRC and the ACRWC, these treaties do not 
give the state an open access into the family environment. However, there is significant 
agreement [see chapter four and five of this thesis] that there are instances where the 
state, through its agencies for example, the court – should intervene into the family 
environment, override parental influence to protect a child.67 International law 
recognises such instances through the extensive interpretation of its accord to states, the 
responsibility to assist parents in the upbringing of a child.68 It is in providing this 
assistance, and the intrinsic nature of state obligation to protect its citizens that the 
involvement and influence of the state cannot be completely discarded in assisting 
children to enjoy their right to participation in family decision-making processes.69 
Parental evolving capacity should inform parents when to appreciate state interference 
and the fact that it is intended to protect the child and not to spirit away parental 
authority.   
6. Conclusion 
The legal and practical meaning of children’s participation and specifically their right to 
participate in family decision-making processes that has been analysed in this thesis 
offers an illustration of where the primary cynicism about the reliability and validity of 
children’s opinion has given way to a more dominant parental opinion. Parental trust 
and reliance on children’s opinion is still very weak and only becomes stronger as the 
child grows older. The reason for this, as has been discussed in this thesis, is based on 
the fact that decisions on issues that concern children could be complex. As seen above, 
it could require the logical mixture of medical, legal, social and ethical issues. In the case 
of children, it is difficult to sever or to isolate any of these, as what is ethical within a 
given family might not correlate with legal standards or contemporary medical practice. 
The participation models discussed above have, to a great extent, attempted glossing 
children’s right to participation by explaining what it is and what it entails and what any 
decision on a matter concerning a child should focus on. However, the models have been 
                                                            
67  Contemporary parenting is aware of such possibility especially because several African states have 
established ‘hotlines’ which can be used by any member of the family to invite a state agency – police - 
into the family environment to protect a child. In South Africa; 10111, Angola; 113, Botswana; 999 and 
Egypt; 122.  
68  This responsibility is visible throughout the CRC and the ACRWC. 
69  See chapter 5 for detailed analysis of state interference. 
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adopted to best suit such participation in the public sphere – the private sector has not 
extensively been explored. 
Reflecting on the practice in the private sphere in an African context with the 
assistance of selected court cases, this thesis has displayed the fact that although typical 
African traditional practices, legal and policy frameworks do grant much power to 
parents to ensure the well-being of children and to ensure their right to participation, 
such authority is only limited to the extent that its final decision gives due weight to 
children’s views in the child’s best interest.  
In assisting in the interpretation and implementation of this right, in the private 
space, this thesis has suggested the balance model, which to a great extent calls for 
parental education to include aspects of how to involve children in the decision-making 
processes on matters that concern them. While this thesis is convinced that the balance 
model proposed above is potentially applicable to various religious, cultural and political 
contexts across the globe, the author’s primary concern as an African is the prospect for 
this approach and model in Africa. In so doing, this thesis insists on the fact that such 
education should not be void of a fair consideration of the cultural and traditional norms 
which do not corroborate with the spirit and the provisions of both the CRC and the 
ACRWC on which most families are found. Else, a complete discard of standing 
traditional and customary values that are not repugnant to natural justice equity and 
good conscience could be an open invitation to resistance from parents.  
Reaching this point, building from the introduction provided in chapter one, 
chapters two, three and four set the stage by analysing legal, policy and institutional 
frameworks both at the international level and in specific national laws in Africa. Legally, 
it is the role of the state not only to ratify international instruments, but also to 
domesticate them, and African states have done impressively well in domesticating 
children’s rights as a whole and specifically their right to participation. It is for this 
reason that the introduction of the state as a third party – on call – to intervene in a 
family decision-making process, has been recognised in the balance model as bearing a 
watch-dog status. The model also calls on parents to recognise and accept the role of the 
state as beneficial to protecting children rather than arbitrary to family values. Indeed, 
chapters five and six have attempted to justify this relationship through the lens of health 
and medical treatment and, in the process, indicated the extent to which each authority 
involved in such decision-making processes has to go, but not beyond what is in the 
particular child’s best interests. In a nutshell, if the African community wants to build a 
society, through the lens of human rights and particularly the rights of the child to 
participate in all matters that concern the child, children need to be involved in current 
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decision-making processes both in the private and the public sphere not only to grant 
them their rights, but to also equip them to also grant the same opportunity to their 
children. 
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